501.BC Indonesia/9–2048: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1

secret
us urgent

815. Gocus 384. I saw Hatta at 1:05 p. m. today. He said morning’s cabinet meeting dealt with emergency authority to handle Communist situation. Night session would decide on USDel plan. He said RepDel would give USDel written answer tomorrow.

I told Prime Minister I cabled Department Republican communiqué on action against Communist uprising. I said while outbreak regretted, crisis gives Republican Government opportunity show determination suppress Communism. This should impress world at time when Netherlands Foreign Minister has stressed to us need for concerted action in Far East against Communism. I said Department concerned over Communist threat to his moderate regime. I added I would be glad recommend to my government practical ways to assist democratic non-Communist government of Indonesia oppose Communism. I thought first step should be get Republic and Netherlands quickly negotiating political settlement and soonest thereafter deal with Indonesia as whole in considering assistance.

Hatta hoped have Communist uprising Madiun sector quelled in fortnight. Situation is serious since Communists under Moeso control the two seaports on which Jogja area depends and also oil refinery. Half company Republican troops defending airport near Madiun [Page 358] with instructions destroy if overcome. Government fears Communists might land arms there from Malaya or elsewhere. Hatta said that Moeso pledged support from Moscow. Said coup Madiun means loss troops plus important supply Republican weapons. Said Republic seriously needs police force material discussed with US attache and now ammunition and weapons for use against Communists. Said Dutch should not worry over Republic receiving such material for use against common Communist enemy. Hatta expressed fear however that military might move into Republican territory as Republican forces move on Madiun. Said Republican Government now has strong support of population against Communists but this would fade if Dutch crossed SQL (status quo line). I assured Prime Minister that if peaceful Indonesian federation established Department would support extension financial help in which all states would share according to needs and dependent on capacity utilize shares of loans efficiently and on sound basis.

I said if favorable response given me tomorrow, I hope Dutch will accept promptly thereafter. Hatta confirmed my understanding that if Dutch accept before 25th, he will instruct Palar not present Republican complaint to SC. After both parties assent I said we would work toward improving atmosphere for negotiations. Once negotiations commenced we would expect reasonable changes at instance of parties but would insist through GOC on speedy consummation. Suggested each side prepare any substitute language it prefers in order actual negotiations can start promptly after acceptances received and draft becomes GOC working paper. I told him if Republic interprets Renville as permitting either party request continuation GOC through interim period and so desires opportunity would be afforded make such request in negotiations. I said acceptance should be kept confidential for present.

I reminded Hatta boisterous reception accorded GOC train September 1 had not perturbed us but that serious subsequent turn in situation makes desirable no incidents be permitted on our departure. He gave strong assurance.

Indian Consul Hogua called on Scott today. Expressed view his government would back Hatta Government in every practical way in struggle against Madiun group. He believed Delhi would ask Dutch release to Republic soonest quota of textiles GOC had earmarked for NEI. He hoped US and British Governments would find similar means offer immediate practical assistance.

In present critical circumstances he considered it of prime importance that Dutch not use Madiun situation as pretext cross SQL and that Dutch cease attempts capitalize on relatively unimportant matters [Page 359] which have lead to recent incidents and which have been enlarged in Republican public opinion out of all proportion their significance.

Although he refrained from saying he knew of existence of USDel’s draft plan, it obvious he did. Stated he had urged Hatta and Sukarno accept as basis negotiations [draft?] proposal suggested by any member GOC. Appeared convinced they would accept prior our departure September 22. Signed Cochran.

Livengood
  1. Repeated in telegram 463, September 23, 3 p. m., to The Hague.