856d.00/9–1748
Memorandum of Conversation, Prepared in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs
| Participants: | Dr. Blom, Special Adviser, The Netherlands Foreign Office on Indonesia |
| Mr. Butterworth, Director, FE | |
| Mr. Lacy, SEA | |
| Mr. Nolting, NOE |
(Following conversations between Mr. Stikker, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, and the Secretary and Under Secretary,1 Dr. Blom [Page 348] was invited to take up matters of detail with Messrs. Lacy and Nolting.)
Dr. Blom produced a written memorandum, called a “Note Verbale”,2 in which objections were raised to the procedure involved in the presentation of the US proposals in Bata via, and six major points were listed which the Netherlands Cabinet regarded as unacceptable “as a basis for negotiations”. Dr. Blom stated that a much longer list of objections had been compiled in The Hague, but that the majority of these items had been dropped on the grounds that they could be satisfactorily negotiated after the paper became a basis for negotiations. On the six points listed in the note verbale, however, Dr. Blom made it clear that his government considered that there must be changes in the US proposals satisfactory to the Netherlands as a condition precedent to acceptance by the Netherlands of the US proposals as a basis for negotiations.
The matter of procedure was again briefly discussed and passed over by the US representatives as having been sufficiently explained and adequately justified in preceding conversations. On the six points of substance in the Dutch memorandum, the Department’s representatives made it clear to Dr. Blom that if he intended in these conversations to present the US Government with a demand that the US delegation’s proposals be amended in the respects indicated as a sine qua non to Netherlands acceptance of the proposals as a basis for negotiation, it was necessary (a) that this be done in a more formal manner and on a higher level (inasmuch as it was not our understanding that the Netherlands Foreign Minister had laid down an ultimatum of this character in his discussion with the Secretary and Under Secretary), and (b) that in any event the Department was not prepared to negotiate in Washington any alteration of the US delegation’s proposals. Dr. Blom then stated that the same note verbale was being presented to Mr. Cochran in Batavia; that he understood we were not prepared to negotiate changes in Washington; but that, in his opinion, his Foreign Minister had made it clear that changes in the draft proposals in the six respects indicated were in fact conditions precedent to the acceptance of the US delegation’s proposals as a basis for negotiations. He then requested that the points raised in the note verbale be examined.
In the discussion which followed, it appeared that certain of the Netherlands’ objections might be based on misunderstandings of the relevant articles of the US draft proposal. These points, on which it seemed that clarifications of the US draft proposals might, without [Page 349] doing violence to the meaning or logic of the plan, meet the Netherlands’ objections, were the following:
II, paragraphs 3 and 4. Note verbale (attached).
The Dutch interpretation of state militias envisaged large bodies of organized troops under command of the individual state governments. We replied that we believed the intention of the US proposals in this regard was to have preponderant military force under control of the Provisional Federal Government, leaving to the states only such forces as might be necessary to maintain order and form adequate constabularies. Under the emergency provision we explained our understanding, subject to correction by the US delegation in Batavia, that all forces, including Netherlands troops, would be available to the High Commissioner. With regard to the safe-guard against an unwarranted assumption of emergency powers, namely, the assent of the President or Prime Minister, the Department’s representatives took the position that this is a point of substance having great weight in negotiability of the US plan with the Republic.
III. The Dutch objections were based on the fear that the Provisional Federal Government might have schizophrenic foreign relations, resulting from the inheritance of pro-Communist treaties and alliances from the Republic. We replied that our understanding was that the foreign relations of Indonesia under the Provisional Federal Government would be and, from the point of view of mutual interest of the US and the Netherlands, must necessarily be unified and pro-Western in orientation; and that we further believed that this was the intention of the US proposals.
IV. It appeared in discussion that the Netherlands’ objections in this connection might also be met by clarification without affecting the substance of the US proposals.
V. With regard to the exercise of the veto, it appeared that paragraph (a) in the note verbale was implicit in US proposals; that points raised in paragraph (b) and (c) might well be negotiated in a manner satisfactory to the Netherlands, but as now worded were too broad.
VI. Foreign Minister Stikker in previous conversations, and Blom again in conversations now being reported, emphasized the firm opposition of members of the Netherlands Government to the date specified in Annex 3B of the US proposals and stated that removal of this objection would be a considerable political factor in Holland. Our reply was to the effect that we considered the equities in this matter easily negotiable in Batavia and that we could not conceive of the US proposals being rejected because it contained the date March 1, 1942 on the question of assumption of debts.
On the hard core of substantive points remaining, namely, the holding of elections as the first step, the safe-guard against the unjustified [Page 350] assumption of emergency powers, and the broad exercise of the veto, the US representatives took the position that (a) there could be no alteration of a substantial character unless both parties agreed to same and (b) the Department stood firmly behind the US delegation’s proposals as both fair and practical.
Dr. Blom went into considerable detail in support of the thesis that without substantial modification of the remaining points, there was no chance of the Netherlands Government gaining the necessary two-thirds support in the States General; that, indeed, in a long cabinet session on the question, when the political possibilities were canvassed, it was suggested by certain cabinet members that a re-shuffle of the cabinet might enable the government to swallow the proposal with hope of parliamentary support, but that this idea had finally been abandoned as unworkable. In our reply, we made it clear that the acceptability of the proposals to the Netherlands Parliament was a matter which the Netherlands Government, of course, had to handle on its own; that there might in fact be no compromise settlement politically satisfactory to both sides; but that in the event that the Netherlands Government found itself unable to accept the proposal as a basis for negotiation, the US Government would be hard-pressed to discover any further usefulness for its delegation on the GOC; and that in the event that the GOC failed or the US resigned therefrom, such action would occasion reports to the Security Council.
In a further conversation the following morning, September 18, in which Mr. Helb, Counselor of the Netherlands Embassy, participated, approximately the same ground was covered and the same positions taken, with one significant exception. This was that Dr. Blom stated that his Foreign Minister had determined to fly to The Hague on Monday to consider with his government what could be done to make acceptable the heart of the US proposals, namely, the holding of elections throughout Indonesia in January 1949. The Netherlands representative referred to the possibility—in their view the probability—that Hatta would himself not wish to hold elections so soon in view of the danger that a majority of Communists might be returned to the constituent assembly and the provisional parliament. He asked whether the US had objections to the Netherlands delegation’s sounding out Hatta on this subject. There were no objections, of course, on our part. “We emphasized, however, the need for quick action in reaching a final settlement in order to counteract the rising communist influence within the Republic and possibly elsewhere in Indonesia.
The Netherlands representatives requested that, pending the outcome of Stikker’s conversations on Tuesday in The Hague on the major questions separating us, we [not?] inform Mr. Cochran of our discussions here. This was agreed.
- Telegram 431, September 17, 8 p. m., Usgoc 142, to Batavia, informed Mr. Cochran of the Department’s conversations with Foreign Minister Stikker (501.BC Indonesia/9–1748); details were sent subsequently in telegrams 436, September 20, 7 p. m., and 438, September 21, 5 p. m., none printed.↩
- Not printed.↩