501.BC Indonesia/9–1748
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
| Participants: | Under Secretary Lovett; Mr. Butterworth, Director, FE; |
| Mr. Hickerson, Director, EUR; Lacy, SEA; | |
| Mr. Nolting, NOE; | |
| The Honorable Dirk Stikker, Netherlands Foreign Minister; | |
| Dr. E. N. van Kleffens, Netherlands Ambassador; | |
| Dr. N. Blom, Legal Adviser to the Netherlands Ministry of Overseas Territories. |
[In his conversation with the Netherlands Foreign Minister immediately preceding the conversation with Mr. Lovett, the Secretary had suggested that the Netherlands objections to the Cochran plan be discussed in detail with Mr. Lovett and his technical advisers.]
I canvassed briefly the history of the Netherlands-Indonesian dispute, commenting upon the serious character of the problem, the great delays and the many disappointments which had postponed its solution, and the part which the United States was playing in the achievement of a final settlement. I pointed out that Mr. Cochran as well as the Department were determined that the growing Communist strength in Indonesia be contained and, if possible, eliminated; that we felt the Communist threat in Indonesia was both grave and immediate; that, in our opinion, the Communist threat could be met within the Republic only by Hatta since the intrusion of the Dutch in the Republic would, we believed, immediately polarize nationalism and Communism in a common front against Netherlands aggression. I said that it appeared to us that Indonesian nationalism must be accommodated in a just and practical way as a condition precedent to dealing with Communism in that area and that for these very reasons, Mr. Cochran had offered his plan in the most expeditious way possible in the belief that its acceptance by both parties would strengthen Mr. Hatta and his government sufficiently to enable him successfully to liquidate Communists [Page 346] within the Republic. I continued to say that since Mr. Cochran was functioning in Indonesia as a Good Officer, he could not impose on either side a solution; that, accordingly, Cochran’s plan as offered was, of course, subject to change through negotiation between the parties and that Mr. Cochran had offered the plan in the most informal fashion possible for this very reason. I asserted, however, that it was the view of Mr. Cochran and of every officer in the Department concerned with the problem that the plan as drafted offered the best prospect for a just and practical settlement of the dispute under present circumstances, and that it was the hope of this government that the government of the Netherlands could accept it with its essentials unchanged as soon as possible.
The Netherlands Foreign Minister said that while he regarded the plan as offering a reasonable and just solution to the dispute, he considered that (a) it had been offered to both sides in contravention of agreements reached between Netherlands representatives in Washington and Dept and between Mr. Cochran and representatives of the Netherlands Government in The Hague, and (b) it contained some six points which were either impractical of operation or entirely unacceptable to the Netherlands States General. The Netherlands Foreign Minister was advised that the Department in no way committed itself with Netherlands representatives to discuss beforehand any plan which Mr. Cochran might elect to offer to both parties, and that the Department had no knowledge of any commitments of a similar character entered into by Mr. Cochran at The Hague. The procedural aspects of the Netherlands objections to the plan were thus dispensed with.
After much general discussion, it was agreed that of the six objections put forward by the Netherlands, four, or possibly five, might be met through clarification of the plan by Mr. Cochran since it was the opinion of the officers of the Department that those objections arose from misunderstanding on the part of the Dutch of Mr. Cochran’s intentions. It was clear, however, that at least one point was substantive in character and could not be removed through clarification: this point was the one in which the Netherlands objected to the holding of elections throughout Indonesia in January 1949 as undesirable because those elections might be won by the Communists. It was explained to Mr. Stikker that the elections had been devised by Mr. Cochran as a means of solving what had heretofore been regarded as insoluble problems, namely, the holding of plebiscites and the establishment of an interim government of popular origin—a sine qua non for Republic participation in such an interim government. It was pointed out to Mr. Stikker that if Mr. Hatta, fearful of Communist successes in the January elections, were to agree with the Netherlands that such elections were undesirable, Mr. Cochran would, of course, incorporate in [Page 347] his plan any changes which were agreeable to both Mr. Hatta and the Netherlands negotiators.
Mr. Stikker was at pains to make clear that it was the desire of his government to strengthen Mr. Hatta and thereby to create conditions under which Communism could successfully be crushed in Indonesia but that he and Mr. Cochran and the Department apparently disagreed on the manner in which this should be done.
It was agreed at the end of the meeting that further discussions of the six objections raised by the Netherlands should continue at a working level the afternoon of September 17.