Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/9–348

Memorandum by Mr. James W. Barco, of the Division of United Nations Political Affairs, to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

[Washington,] September 3, 1948.

Subject: The Indonesian Situation

The following are my brief comments on the present situation in Indonesia. It is apparent from the recent telegrams from the United States Delegation on the Good Offices Committee and the Consulate General in Batavia that the situation in Indonesia is rapidly approaching a point at which it may well be impossible to accomplish a peaceful settlement of the dispute between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands Government. The principal features of the situation as it now stands are in my view the following: (I should like to note that the impressions I had at the time I left Indonesia on August 16, have been substantiated by the recent developments reported by the United States Delegation.)

1. The conviction of Indonesians within the Republic that the Netherlands Government has no intention, contrary to its public statements of transferring true sovereignty to an independent United States of Indonesia. Acts of the Netherlands Government giving rise to this conviction are:

(a) the Netherlands plans for the union between the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands, which would leave a large share of political control in Netherlands hands;

(b) statements made by Netherlands Representatives in private conversations to the effect that sovereignty in the United States of Indonesia would in fact be qualified;

(c) the participation in the present Netherlands Delegation and Netherlands East Indies Government of Indonesian heads of departments who, obvious to all observers, are Netherlands appointees without any real responsibility;

(d) the practice of the Netherlands Delegation of taking every opportunity to threaten to break off negotiations, resulting in the impression being widespread that the Netherlands is anxious for negotiations to stop;

(e) the continuance of an economic blockage of the Republic by the Netherlands in contravention of the Renville Agreement resulting in widespread hardship among the people of the Republic;

(f) the failure of the Netherlands to consult with the Republic on a draft act for an interim government in Indonesia (see para. 2 below). This act, as drafted by the Netherlands on the recommendation of the Bandoeng Conference, provides for virtually complete control by a Netherlands High Commissioner over the Government of Indonesia during the interim period prior to transfer of sovereignty and creates the impression that not even during this period does the Netherlands intend to relax its grip on Indonesia’s internal affairs.

2. The Republic has in no way gained by the disposition of the Indonesian case in the Security Council, but, on the contrary, has lost ground rapidly since the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement and has lost large sections of Java, Sumatra and Madura to the Netherlands. While the Renville Principles and the Security Council resolutions provided that the positions and rights of the parties would not be prejudiced, the large sections of territory lost by the Republic in the military action of July 1947 have in fact been developed as states with all the appearance of permanency and the heads of these very states and of other states outside the Republic have assembled in a conference at Bandoeng which was originally announced by Netherlands authorities as being of simply a consultative nature, but which has resulted in another definite step being taken for formation of the United States of Indonesia. On the basis of recommendations made by the heads of state assembled in the Bandoeng Conference, the Netherlands Government has taken action to have the Netherlands Parliament enact legislation for an interim government in Indonesia without consulting the Republic as to the terms of the legislation. In the Republic’s view this presents another fait accompli with respect to the provisions for an interim government. As a result, they feel one more step in the chain of events leading to establishment of a United States of Indonesia (without the Republic has been taken.

3. Coupled with the conviction in the Republic that the Netherlands does not intend that the United States of Indonesia should be truly sovereign is the fear that the Netherlands plans for the establishment of an interim government will enable the Netherlands to take military action against the Republic under the guise of restoration of law and order and reestablishment of Dutch sovereignty. This fear is strengthened by the continued reference in Netherlands official documents and statements that before any transfer of sovereignty, the Netherlands must reestablish its authority in the whole of Indonesia. In the opinion of members of the Netherlands Delegation this would mean mopping up dissident elements in the Republic by the federal forces of the interim government. To the outside world this might have the appearance of civil war, but there is widespread belief among neutral observers that it would provide the occasion for the Netherlands eliminating the Republic as a political force. The latest evidence tending to bear out this contention is to be found in section 8 of the draft overall agreement approved by the Netherlands cabinet as reported in Gocus 364, September 1,¹ to the effect that “as soon as during a period of at least 6 and at most 12 months under peace, order and security …”² a decision by democratic procedures will be taken with respect to the delineation of states within Java, Sumatra and Madura.

4. Present tension is daily increasing as a result of the continued failure of negotiations and especially as the result of recent actions by Netherlands authorities. These actions were the shootings which occurred when Netherlands forces recently broke up a meeting of Indonesian youths at the Republican headquarters in Batavia during the showing of a motion picture on the Princess Elizabeth’s tour of Paris, the seizure of President Sukarno’s house in Batavia which is the headquarters of the Republic in that city and regarded as a shrine by Republican adherents, and the decree of the Netherlands authorities that Republican Delegation members who have heretofore maintained homes in Batavia must remove their families and property to Republican territory. These actions have seriously exacerbated the situation, aroused new suspicions and animosities and have had the immediate effect of further postponing and making highly doubtful the resumption of negotiations.

5. As a result of the complete failure of negotiations since the signing of the Renville Agreement and the increasing difficulties of the Republic economically, the Indonesian people within the Republic are becoming increasingly discontented with the present situation and increasingly pessimistic as to the outcome of negotiations. The peoples’ discontent is understandable to any observer who has seen the conditions under which normal life is carried on in the Republic; where as a result of the restrictions on trade imposed by the Netherlands, large sections almost totally lack consumer goods. As a consequence, the Republican Government of Dr. Hatta, which as now constituted is somewhat right of center, is experiencing increasing difficulty in maintaining its position against the pressures from the left and the agitation of the communists. While communists in the Republic are estimated by neutral observers at 2,000 or less, there are some able communist agitators who are making capital of the natural discontent of the population, and it can be prophesied that if the situation continues to worsen communist influence will expand rapidly. The fall of the Hatta Government, which is almost certain within a short time unless rapid progress is made in the settlement of the dispute, will inevitably result in a Left Wing government and increasing disturbances.

6. The present Republican Government’s difficulties are increased by the almost complete lack of transportation and communications facilities owing to the Netherlands failure to lift restrictions on trade, so that one area controlled by the Republic is frequently completely out of touch with another area. As a result, when disorders occur within the Republic, the government may be unable to move rapidly enough to contain them and the situation is sufficiently explosive that minor disorders can rapidly spread into a conflagration.

7. The overwhelming sentiment within the Republic is pro-Western and pro-American and there is widespread demand for American technical and educational assistance. Most Indonesians understand, moreover, that the solution of the dispute depends largely upon the position taken by the American Government but at the same time these Indonesians are rapidly losing faith that action by the American Government will in fact be soon enough or strong enough vis-à-vis the Netherlands to save the situation.

8. The time left for a solution which will eliminate a serious communist threat in Indonesia and provide a settlement preserving the legitimate interests of the Netherlands as well as American strategic and economic interests in the area is becoming very short, and chaos may result in the near future from spontaneous uprisings or inspired disturbances in which the Netherlands will undoubtedly attempt to restore order, bringing about an inevitable resumption of military action.

Conclusions

1. The present situation in Indonesia is more critical than it has been at any time since military action began in July 1947.

2. The Dutch may resume military action at any time under the guise of restoring all law and order.

3. If military action is resumed there is little or no possibility that either side will be successful within a period of at least five years.

4. If fighting is resumed it will have three important and far-reaching results:

(a) It will continue to drain Dutch economic resources and keep essential Dutch manpower in Southeast Asia rather than in Europe;

(b) It will stimulate the growth of communism not only in Indonesia but throughout the vast populations of Southeast Asia;

(c) The Security Council would be unable to stop the fighting without the application of sanctions and Indonesia would be lost to the West both economically and politically.

5. The only hope for a present settlement lies in a more active role by the Good Offices Committee with simultaneous diplomatic pressure of the strongest sort by the United States on the Dutch.

Recommendations

It is recommended that:

1. The United States plan be presented forthwith to the Good Offices Committee.

2. The Dutch be advised in the most serious and solemn fashion that unless they give bona fide consideration to this plan and adopt an attitude which in good faith looks toward the independence of the United States of Indonesia, the United States will be obliged to take one or more of the following steps:

(a) Take the initiative in bringing the Indonesian case back to the Security Council pointing out openly in the Council that the Dutch have not been acting in a bona fide fashion nor in accordance with the Renville Agreement.

(b) Withdraw from the Good Offices Committee on the same grounds.

(c) Accord recognition to the Republic.

(d) Establish direct trade relations with the Republic.

1. Telegram 742, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 313.
2. As indicated in the original.>