501.BC Indonesia/8–1648: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
693. Gocus 353. [From Cochran:] Summary from departure Washington July 27 to August 14.
In New York July 27 visited Jessup, Noyes and Hyde.1 Jessup sought clarification revision Critchley-DuBois plan particularly on points he considered anti-Republican. With Noyes had pleasant call on Palar. Noyes and I received Naryanan. Noyes was to prepare memoranda these talks. I opposed Jessup’s idea of Department’s cabling Ogburn to explain to Republicans my Netherlands sojourn.
At Hague from July 31 through August 5, saw Eugene Black,2 large number political leaders including those of outgoing government and [Page 300] several in subsequently formed Government. Also talked with few Dutch and other businessmen, Belgian representative Herremans, retiring Netherlands representative Vredenburch. Appreciated immensely support given by Embassy planning schedule making contacts.
At Hague my conversation with officials led me believe Dutch thinking along following lines, that: (a) there is genuine desire [on part Dutch] to grant promised sovereignty to Indonesia; (b) disappointment and mistrust have followed failure Renville Agreement be implemented; (c) Dutch kindly disposed toward Hatta but doubt his ability enforce terms any agreement; (d) Dutch leaders practically unanimous that elections impossible before law, order restored; (e) Dutch see considerable benefit Bandung resolutions as coming from men with genuine nationalist aspirations; (f) Dutch Government has decided take cognizance these resolutions and work toward Indonesian federation into which Republic will be brought one way or another; (g) next steps after formation new government were to be consideration constitutional revision and passage amendment; (h) work has already commenced integrating ideas Bandung resolutions with so-called Batavia plan which Enthoven, Netherlands constitutional expert, had brought to Hague; (i) these ideas would not be formulated definitely until new government heads had opportunity to participate therein and progress debate on constitutional amendment had revealed opinion; (j) introduction act to implement constitutional amendment could not take place until above ideas had been formulated and submitted through Dutch to US for GOC study; (k) Dutch official opinion was so strongly fixed upon Dutch Government determining form provisional government and methods setting it up that any plan envisaging elections or plebiscite prior to establishing first provisional government would be futile.
Called on Van Mook evening my arrival Batavia August 9. Reviewed with him and 3 top members Netherlands delegation discussions Washington, New York and Hague. Tenth became acquainted with my associates and planned work. Eleventh, gave press conference. In response specific questions stated I brought no American plans; had some ideas and would contribute them as member of committee of 3; was an uninstructed representative; saw no reason for expanding terms of GOC reference beyond those of good offices at this juncture; was receptive to all ideas that can lead to solution including thoughts in DuBois-Critchley plan; desired take advantage all exploratory work done by predecessors and associates as we now make fresh approach to Indonesian question. I said my impressions at Hague were that Dutch would move forward with their thinking on Indonesia once government is reconstituted and I was not only hopeful [Page 301] that reasonable and happy solution could be reached but delighted have part present task.
I had not anticipated talking so much or so specifically as there had been leak which appeared in local press of August 7 quoting “well-informed Republican sources” that I was bringing new proposal from Department for solving Dutch-Indonesian dispute said to differ little from Critchley-DuBois plan, and that Department would press to reach agreement within 2 months and was replacing staff members of USDel with new men.
On August 12 I flew to Jogja for initial calls accompanied only by Gol. Mayer rather than by political assistants to avoid technical discussions. Cordially received by Prime Minister Hatta and Sukarno. Hatta gave small luncheon. Called on Foreign Minister Salim. With approval Hatta and Sukarno, received insistent press group. They sought clarification certain points made in Batavia conference preceding day. I followed same line.
At Presidential dinner attended by Cabinet members, military and other leaders, I had one important conversation in which I told Sukarno and Hatta of my press conference. I explained that I had been led to believe that ideas would come out of Hague shortly which could help us in resuming conversations in Political Committee. I said I thought political discussions should be postponed until Dutch advanced their ideas to GOC. I was not prepared to insert an American item on agenda for inaugurating political discussions and presumed neither Republicans nor Australian delegation desired revive Critchley-DuBois plan. They were in agreement no utility opening political discussions now but said were prepared resume whenever Dutch ready.
Returned Batavia 13th. Attended my first GOC meeting. Chairman Critchley raised question when GOC would move Kaliurang and length of stay. He was asked by committee to consult Netherlands delegation thereon with hope two parties would agree schedule. I told GOC of my trip and conversation with Sukarno and Hatta on resumption political discussions. I indicated readiness USDel proceed Jogja August 16 on invitation Sukarno to witness opening exhibit at Solo that date and attend national celebration seventeenth. All delegates on GOC will go. I said this plan and arrangements for moving headquarters temporarily Kaliurang should depend on understanding with Republicans that they will not proceed planned repairs Jogja Airport while we there since would destroy our communication system.
I called on Schuurman to give highlights Jogja trip. On fourteenth he said he had repeated my report Van Mook who desired see me. Scott and I were received by Van Mook and Schuurman evening [Page 302] fourteenth. Van Mook expressed opinion from reports Dutch conversations with us in Washington and from subsequent messages that USDel would submit plan to revive political discussions. I said I had gone to Netherlands purposely get acquainted with official views. From official visits there I had been led believe Hague would advance ideas shortly incorporating Batavia and Bandung thinking as edited by new government which they desired GOC to have before any new proposal set forth for achieving political agreement. Van Mook thought there would be no changes Dutch views as result change government and was restless proceed with drafting final arrangements by own staff unless USDel actually had plan as he understood for quick presentation. Strongly sensing that Van Mook would wish his plan be final proposal, I insisted that there be no plan or ideas advanced by USDel until we had received promised word from Hague as to outcome work being done there. When Van Mook stressed his conviction that work there was only on question of provisional government and that GOC should proceed, I was convinced he either not been kept well informed progress Hague or is as much out of line with official Dutch thinking as some Dutch officials Hague intimated to me. I held to my point that we should wait word from Hague especially since Neher will return Batavia about August 20 presumably with latest instructions. I feel that for us to make move prior thereto would embarrass Dutch officials Hague, resulting our ideas being opposed strongly by Van Mook and in final resort to his own plan. Once word received from Hague we can decide whether this is acceptable beginning and how it should be presented as plan or part thereof.
See Gocus 3523 regard revelation of opium traffic by Republican leaders allegedly under guise GOC travel on American plane and delegation train and USDel does not intend interfere normal course law on narcotic traffic but will endeavor with other members GOC prevent developments which might make travel from one area to another impossible and carrying on of negotiations difficult. [Cochran.]