501.BC Indonesia/7–2848: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
658. Eyes only for Reed from Ogburn.
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US Delegation respectfully suggests that any further efforts persuade Republic that SC is unprofitable locus for negotiations will do more harm than good. Apart from interlude surrounding US-Australian working paper, Republic has been consistently convinced US Government solidly supports Dutch. Republic equally convinced its only weapons against Netherlands are public opinion and needling by Russia. Evidence Department anxiety over reference controversial [Page 292] matters to SC will only make Republic more inclined refer such matters. Far from believing SC debates highly undesirable because such discussions could seriously prejudice success negotiations, Roem states frankly he believes they extremely helpful and cites as example effort to relax trade restrictions made by Dutch June 30 following discussions SC on blockade. Since Republic aware GOC alone helpless to produce political agreement owing inability reach agreement itself on essential points, it would have little interest in assurances of US Government’s determination to support GOC with every appropriate facility and would not even understand what that means. Mere fact that Netherlands intends resume full scale negotiations will also make little difference to Republic. Republic fully understands that actual locus for negotiating solution Indonesian problem is neither Lake Success nor Batavia-Kaliurang but Washington and nothing we can say will persuade Republic otherwise. What Republic wants to know is whether Department will assure transfer full sovereignty to USI in near future and support agreement whereby Republic will continue administer its own territories interim period without attempts by Netherlands troops to “restore law and order” these territories. Unless affirmative answer can be given both points, Republic will regard any US approaches with indifference.
Regarding GOC reports to SC, we may remind Department Belgian Delegation has veto power over all reports. We believe responsibility protecting Dutch position devolves on Belgian Delegation, for which task Belgian Delegation adequately staffed with Herremans, Bihin and Werrouys, although Herremans departed yesterday for fortnight Brussels. For past three months at least US Delegation has been reporting necessity Dutch achieve record here which will stand up in SC. US Delegation has also reported that Dutch appear take little interest this aspect dispute and rely on US to cover up (Gocus 245, April 24,1 and 261, May 10). We feel US Delegation cannot continue as in past to take initiative in assuring that GOC reports to SC will be innocuous regardless developments here and merits Republic case simply because Belgian Delegation does not wish assume this unpleasant task. One way or another, Indonesians will achieve independence. Their future orientation even now in process determination. We already greatly concerned by effect on Indonesians (who inherently perhaps most pro-American people in Asia) of line taken by US Government as they see it. Main immediate problem for US policy here is how give Indonesians incentive and means prevent duplication Indonesia of Communist gains in Burma and Malaya. Difficulties British in combatting non-nationalist Communist activities Malaya give good indication impossibility [Page 293] of Dutch successfully overcoming strong Communist threat, should such develop, if combined with present powerful nationalist government here. Hence we continue feel that confidence in US friendship and understanding on part Indonesian nationalist leaders must be strengthened at all costs.
Since early May, when our estimates situation began show clearly that premises US Delegation and Department policy required radical revision, US Delegation has faced increasing difficulties in following course presumably acceptable to Department since we have had no knowledge how Department intends adapt itself to emerging issues. We have had no comment whatever from Department on US-Australian working paper. While we assume Department had rejected our analyses situation, we have no idea what or whose analyses are accepted. Until receipt five telegrams sent July 23 and 24 we have had virtually no word from Department for past month. Statements by Jessup in SC to effect SC should not ask receive US-Australian working paper since it evident GOC did not consider its submission desirable, combined with secret instructions to us that Department unalterably opposed submission working paper, has put US Delegation in most awkward position relation Australian Delegation and Republic not helped by fact situation is of course transparent to both, putting US Government in extremely unattractive light.
While US Delegation continues in dark as to how Department views current situation or what action it proposes, situation grows steadily less promising. Attacks made Salatiga area reported yesterday’s Aneta by band from Republic area, plus our info attacks likely be repeated, tends substantiate US Delegation fears Republic may be beginning lose control situation locally and threatens maintenance truce that area. We have no way knowing whether status quo may be maintained for several months or merely for days. We must, however, repeat that time is growing shorter.
Please inform who on arrival Scott will be acting US Representative. [Ogburn.]
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