501.BC Indonesia/7–2148: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
636. Gocus 339. Negative attitude Republic at latest committee meetings indicates it has given up hope political agreement through GOC as currently empowered. We advised Sastroamidjojo and Pringgo Digdo we thought stalemating of discussion subsidiary matters by Republic was ill-considered strategy and would only put Republic [Page 286] in bad light. Latter denied this was Republic strategy but asked us see Roem soonest. (Roem now ill.) Former said there no point continuing talks indefinitely without progress toward political settlement. US delegation believes Republic has decided only SC action can produce settlement. Failing decisive SC action, Republic will brace self for renewed Netherlands military action. Fact is, without strong intervention third party, resumption hostilities appears inevitable. Question who is to govern Indonesia, which is basic issue, is beyond power GOC alone resolve. Under no conditions will Republic Indonesians submit to Netherlands authority. Cannot be overstressed that Republic has in fact been independent since 1945 and like any independent country will fight before accepting control by foreign power. Government would indeed have no choice but reject proposals which would subordinate Republicans to authority NEI Government in whatever form. Same time, Netherlands gives no indication being prepared abandon its aim of bringing Republic under full authority pre-federal government in which Netherlands will retain overriding power before considering transfer of sovereignty.
Recent news from Batavia and Bandoeng indicates Dutch proceeding with plan build pre-federal government without Republic, which is, in fact, virtually only course open them unless they prepared attempt eliminate Republic by force soonest or permit Republic retain self-governing powers pending formation truly self-governing all-Indonesian Government. However, Dutch are faced with serious dilemma. Despite talk of creating USI without Republic, Dutch cannot give governments non-Republican areas real powers without enabling such governments make common cause with Republic, which they extremely apt do. Other hand, if Dutch proceed too slowly in granting self-government, or even transferring sovereignty, Nationalist pressures in non-Republic areas may reach explosion point. Nationalist or pro-Republic feeling is unquestionably strong in Netherlands controlled East Java and East Indonesia (which is practically ready adopt slightly modified Republic flag) but greatest danger for Dutch is in West Java Pasundan state, of which both President and Prime Minister are Republic adherents and where popular support for Republic appears particularly strong. Unless Dutch prepared give into Nationalist forces in both Republic and non-Republic areas, military suppression of such forces would appear only alternative. Should restiveness non-Republic areas continue increase, perhaps requiring intensified military action West Java, logic would dictate advance on Jogja in effort cut off Nationalist movement at main source.
[Page 287]Appearances are that Dutch already discovering formation “loyal” USI even without Republic may not be easy.
While Dutch in difficult position, evidence indicates increasing strains on present Republic Government which has been unable in course 7 months obtain political settlement satisfying pent-up Nationalist aspirations. Government moreover is faced with increasing economic difficulties while with deterioration transport and communications equipment it must be encountering growing difficulties in maintaining administrative control all areas. Although Republican leaders continue display confidence, probably based on conviction they can make Indonesia too hot for Dutch in long run (which they can), it difficult see how present Republican government or Renville Agreement can long withstand these strains. Should Hatta prove unable control situation, only left wing elements, particularly elements which profit from increasing disorders, can benefit. Meanwhile, conviction of imminence further police action appears once more growing among peoples Republic.
Many elements immediate situation unclear. There appears remain however as constant and most dangerous factor persistent Dutch belief that if they can bring about collapse Republican Government through political and economic squeeze or drive it into hills by military force, Indonesians will turn to them, although analogies other areas leave little doubt Indonesian Nationalists would in such circumstances turn to extremist, including Communist, leaders and that Chinese Communists from Singapore would find abundant opportunities for exercise their organizational talents in ensuing disorders. This connection, every SC debate on Indonesia probably wins thousands new converts to USSR here. Sign now over main street Jogja erected by left-wing party urges adherence to Russia while opposes Dutch colonialism. However, owing western orientation majority Indonesian youth and intellectuals and Moslem faith population, trend to left may still be reversed.
Time running short. Present trends appear lead in direction increasingly unsettled conditions, resumption hostilities and perhaps eventually to chaotic conditions and Communist ascendancy Nationalist movement. GOC now apparently bankrupt. Quite possible no more committee meetings, except perhaps security committee, will be scheduled after this week unless situation radically altered by introduction some new elements. Will be increasingly difficult delay report to SC of complete failure. Signed Ogburn.
Sent Department 636; Department pass The Hague.1
- This was done the same day.↩