501.BC Indonesia/6–2848: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
569. Gocus 324. Re Usgoc 115.1 (1) First of six principles provides Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties and responsibilities on a provisional federal government. Our plan suggests Netherlands [and] Republic both confer same rights et cetera on provisional federal government at same time, which seems fair. This could be done pari passu, parties first turning over control currency to such government, then control armed forces and TNI, but we believe simultaneous transfer all federal functions by both would prove most workable. Incidentally nothing in Renville principles makes establishment provisional federal government obligatory or throws any light on terms upon which Republic would acknowledge its authority. Respect exercise Netherlands sovereignty during interim period, our plan envisages that Netherlands sovereignty as no less than that Netherlands would have exercised over Java–Madura–Sumatra under Linggadjati, with de facto authority exercised by Indonesia provisional federal government.
(2) Regarding argument that Constituent Assembly will be formed by Republic, this is true to extent that majority delegates will be pro-Republic because prevailing sentiment Indonesians is pro-Republic. Objection that Republic would be maintained in present position before Assembly meets is irrelevant. Under Linggadjati, Republic would have represented four-fifths Indonesians. Under present setup, Republic includes only two-fifths Indonesians, If Netherlands contention true that Indonesians welcomed relief from Republic rule as result police action, the three-fifths Indonesians now outside Republic could be expected elect anti-Republic delegates with Republic having only minority in Constituent Assembly.
(3) Reference to “constant intimidation on part of Republic” as factor in elections presumably refer to elections in non-Republic areas. Prevention of intimidation would depend upon (one) vigilance Netherlands law enforcement agencies, and (two) assurance absolute secrecy ballot and full dissemination information on secret ballot. We believe second means would reduce effectiveness intimidation to minimum. [Page 272] As previously stated, prestige accruing from Netherlands military successes and Netherlands distribution textiles, medical supplies and other goods and services should give Netherlands decided advantage in winning three-fifths Indonesia electorate away from Republic which, owing blockade, has so far had nothing offer electorate but hardships and freedom. Moreover, nothing we have seen here indicates Dutch likely encourage fair elections if this means giving pro-Republic sentiment opportunity to express itself. We believe intimidation by Republic agents will at least be balanced by various forms influence (not excluding police state tactics) exerted by Dutch.
(4) Charge that “plan disregards non-Republic Indonesians and non-Republic Indonesia organizations” not understood. Plan calls for provisional federal government elected without reference any groups or organizations. Division of Indonesians into Republics and non-Republics, fostered by Netherlands seems us as artificial as the Federalist versus Unitarians issue. Even Indonesians who would rather not be under Republic appear take pride in Republic as spearhead and champion nationalist cause. Schorr, who is least anti-Dutch of US correspondents here, states after return from Bandung that over half representatives non-Republic states he met are sympathetic Republic in varying degrees. (He also found considerable sentiment in favor US-Aus plan, chiefly because plan would bring TNI under control provisional federal government soonest and also bring Republic into provisional federal government, which they consider vital, visualizing day when, if Republic left out, Republic might wish settle accounts.)
(5) Criticism that plan makes no provision for maintenance law and order interim period can only mean that Netherlands Embassy envisages federal army (meaning Dutch troops) marching into Republic to put down irreconcilables. An Indonesian government which exercising real governing power and in which Republic fairly represented (as envisaged our plan) might conceivably request assistance Dutch troops in quelling uprising. Under any other conditions, further advance by Netherlands army will mean war. Netherlands with or without “Federalists” lacks military potential to impose stability on all Indonesia unilaterally. Its success to date even in non-Republic area is not too impressive, and if anything disorders appear increasing. Unless essentials our plan accepted, present condition law and order likely be most favorable Indonesia will see for long time.
(6) Our plan merely recommends parties agree shortening pre-election period to 3 months. If Netherlands hold out for 6 months, Republic would be forced accept. May be noted, however, provision for elections to follow from 6 months to year after political agreement [Page 273] was taken from Christmas draft message and was meant to permit free discussion vital issues unimpeded by presence Netherlands forces which after political agreement were to be withdrawn to July 20 position. Provision drafted by Graham. Out of context Christmas message, it has no particular relevancy and would only serve delay creation USI. Netherlands Embassy fear elections could not be organized in 3 months contrasts with holding of Madura plebiscite and West Java election under Netherlands auspices about 10 days after first announcement.
(7) Assertion that under our plan 460,000 Republic combat troops would be left intact can only result from misunderstanding. Reduction Netherlands and Republic forces would be joint. We believe Republic would agree reduction TNI to 6000 to be under control provisional federal government.
(8) All Netherlands Embassy objections appear based on fact our plan does not promise eliminate Republic or guarantee Republic elements will not dominate Assembly. So long as Netherlands thinking in this vein, discussion is useless. Signed Ogburn.2