Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

856e.00/6–2548: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

confidential
priority

Batavia, June 25, 1948—11 a. m.

559. [Gocus 322.] Re Department’s inquiry respecting Netherlands position in carrying out of Renville Agreement, following to be noted:

(1) Article 2 of clarification truce agreement states if truce increasingly implemented and general situation continues develop favorably, demilitarized zones will, as matter course, be further extended. While military observers point out demilitarized zones constitute economic dead areas and recommend against extension, both Republic and GOC have urged extension to ease atmosphere, arguing that narrow zones regarded by population as no-man’s land between poised armies and if enlarged would not be dead areas. Netherlands delegate has refused discuss, chiefly on grounds continued infiltrations by Republican soldiers across line. We believe illegal infiltrations inevitable so long as movement persons across line, particularly return of demobilized Republican soldiers to their homes, rigidly restricted, and that infiltration Republican agents for purposes espionage and political agitation also inevitable so long as normal political activities Netherlands areas outlawed.

(2) Article 5 of truce agreement states that pending political settlement, maintenance law and order in demilitarized zones will remain vested in civil police forces of parties, but that temporary use military police not excluded, it being understood police forces will be under civil control. Police in Netherlands demilitarized zones still largely under military control.

(3) Article 3 of truce agreement states establishment demilitarized zones in no way prejudices rights, claims or position of the parties under SC resolutions of 1, 25 and 26 August and 1 November 1947. In effect, Republic accepted truce placing territories containing half population Java, Madura and Sumatra under Netherlands control only on condition Republican claims to these territories would not be prejudiced by Netherlands action. Republic maintains, we believe justifiably, that Netherlands in setting up separate states these territories did not give pro-Republic sentiment real opportunity express itself. However, creation some form administration analogous state governments these territories was necessary if Indonesians to have opportunity participate in government pending final delineation states and we believe Netherlands action defensible so long as states so created retained purely provisional character. However, participation representative these states in Bandung conference, which official statements indicate expected lay foundations USI and union, and recent announcement that Pasundan state to receive full powers as state in USI seem to us substantiate Republican charge that Netherlands has failed live up to key provision Renville agreement. (This connection, Republic seems on solid ground in affirming its obligation not expand foreign relations derives from provision for maintenance political as well as military status quo of Java, Madura and Sumatra rather than from first of six additional principles which can become operative only when political agreement signed and Netherlands, in compliance this principle, able state interval after which sovereignty to be transferred.)

(4) Article 6 of truce agreement and 5th of 12 principles provide resumption trade and economic activity throughout Indonesia soonest practicable. After 5 months, these provisions largely unimplemented. Agreement has been reached permitting limited volume trade in vicinity demilitarized zones. Such trade of significance only to local population. Agreement in principles on opening main highways and rail lines across status quo line has had no practical results. As regards far more important question of seaborne trade (between ports, Republican controlled territory, between Republican controlled territories, between Republican and Netherlands controlled territories, and between Republic and other countries) Netherlands has in effect maintained effective blockade against Republican areas of central Java and Bantam. In Sumatra, long coastline and proximity Singapore has for some areas modified effectiveness Netherlands naval control. However, population south Sumatra seriously affected. Agreement for partial lifting blockade, initialed in subcommittee June 15 but not yet finally approved, provides resumption seaborne trade under agreed upon system controls. It will remain operative only 1 month, unless agreement on air traffic signed meantime. Assuming this obstacle overcome, practical results will still depend manner administration. Agreement specifies ships trading Republican ports must call Netherlands ports at least on way in and gives Netherlands right insist value each outbound cargo be balanced by value incoming cargo, which may make whole procedure unworkable. Regarding results to be expected, following to be noted:

(a) In past, Netherlands authorities, including Netherlands navy which appears act with degree independence, listed even cotton textiles as contraband. Republic May 8 submitted 23 page list of items it requested permission import, including motor vehicles, textiles, tools, road and bridge reconstruction equipment, electrical equipment, maintenance items (soil, paint, etc.), paper and printing equipment. Netherlands delegate reply month later stated it would favorably advise Netherlands Indies Government with respect 14 items, comprising only bicycles and road building equipment.

(b) Three days after initialing seaborne trade agreement, Netherlands navy informed Netherlands Consul General Singapore of fortnight suspension of sailing permits for Djambi, only important Republican port east Sumatra, in consequence Dutch patrol vessel being fired on.

(c) Ship now in Batavia harbor has been unsuccessfully trying since May 28 obtain official clearance unload cargo mapharsan (used in treatment yaws) consigned Inter-cross Batavia for use Bantam with assistance military observers although Dutch well aware critical need this drug Republic areas.

It only fair state that Netherlands regulations and Netherlands navy not alone responsible critical shortages important commodities Republican areas, but that in addition many practical obstacles to resumption trade are present.

(5) While full carrying out of commitments undertaken on board Renville could improve present situation no over-all change present difficult situation can be expected until agreement reached at least on main elements political settlement. No such agreement in sight. In Linggadjati agreement, Republic accepted establishment Netherlands authority over Borneo and East Indonesia in exchange Netherlands recognition Republican authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra. In Renville Agreement, Republic surrendered to results police action by accepting, conditionally, extension Netherlands authority over Madura and economically most important areas Java and Sumatra, although extensive areas, including whole southern part west Java, had been occupied by Netherlands through military action after ceasefire order. No Republican government will, or indeed could, in political agreement accept extension Netherlands authority over remaining areas Java and Sumatra, as demanded by Netherlands under its interpretation 1st of 6 principles.

Sent Department 559; Department pass The Hague from Batavia.¹

Livengood

1. This was done the same day.