501.BC Indonesia/6–1148: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
493. Gocus 302. 1. Regarding Dutch opposition presentation GOC suggestion political agreement as set forth Hague’s 342,1 following to be noted:
- a.
- Republic’s attitude has not stiffened recently on strength rumors impending GOC suggestion. No discernible difference in rigidity [Page 235] either Republic’s or Netherlands’ positions since commencement negotiations. Dutch plan “already agreed upon” has never had chance acceptance by Republic.
- b.
- USDel plan (Gocus 3002) will in sense upset Dutch applecart. USDel convinced however plan only way save Dutch apples, let alone American.
- c.
- It not true presentation plan threatens cut ground from under subcommittees. Political subcommittees have reached nearly complete standstill, Republic news bulletin justified in terming past two weeks talks “farcical.”
- d.
- Statement that GOC wishes modify Renville principles quite unfounded. Both parties have consistently taken position principles do not constitute agreement and will not take effect until political agreement based principles reached, Republic with respect foreign relations, Dutch with respect permitting freedom speech and assembly and announcing “stated interval” after which sovereignty to be transferred. Only deviation from Renville principles in USDel plan is recommendation period between agreement and elections be shortened to 3 months in view unexpected length time being taken reach agreement. USDel plan is only one suggested under which vital second of 6 principles, assuring fair representation all states in Provisional Federal Government, can be implemented.
- e.
- Allegation that USDel plan is less fair to “Federalist movement” than to Republic cannot be seriously intended by Boon if he be familiar with broad outlines plan, as he must be since plan has indeed been repeatedly discussed with Vredenburch and Riphagen.
- f.
- While it true there wide divergence views between Netherlands and USDel respect character Republic, we believe real crux of difference is USDel conviction that no solution Indo problem possible until strength various groups, including “Federalists”, assessed by expression popular opinion.
2. Boon statements contain several errors fact, including character economic blockade and some remarks attributed Dubois.
3. Very difficult believe present alarm on part Republic is feigned for political reasons, particularly view effort Republic move considerable part government to Sumatra. We believe it almost impossible gauge atmosphere Republic from distance. Republic jitters and lack hope based conviction that in long run armed resistance will be only alternative to acceptance Dutch demand that full authority NEI Government (however disguised) be reexerted over all Indonesia and is very real factor situation. With negotiations under GOC virtually terminated, every day increases pressure on moderates Republic and possibility incidents. Situation cannot possibly be kept in status quo.
4. These are among factors leading us make every effort get agreement GOC text our plan, which is only suggestion yet made for reconciling [Page 236] differences parties, unresolved since 1945, in terms what both claim they endeavoring achieve, i.e., earliest creation sovereign democratic Indonesia. While Herremans appeared initially disposed support plan, he voiced strong opposition after conference Riphagen and Vredenburch, who came up from Batavia for purpose. On June 9 plan was redrafted in some details to accommodate AusDel suggestions and adopted same day as joint Australian-US working paper. Owing my closeness situation here, I felt unable avoid responsibility for decision respect timing its submission. Accordingly after deep consideration all factors, I left Critchley to give working paper to Hatta June 10 and flew Batavia and gave Van Mook copy. Both in covering letters to Hatta and Van Mook and in my conversation with latter, it made quite clear paper entirely informal and would not be reported publicly or to SC unless parties unable reach agreement any basis and then only after any revisions called for. It also made clear Van Mook invitation to Hatta clearly implied reconstitution Netherlands and Republic delegations outside GOC, attention being drawn to Van Mook’s view that bridging gap between parties along lines followed so far would be difficult, implying GOC definitely in discard. Letter stated that we considered some contribution from GOC should be made if seven and half months effort assist parties to be justified, especially now that continued value GOC opened to question. I told Van Mook working paper might prove be GOC swan song.3
5. If serious discussions under GOC to be resumed, which appears problematical, working paper will at least give delegations something talk about, which they now lack. But chiefly paper should ease strain Republic, which has been holding militants, [FDR?] left wing, in line partly on strength possible positive contribution by GOC, and should postpone at least temporarily dangerous internal and international complications certain result should Republic conclude hope successful outcome negotiations definitely at end. Already dangerous drift inside Republic, new evidence Bandung conference moving to define future Netherlands-Indo relationship, unmistakable signs Netherlands delegation maneuvering GOC out of picture, and possibility incident any moment on status quo line convinced me no time to be lost. Signed Dubois.
Department pass Hague.4