501.BC Indonesia/6–548: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
342. Boon, chief political affairs Netherlands Foreign Office, yesterday called in Bonsal and told him that fact representatives aware Australians [Page 216] and Americans in GOC working on compromise proposal (see final paragraph. Gocus 2951) covering whole range problems has had result Republic has gotten idea now is time to become exceedingly difficult. Rumors on subject have appeared in press here. Bonsal verified that Boon fully aware both possibility such proposal and broad outline already repeatedly discussed with Vredenburch and Riphagen.
However, Boon said that communication proposed plan to represent [atives?] “upsets apple cart to large extent” and cuts ground from under subcommittees which have achieved certain results. He went on to say that Dutch so far really know little about compromise proposal, that it will be difficult for Dutch to go back on plan already agreed upon and reflected in Renville Agreement. He again said that method of handling present proposal had given advantage to Republic which becoming more difficult. He said that he had hoped that Department would examine Dutch proposals and express definite views thereon before permitting fresh entirely different proposal to be made.
Boon said that Dutch Government’s problem with Dutch public opinion especially in view forthcoming elections should not be underestimated (see Embtel 325 of June 1). He said that Dutch Government looks to us for guidance and support under present circumstances but he said fact that Dutch speedily accepted Renville proposals should not lead to belief that Dutch Government would find it possible similarly to accept any new proposal at this time. He evidently hoped that before placing Dutch Government in position of having to make decision Department would make possible full exploratory discussion of entire situation both in NEI and also in Washington.
Boon and Bonsal agreed that crux of matter is divergence between views of GOCUS re Republic as expressed to Netherlands delegation and those held by Netherlands delegation, Netherlands Government and bulk of Netherlands public opinion.
In this connection entire Dutch press from Right to Left except Communist supports thesis that USSR-Republican deal is crass violation Republic’s obligations and insists on satisfactory explanation. It would be difficult to find anyone here in agreement with Dubois (Gocus 2852) that Republic has done all that it should or can do at this point. However, Boon insists that Netherlands Government wishes to relegate this question to background (see Embtel 337, June 43).
Boon also referred to conversation between Dubois, Vredenburch, Neher on June 2 in which Dubois severely criticized Netherlands policy to date, stating that interim sovereignty question secondary as sovereign [Page 217] USI to be created within year, that Dutch could not ask dissolution Republic army and that Dutch working papers generally not realistic. Boon commented that Dutch public opinion which is very tenacious adheres to Renville principles and that GOC wishes to modify those principles largely because Republic refuses to implement them. He raised question of Dutch position vis-à-vis non-Republican Indos. He was also critical of alleged Dubois remark that Republicans only accepted Renville principles because Dutch were ready to move on Djocja and of apparent allegation that Dutch still threaten police action.
Boon remarked that he seriously studying possibility government’s making statement which would allay unfounded though actively promoted fears (for example Hatta and Soedirman interviews) that Dutch planning renewed police action. He said that Dutch troops in Indo had actually been reduced and he pointed out alleged general mobilization order on Republicans side. He said that it was difficult for Dutch Government, under circumstances being created by Republic, to bind itself under no circumstances to use Dutch Army but that his thinking was along lines of announcement that during definite period no action contemplated. However, he stressed that all this was still under consideration.
In discussing non-Republican Indo movements, Boon said fact Dutch had not interfered in election Republican president in Pasoendan should demonstrate Dutch interest in expression popular will. He said there are other similar instances.
Boon referred to previous conversation with Bonsal in which question of blockade, medical supplies and general economic conditions in Republic had been touched upon. He indicated that he realized importance these aspects and said proposal in preparation. However, he blamed Republic for existence deplorable conditions their territory and stated Dutch blockade applied only to estate produce and stocks to which Republic had no title, adding that native producer is being grossly swindled by middlemen (Republican officials and others). Boon stressed favorable impression economic developments non-Republican areas.
Embassy has noted with regret GOCUS reports Vredenburch’s tactlessness and lack self-control. However, both Dept and GOCUS undoubtedly understand that position Dutch Govt depends on fundamental factors including attitude political parties here and their democratically elected representatives. Idea that there is in fact a non-Republican Indo federalist movement which deserves at least as much if not more consideration that [than] Republic deeply rooted in Dutch thinking. While GOCUS recent proposals undoubtedly have great [Page 218] merit they will require careful study both in Batavia and Hague especially as they introduce profound edification [modification] during interim period of Dutch conception Linggadjati and Renville Agreements.
Before definitive proposals are made, might it not perhaps be helpful to have consultation in Dept with representatives GOCUS and this Embassy present? Embassy agree with GOCUS that this will be our last chance to get favorable settlement through agreement of parties and our proposal should contemplate all pertinent factors.4
Dept pass Batavia.5
- Telegram 462, June 2, p. 207.↩
- Telegram 441, May 29, p. 193.↩
- Not printed.↩
- In telegram 247, June 8, 6 p. m., to Batavia, “Eyes alone duBois from Butterworth”, the latter stated: “For some time I have imagined that you might like to have a brief visit home and now that suggestion has been put forward in last para Hague’s 342, June 5, Hickerson and I would like to have your reaction thereto. We could instruct Bonsal to fly here for consultation with you.” It was added that during the possible absence of the chief Netherlands and U.S. delegates, GOC negotiations would not be pressed. (501.BC Indonesia/8–548)↩
- This was done on June 6.↩