Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/6–148: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

confidential
us urgent

Batavia, June 1, 1948—6 p. m.
[Received June 3—11 a. m.]

459. Gocus 292. Further to Gocus 275,¹ USDel in talk with Riphagen few days ago stressed importance formation provisional federal government on basis elections as offering perhaps only hope political agreement. In course talk we advanced basic argument set forth Gocus 275. Riphagen held to Netherlands delegation position which as set forth working paper on defense is that “demobilization Republic military forces will have to take place gradually according schedule to be agreed upon and will have to be completed some time before delineation states either by plebiscite or other method. For it need not be argued there can be no question of truly free expression popular will as long as considerable, partly irregular fighting formations prevent return normal conditions”. He said he unable see Republic objection accepting control provisional federal government and recognizing Netherlands sovereignty for short period, and maintained elections quite impossible so long as freedom ballot could not be guaranteed Republic areas. We replied as follows:

1. Provisional federal government as envisaged oral note (Gocus 289²), in which members would be appointed by lieutenant governor general who in addition would exercise absolute power, seemed to us nothing more than NEI Government. We could not conceive Republic surrendering two pages of powers listed oral note to Government whose cut-and-out Dutch character would not be altered by circumscribed and minority participation Republic.

2. Netherlands concept interim period envisaged restraints upon Republic such as no revolutionary movement could be expected endure, particularly one which had successfully exercised full powers government over tens millions people for nearly three years. If Republic forced accept Netherlands terms, we believe that by time Netherlands considered “normal conditions” restored and “truly free expression popular will” possible, Republic would not be left to take part since Republic leaders, apart from those who had alienated selves from Republic movement by agreeing Dutch terms, would hence be dependent Dutch support, would all be dead, in jail, or in hills. (However, we did not believe restoration normal conditions in Netherlands sense possible.)

3. Sovereignty in our view implied obligations as well as rights, and that in preparing Indonesians for independence Netherlands had paramount obligation allow Indonesian peoples find their own leadership and avenues political expression, and allow Indonesian political groups achieve equilibrium, without employment Netherlands Armed Force, to weigh one side against an otherwise independent USI [which?] would fall heir unresolved and dangerous conflicts. However, we convinced Netherlands post-war policy had been to oppose Republic movement by every means and to give every encouragement to anti-Republic elements. In circumstances, we considered it not remarkable Republic balked at accepting reimplementation Netherlands sovereignty over all Indonesia.

4. Formation representative Indonesian Government seemed to us sine qua non any real progress toward settlement political issues. Since no alternative to elections appeared exist as means obtaining true representation, we believed parties should forthwith concentrate efforts on evolving methods assuring secret ballot, reduction unwarrantable influences to minimum and conduct electioneering. Seasonably satisfactory solution these problems, which we considered not impossible, would largely meet argument that “Federalists” would have no chance in Republic areas. Any event, we believed Netherlands had already won major concession from Republic in obtaining confirmation its control over territories containing three-fifths Indonesian voters. Moreover, we convinced great majority Indonesian brains were in Republic and that firm basis Netherlands-Republic cooperation not difficult obtain.

Consequently we saw no reason for Netherlands trepidation at prospect provisional federal government dominated by Republican parties, especially since Republican elements seemed far more able than any other groups assure coherent administration Indonesia.

Riphagen conceded majority of capable Indonesians in Republic and that any elected Indonesian assembly likely contain majority Republicans but was adamant other points.

USDel recently sounded out Pringgo Digdo on possibility satisfactory general election on regency basis under present conditions. Pringgo Digdo thought that if GOC observation assured, election should present no great problems and appeared imply that if held under such observation Republic would accept verdict. He said only obstacle electioneering Republic areas by anti-Republic speakers would be “moral pressure” which he conceded would be virtually prohibitory. However, TNI would guarantee security anyone who wished speak. He admitted general election in Republic would have undesirable consequences sharpening party conflicts but said this would certainly not be overriding consideration.

USDel has also discussed with AusDel details of possible election procedure. AusDel convinced that while election would not be models it offers only solution present impasse which parties might reasonably be expected accept and that there no reason it could not be conducted with adequate smoothness and prospect achieving far closer approximation true representation Indonesians than any other method. We hold same view. Critchley believes participation Republicans in pre-federal government in interval prior elections would raise more problems than it would solve.

We also now seriously question practicality attempting install Republican representatives in any pre-federal government prior formation elected provisional federal government, believing arrangements requiring would be too complicated and distracting to be justified for short period, furthermore that question jurisdiction such government over Republic would be thorny problem. We believe major efforts this period should be rather toward closer cooperation between parties, particularly in economic field and toward preparation integration Republic with other Indonesian areas following formation provisional federal government.

After further thought, USDel believes that if additional difficult negotiations and possible deadlocks to be avoided, political agreement should cover whole future Netherlands-Indonesian relationship and hence should incorporate final draft union statute rather than mere principles for subsequent elucidation by roundtable conference. While it true that Republic will not exist as such after institution provisional federal government and that there no other organization now existing which could be bound by agreement following institution such government, nevertheless Netherlands, in agreement with Republic, could legitimately reserve all rights regarding transfer sovereignty should Constituent Assembly refuse ratify union statute as contained political agreement. We consider such provision essential safeguard Netherlands interests.

Amending and amplifying plan outlined Gocus 275, we propose following schedule phases leading creation USI:

I. Pre-Election Period

A. To be no more than 3 months, subject Technical Commission reaching agreement on delineation states.

B. Republic to retain responsibility for security areas under its control, TNI continuing in existence.

C. Republic foreign relations to be frozen with technical status its representatives perhaps being altered.

D. Parties to establish following joint bodies, among others: (1) Electoral commission charged with making preparations for elections; (2) reconstruction board, charged with duty expediting restoration non-Indonesian private properties Republic areas to owners and opening of Republic areas to trade and commerce; (3) Preparatory Commission to plan integration Republic fiscal and monetary systems and Republic administration (so far as it includes federal functions) into provisional federal system; (4) Defense Commission, including joint staff, to carry out progressive partial demobilization armed forces both parties and plan integration TNI into defense forces provisional federal army; Technical Commission to delineate states.

II. Provisional Federal Government

A. Elections to be held throughout all Indonesia for delegates to Constituent Assembly with regencies or equivalent areas as electoral districts without regard present state boundaries.

B. Constituent Assembly as provisional parliament to form provisional federal government, which will replace March 9 government.

C. Netherlands to transfer to provisional federal government full powers self-government and Republic to transfer control TNI, foreign relations, currency and other federal functions.

D. Lieutenant Governor General to exercise veto power over action provisional federal government only within agreed limits and not over Constituent Assembly in exercise functions enumerated below.

E. Constituent Assembly to: (1) ratify delineation states; (2) draft constitution USI; (3) ratify union statute; (4) provide for elections in accordance constitutional provisions.

F. Provisional state governments to be formed, probably through election of officials by delegates to Constitutional Assembly from regencies included in states.

III. Creation USI

A. USI to be considered formed and to seek full diplomatic representation abroad and membership UN and allied international bodies after steps in subparagraph “E” above complete and constitution ratified by representatives of majority states in Constituent Assembly. (States unwilling ratify may seek special relationship with Netherlands and USI.)

After close consideration whole problem political agreement, USDel now considers that plan along lines above offers virtually only hope early, peaceful formation USI: While plan admittedly would be gamble, we believe odds favor its success, whereas indications are that over-all Dutch plan, which depends wringing further and vital concessions from Republic and virtual restoration pre-war NEI Government interim period without serving any essential objective, is almost certain lead to catastrophe. We believe US should press for Dutch acceptance in GOC and Washington and Hague, and if ultimately necessary even in SC, in order clearly dissociate US from responsibility debacle which appears unavoidable should Dutch refuse abandon their plan and which will irreparably damage US prestige throughout Far East unless our position clearly manifested.

We believe announcement Netherlands acceptance plan to grant full powers self-government to elected Indonesian Government in accordance program outlined would instantly transform atmosphere here and that evidence Netherlands intention carry out plan in wholehearted spirit would cause Indonesian confidence to soar for first time since September 1945, and provide firmest possible basis lasting attitude cooperation on part Indonesians toward Dutch. Moreover, we believe under these conditions Indonesia not incapable providing pro-western, stabilizing influence of greatest importance all southeast Asia.

In absence contrary instructions from Department, we shall endeavor get agreement GOC on plan and also on other areas political agreement covered AusDel working paper (Gocus 282³) in order go before parties with complete proposals.

If Department disapproves plan, USDel frankly at loss know what suggest.

Department pass Hague.⁴

Livengood

1. Telegram 418, May 21, p. 178.
2. Telegram 446, May 31, p. 200.
3. Telegram 436, May 26, not printed.
4. This was done on June 3.