501.BC Indonesia/5–2848: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
319. Embassy has followed with closest interest recent exchanges between Department and GOCUS re state of negotiations between Netherlands and Republic (Gocus 275 May 21 and Usgoc 100 and 101 May 14 and May 21 [27] respectively). Discussions with Dutch Foreign Office officials show that Dutch here are highly and increasingly pessimistic re intentions and competence of Republic. Dutch feel that they have made great effort in preparation for interim period and creation new order and that this effort has not found response from Republicans. Secretary General Foreign Office has expressed personal view that Republic tactics are partly inspired from Moscow and that more reasonable Republic elements are under domination of terroristic groups in accordance familiar Asiatic pattern. Tass announcement and timing re Indo-USSR relations will not improve atmosphere.
Embassy believes that, although question of procedure if negotiations fail is under consideration, Netherlands Government hopes postpone decisions Indies policy until after elections scheduled July 7 and that thinking in government circles still predicated on hope that agreement with Republic at least on paper can be obtained in course [Page 188] current negotiations. Help GOCUS still heavily relied upon. In absence such agreement following possibilities exist:
- 1.
- Resumption police action, capture Djocja and elimination Republic Government. Practical considerations, including attitude dominant Dutch political parties, make this improbable present conditions hut further deterioration Soviet-US relations, further indication Soviet support Republic and further weakening SC’s prestige as peace-enforcement organism would among other factors have eventual bearing. Dutch Army in NEI will presumably have to be used, withdrawn or at least reduced to smaller proportions in near future. But Embassy is confident Netherlands Government does not currently intend to take decisive military action.
- 2.
- Creation of USI without Republic with resultant attempted isolation of Republic. This course has undesirable features but may be considered only available one by Netherlands authorities. Bandoeng meeting could work this direction. Government feels encouraged at economic progress non-Republic areas.
- 3.
- Complete withdrawal of Dutch from Indonesia or at least from Java, Sumatra and Madoera. This is mere talk at present but continued maintenance Dutch forces in Indonesia in absence improved situation and prospects may well eventually prove too great a burden politically and economically for Dutch Government.
SC prestige here at low ebb and what is regarded as US interference (incompetent on part of “west”—hostile on part Soviets) in Indonesian problem increasingly resented. This not inconsistent with Government’s hopeful looking toward GOC and especially GOCUS in present circumstances:
Foreign Office obviously hopes GOCUS will move in direction (a) of bringing pressure to bear on Republicans in order to get them to accept and implement political agreement along line Dutch proposals; and (b) of preventing Republican appeals to SC and discussion of problem there. In return for this support they might make concessions re political conditions areas they occupy Java–Sumatra and re economic conditions in Republican territory. Credits pending for NEI in Netherlands and US might play role here.
This Embassy realizes that policy toward Ind[ones]ia problem depends largely on appraisal strength Republic as both political entity and movement. On this point views of Netherlands representatives and of GOCUS currently widely divergent. This Embassy can only suggest that a solution of problem which if possible would ensure continued Netherlands participation in economic development and defense at least of major part Indonesia during forthcoming critical years would, even if not an ideal solution from point of view Indonesian nationalism and untried Indonesian democracy, strengthen practical friendly western democracy in the Netherlands and permit this country to play proper role on our side of Europe during a period [Page 189] when attainable goal is apt to be preservation bases our civilization in limited territory rather than creation ideal conditions everywhere. Department pass Batavia.1
- This was done the same day.↩