Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

501.BC Indonesia/5–2148: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State

secret

Batavia, May 21, 1948—1 p. m.

418. Gocus 275. Regarding Usgoc 100.¹ USDel believes Department should not revise its position (which USDel has supported strongly in conversations RepubDel) respect commercial transactions between Republic and US nationals, loan, or forthcoming discussions mentioned Usgoc 96.²

Other points raised Usgoc 100 relate fundamental intentions Netherlands and Republic and over-all prospects settlement. Before expressing our views, we had hoped review whole problem political agreement with Vredenburch and Riphagen. Latter stated, however, that while he considered such review imperative, they would prefer delay few days until talks with RepubDel had outlined issues more clearly. Following estimate situation, which represents consensus extended meeting USDel with Abbey and Davies³ held yesterday, therefore provisional.

Little question that NethDel, following 2 months delay after Renville Agreement, has for past 2 months been pressing for conclusion negotiations within framework Renville Agreement and that Republic, confronted by certain Netherlands demands, has been holding back in hope of rescue by SC or GOC with enlarged powers. Issues which chiefly threaten success current negotiations as follows:

(1) Strength Republic in Provisional Federal Government.

(2) Provisions for internal security and defense interim period.

(3) Status Republic’s foreign relations interim period.

(4) Union statute, particularly provision granting union court right to adjudicate in appeals by individuals and corporations.

Above issues represent crystallization broad divergencies.

Dutch appear envisage as key to interim period the disbandment of TNI as such. Vredenburch indicates demobilization would apply armed forces both parties, but USDel impression is that Republican forces would be reduced drastically to status security battalions and that Netherlands would retain preponderant military power. Netherlands army and any Republican forces marked for incorporation federal army would be under authority interim government in which Republic presumably would hold about one-third of places. (Vredenburch said yesterday he had presented Republic “oral note” on organization Provisional Federal Government about which he evidently in no hurry inform GOC or USDel.) Other two-thirds would be held by men whom Netherlands would have every reason regard as “dependable” since anti-Republic leaders must depend on Dutch rather than on support popular movements, certainly it impossible imagine Netherlands placing Dutch armed forces under jurisdiction any government which would not act as agent its authority. While Netherlands position not incorrect under Renville Agreement, it by no means only correct position, and Republic likely never agree surrender all authority in areas it controls to governments so constituted. In interim period as envisaged by Netherlands, Republic would be powerless. Insistence by Netherlands that Republic’s foreign relations be completely terminated, greatly increases Republic’s alarm since in its view this would leave it isolated and voiceless.

USDel considers key to implementation Renville principles interim period lies in second of additional principles stipulating all states will be offered fair representation any Provisional Federal Government. Principle cannot be applied literally since until states formed Java, Madura, Sumatra, in accordance popular will, it impossible say what areas Republic properly includes or hence how great its representation should be in Provisional Federal Government if such representation to be fair.

On basis this principle, there some grounds for current Republican view that Provisional Federal Government cannot be organized until states formed. However, we consider intent of principle is provide fair representation all parts Indonesia as means insuring that Provisional Federal Government will be fairly representative Indonesian peoples. This poses issue which has been at heart Dutch-Republican dispute from start, namely, who are real representatives Indonesia. We have expressed view Riphagen that answer this question cannot be much longer delayed.

Republic has never budged from position it alone qualified speak for all Indonesia. Dutch, in USDel view, have from start never deviated from objective of transferring sovereignty to an Indonesian Government in which Republican representatives will be in minority and major role will be played by Indonesians amenable Netherlands and opposed Republic. Were anti-Republican groups actually more representative Indonesian peoples than Republic, Dutch intentions might well be carried to successful conclusion in formation dominantly non-Republican USI. However, evidence available USDel indicates Republic enjoys confidence Indonesian peoples to far greater extent than any other group, that hence in ability govern Indonesia and carry out commitments made in name Indonesia, elements constituting Republic are most representative and most qualified speak for Indonesia. If Dutch succeed carrying out their intentions, even if entirely within framework Renville Agreement, resultant Provisional Federal Government of USI will be unnatural organization which only Dutch arms, if anything, can maintain.

Because we consider conflict of Netherlands and Republican claims must be settled before foundations USI can be laid on representative, stable basis, we asked Riphagen consider possibility constructing Provisional Federal Government on basis nation-wide elections (Gocus 261⁴ paragraph 7). Later we asked Vredenburch if he considered possible hold such election within 3 months with view establishing representative Provisional Federal Government which would also become constituent assembly. Vredenburch dismissed suggestion as out of question, stating no election possible until freedom from coercion could be assured. He indicated all groups throughout Indonesia resorting violence or intimidation electorate must be eliminated and that task establishing requisite order interim period would pertain pre-federal army (meaning chiefly Dutch troops) in concert with state security battalions. Apparently any disorders, uprisings or incidents would be dealt with by predominantly Dutch forces, which would also put down any TNI units resisting demobilization. Vredenburch intimated Netherlands forces had done fairly well reestablishing security Netherlands held areas and should have no great difficulty extending security Republican areas. We convinced such actions by Dutch would incite 10 outbreaks for every disturbance quelled and that present situation would seem paragon of orderliness in comparison with results to be expected from such methods. Colonel Mayer⁵ agrees our estimate and our view that had Britain attempted pacification Burma up to Dutch standards prior transfer sovereignty, it would have become embroiled increasing difficulties and transfer sovereignty have been indefinitely delayed.

USDel increasingly inclined believe that if deadlock on interim arrangements develops, which seems likely, only constructive means resolving impasse and creating firm basis USI will be through agreement parties to formation Provisional Federal Government by election. We visualize some such procedure as following:

(1) Upon conclusions political agreement, Republic to enter March 9 government with three or four places. Republic to remain responsible for security areas under its control, TNI continuing in existence. Joint Netherlands-Republican staff to be formed and progressive joint demobilization to begin. Political and economic barriers between Republic and other Indonesian areas to be gradually removed. Provisions in political agreement respecting common currency and control foreign exchange to be carried out. Republic foreign relations to be frozen.

(2) Parties to agree on rational delineation states in accordance GOC suggestion (Gocus 267⁶).

(3) Three months after political agreement or as soon thereafter as agreement reached on delineation states, elections to be held throughout Indonesia for delegates to Provisional Federal Government with regencies or equivalent areas as electoral districts without regard present state boundaries.

(4) Provisional Federal Government to be formed and organized accordance results elections. Netherlands to transfer to Provisional Federal Government powers self-government and Republic to transfer control TNI, control foreign relations and other federal functions.

(5) Provisional state governments to be formed, probably through elections of officials by delegates to Provisional Federal Government from regencies included in states.

(6) Constitution and union statute to be drafted. Former to be submitted states.

(7) Perhaps 6 months after formation Provisional Federal Government, Netherlands to transfer sovereignty to USI.

Above represents compromise between positions Netherlands and Republic, which wishes stand outside federation until sovereignty transferred. We believe if Netherlands accepted this compromise its position in SC would be secure and Republic would be forced agree and further that Republic would have to accept verdict elections if considered reasonably fair by GOC even if outcome unfavorable, and further that Republic would be forced and would be able cooperate fully in Provisional Federal Government under such circumstances since it would have unanswerable argument to present public opinion its areas. However, we believe fair elections would return majority pro-Republican delegates to Provisional Federal Government. We well aware enormous difficulties, in fact impossibility, assuring completely free elections, but consider violence, intimidation, and irregularities, could be reduced minimum by employment secret ballot technique used recent Madura elections (in which three-fourths delegates elected appear be Republican), organization teams poll-watchers, and unannounced spot-checks by flying team sailors. Opportunity electioneer prior elections would have to be granted all candidates but be limited and controlled. Much would depend display cooperative attitude by parties, which we believe not too much expect. Granting all obstacles smooth election, we still believe resultant government would be more representative than any constructed any other basis and that efforts parties should now be devoted working out method satisfactory conduct such election, which contains key to resolution fundamental dispute, rather than wrangling over other arrangements interim period none of which, in last analysis, likely work and about which Dutch fear discussion SC.

Little question all delegates from Republican areas would be pro-Republican, giving Republic at least twó-fifths all delegates, since this is proportion total Indonesian population living Republican areas. However, under Linggadjati, Republic would have included four-fifths total Indonesian population. Moreover, anti-Republican candidates would have better than equal advantage in contesting remaining three-fifths seats. Any event, we believe elected Provisional Federal Government, confronted task actually governing Indonesia, would not divide into Republican and anti-Republican camps but that alignment will generally be Eight-Wing Masjumi and Partai Nasional⁷ versus Left-Wing coalition.

As we have repeatedly stressed, we believe Netherlands will serve its best interests by conciliating not bucking Republic, that Netherlands is fortunate having nothing worse deal with than present Republican Government. We further consider future Dutch economic position will depend finally upon attitude Indonesians and that Dutch will make great mistake if they endeavor secure such position by attempting confine Indonesian nationalist spirit and attempting gain guarantees in political agreement which Indonesian nationalists will accept only under greatest pressure. Consequently we consider Netherlands should drop provision giving individuals and corporations right appeal union court and empowering union court settle disputes between member states USI, possibly in favor economic-financial agreement along lines US-Philippine agreement. (Critchley states he would go far attempt obtain secure economic position for Netherlands.) We also believe that as gesture to reassure Republic, Dutch should not attempt terminate Republic’s foreign relations prior formation elected Provisional Federal Government since Republic lays greatest stress these relations, which of minor import to Netherlands, but that such relations should be frozen.

It possible Dutch at Bandoeng conference are pressing formation USI in order that either (1) Republic will be forced enter strictly on Netherlands terms or (2) if Republic stays out, resultant conflict can be presented world as civil Indonesian conflict (see ConGen telegram 410, May 19⁸). This is precisely what French endeavored accomplish Indp-China after deciding unsettled conditions made referendum impossible. USDel takes Bandoeng conference particularly seriously view Vredenburch and Riphagen making 3-day trip there end week and view statement May 20 Aneta by NEI government information spokesman, who said, referring date on which USI to be formed, “fortunately it no longer discussions with Republic on which fulfillment agreements about this date depend”.

Assurance by Dutch they would not undertake further police action unless requested by UN or Republic is scarcely relevant actual situation. Final breakdown negotiations would be followed automatically by crambling truce and resumption hostilities, regardless Dutch intention. Furthermore, should Republic reject final Dutch demands, Dutch troops here would act not as agency Netherlands but as agency USI or pre-USI government. Finally, Department’s belief Netherlands neither inclined nor able undertake settlement by force does not conform view local Dutch military as reported by Colonel Mayer.

USDel increasingly concerned by atmosphere developing here and by indications Netherlands contemplating presenting SC with fait accompli respect formation USI.

We believe resources Republican government have been strained to utmost to maintain truce on Van Mook Line which is only successful truce in history Dutch-Republican dispute. If Republic put in position where it must accept political settlement so disadvantageous it could not live up to terms or maintain control its supporters, or reject terms and take consequences, we fear results will be extremely unfortunate respect both Netherlands and US long-run interests Indonesia.

Department’s views earnestly solicited.

Subject Department’s concurrence and outcome forthcoming discussions USDel with Vredenburch, USDel would endeavor gain GOC acceptance suggested plan.

Sent Department 418; Department pass The Hague.⁹

Livengood

1. Telegram 203, May 14, p. 172.
2. Telegram 187, May 7, p. 162.
3. Donald M. Davies, Vice Consul at Batavia.
4. Telegram 385, May 10, p. 164.
5. Col. William Mayer, U.S.A., chairman of the UN SC Military examining committee in the Indies.
6. Telegram 394, May 12, p. 169.
7. Indonesian nationalist party (PNI).
8. Not printed.
9. This was done the same day.