501.BC Indonesia/5–1348: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
396. Gocus 268. USDel dined palace May 11 with Van Mook, Vredenburch, Hoogstraten, Neher, Schuurman,1 Abdul Kadir, Husseins, Djajadiningrat (head Komite Indonesia Serikat and third Indonesia).
In long after dinner conversation all Dutch spoke in turn, stressing repeatedly points set forth Usgoc 97, May 7. Van Mook referred feelingly for contract and illicit Republican trade with Singapore and, deprecating Republican capabilities, emphasized his sole aim is sound practicable workable USI Government. Vredenburch claimed Republican attitude markedly hardened past three weeks and believed Republicans now formulating final position with result that issues would be clearly drawn by end current three weeks sessions Batavia. When this point reached he believed GOC should devote fortnight to consideration positions parties without meetings delegations. Admitting Netherlands delegation prepared give up some points now being maintained for bargaining purposes, he suggested possibility final Netherlands position could be presented GOC by BelDel but stressed USDel would have to carry on from there. He reverted repeatedly to fact any settlement would be work of US and privately urged early meetings with USDel outline course future action. He further indicated he would ask Roem next Steering Committee meeting answer yes or no whether Republicans recognize Netherlands sovereignty. On this point he unwilling negotiate though willing work out face-saving arrangements re foreign relations. He also referred his special desire early satisfactory termination negotiations view acceptance The Hague his resignation Foreign Service to take effect August 1 with possibility extension to January 1.
Neher spoke lengthily and emotionally of (1) strong Russian Communist influence in Republic, (2) reliance Republicans on third world war, (3) unacceptability Sukarno as president USI and desirability his retirement from political life and (4) determination Netherlands not leave Indonesia except to independent democratically selected federal government even at cost impoverishment home country. Implication his remarks unless settlement reached on Netherlands terms, military action inevitable irrespective probable cost and Netherlands losses.
Hoogstraten classified Republicans as comprising (1) irreconcilables who must be shot or imprisoned; (2) moderate, reasonable men; [Page 172] (3) large group now convinced Netherlands can be swayed by stiff Republican stand and (4) Hatta, who subject pressure by all groups, especially third. Stated USDel must make clear to Republicans error of their group since Netherlands will not retreat from its position any issue. Privately, Hoogstraten observed first task interim period would be restoration order by Netherlands troops under federal government orders.
Three Indonesian guests almost completely ignored by Dutch. However, in private conversation Abdul Kadir dwelt on desirability early establishment USI, emphasizing importance current Bandoeng conference. He said he regarded Sukarno as far removed from practical government and surrounded by individuals unable say no. This he had told Sukarno in recent visit. He also indicated NethDel looked favorably on USDel plan for delineations states (Gocus 2492).
Schuurman who just returned from Holland spoke feelingly of increased difficulties in arriving at solution owing SC intervention through GOC.
USDel gained distinct impression purpose dinner was counteract any favorable impression members USDel may have gained from trip with Sukarno and to ascertain whether and how Dubois had acted on Usgoc 93, 96 and 97.3 Also that Neher, who heretofore considered by USDel as most moderate and conciliatory Netherlands representatives, had been for that reason selected to take most uncompromising stand. USDel preserved responsive but non-committal attitude, Dubois pointing out to Vredenburch that GOC had other members than US who could not be omitted consideration.
Sent Department 396; Department pass The Hague.4