501.BC Indonesia/5–1048: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State
385. Gocus 261. Upon receipt Usgoc 931 at Wonosobo, we approached Hatta regarding Tjoa statements. Hatta agreed make public [Page 165] statement Tjoa acted without authorization when facts re his alleged statements confirmed. Roem later told Dubois, Tjoa twice been ordered return Java but twice reported unable to secure seat on plane. Department might help.
While US Delegation believes Republican Government probably not immediately responsible Tjoa’s inexcusable actions, charges made by him will probably be restated by Palar during any debates Indonesian question. US Delegation fears its reporting seriously deficient if it has allowed Department believe GOC, with Australian Delegation a member, would undertake point out to Hatta “invalidity” bases Tjoa’s charges. Contentions that Dutch denying freedom speech and assembly, setting up puppet regimes and blockading Republic, anything but baseless. NEI Delegation has never even bothered reply to Republic’s complaint of prevention plebiscite meetings Netherlands areas, and NEI government regulations pertaining freedom assembly and publication are most restrictive. Regarding naval blockade, while Dutch strenuously object this term, fact is Republic desperate for medicines, its motor transport almost extinct, much of population reduced wearing gunny sacking and goatskins and that no way is offered Republic obtain goods from abroad unless it submits being totally disarmed, which is demanded by Dutch as price its entry Provisional Federal Government.
In estimating likely course Republic in SC, Department should also bear in mind Republic unimpressed by results GOC to date. While agreement on principles resumption internal trade and exchange political prisoners obtained in subcommittees, fact remains only tangible gains accruing Republic as results 6 months presence GOC consist of return 1,000 POWs and absolutely nothing else, which Dutch seem utterly unable appreciate.
As stated Gocus 229,2 possible solution deadlock through presentation final Dutch terms and threat withdrawal GOC will in US Delegation’s view be ineffective unless Dutch record unassailable. This is certainly not case so far and will not be while Dutch, among other things, continue hold thousands political prisoners (Republic estimate is 30,000). As previously reported, US Delegation has tried in vain interest Dutch effectively in their position in SC. Suspicion grows that Dutch expecting showdown to be covered by US Delegation here and by US in SC. US Delegation still considers persuasion in Washington and Hague most necessary if Dutch position to be made secure.
Following return Dubois and Ogburn Batavia May 7, US Delegation had long and warm discussion Riphagen covering whole field dispute but centering upon Netherlands’ demand TNI be totally disbanded outset interim period partly through demobilization and partly [Page 166] through absorption in federal forces, which would be tantamount transfer to Netherlands control, since other states will outweigh Republic in Provisional Federal Government as envisaged at present. We emphasized it absolutely impossible any Republican Government agree such demand and survive, that if Netherlands persisted such demand (which Republic would sooner fight than accept) political agreement was out of question. Riphagen declared other states would never submit Republic alone having army, that this would be intolerable situation and that it struck him Renville principles now in discard. We said retention TNI by Republic as militia with its gradual demobilization and absorption federal forces contemplated during interim period as Republic gained confidence through exercise power Provisional Federal Government would not be contrary Renville principles, that other states far from being defenseless had Netherlands army protect them. Riphagen refused concede Republic could not disband TNI if Republic represented in Provisional Federal Government and even offered fantastic suggestion federal troops (i.e., Netherlands army) be used in dealing with TNI should it resist extinction. (This connection press statement by Republic Minister Information points out 4th of 12 political principles provides gradual reduction armed forces both parties following political agreement, implying existence Republic armed forces interim period.)
Discussion Riphagen highlighted what seems to us essential fallacy Netherlands position, namely consistent underestimation strength Republic support throughout Java, Madura, Sumatra and much of East Indonesia, and unshakeable determination to regard non-Republic Indonesian movements as something comparable. We stated frankly we believed Netherlands living in dream if it believed elements constituting Republic would not completely dominate an independent Indonesia or conceived that such men as Abdul Kadir or Djajadiningrat3 could be considered remotely on par with Sukarno as Indonesian political leader.
We believed if Netherlands really foresaw transfer sovereignty to Indonesia, fairness demanded they immediately inform non-Republican Indonesians, who staking their lives on continued Netherlands protection, to make peace with Republic, that Netherlands confronted with exactly same situation as Britain in India and Burma. Riphagen stoutly denied this.
We offered impromptu suggestion, which we stated we hoped Netherlands Delegation would consider, of forming Provisional Federal Government on basis election delegates from regencies and equivalent districts throughout Indonesia, with government itself to be [Page 167] elected by such delegates. We believed present most difficult problems might well disappear if such plan adopted. Riphagen objected preparations such elections would require much time and that elections would give Republic disproportionate strength Provisional Federal Government since Republic would win all elections its own areas in absence opportunity opposition express itself while winning additional seats from Netherlands army [areas?] during which elections would be free. We said we thought elections could be organized 8 weeks and we by no means sure Republic sentiment would be free express itself in Netherlands areas. (This connection, attack on Netherlands troops by 1,000 Indonesians armed with bamboo staves, almost certainly not TNI, south of Cheribon, in which 300 Indonesians killed, was reported May 7. If Indonesians driven to such hopeless attack, rumors of Dutch actions against dissidents probably not baseless.) Moreover, we believed strength Republic supporters in Provisional Federal Government not of major consequence since Republican parties united only in independence aim and will cease act as solid block as independence becomes certainty. Any event present Republican government, in which any change will be to left, probably best government likely arise Indonesia.
We repeatedly stressed that if Netherlands proposals for political agreement were fair and reasonable in all particulars, Republic would have no choice but accept in final showdown (and we considered Netherlands position on TNI not fair or reasonable). Like all other neutral observers, we convinced Republic only force in Indonesia of real consequence apart Netherlands army. If Netherlands unable win Republic to agreement, settlement by force appeared inevitable, and while we did not doubt ability Netherlands army take Djocja and all main roads in 10 days, we believed it foregone conclusion outcome would be duplication Indonesia present situation Indochina and drastic reduction Indonesian export potential.
Following 3-day tour Republic areas with Sukarno and Hatta, Dubois considers strength Republic lies in following:
- (1)
- Nearly universal passion for national liberty, especially grip of idea liberty on imagination youth.
- (2)
- Disinterestedness, devotion, sincerity romanticism, oratorical powers and winning personality Sukarno, plus effect his martyr background, 7 years as political prisoner.
- (3)
- Practicality and political finesse Hatta.
- (4)
- Discipline, loyalty, martial spirit and esprit de corps TNI.
- (5)
- Fraternal relationship TNI and people and pride of latter in TNI.
- (6)
- Fanatical spirit evacuees, civilian, military, from Netherlands occupied areas.
- (7)
- Fact Republic working for freedom all Indonesia and represents spearhead independence drive to Indonesian nationalists all areas.
- (8)
- Binding force common privations under blockade.
- (9)
- Pride peoples Republic areas their accomplishments to date under all handicaps.
- (10)
- Hate-engendering tactics Dutch.
Dubois believes Dutch making serious mistake discounting these factors, and further believes this crucial time for them make every reasonable concession particularly along lines effective lifting trade restrictions and releasing political prisoners in order restore Republic’s waning confidence their good faith.
Sent Department 385; Department pass Hague.4