501.BB Palestine/11–1248: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
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Delga 717. In telephone conversation with Jessup today Douglas indicated desire for latest information concerning US–UK agreement [Page 1575] on Palestine and on probability truce will now be observed by Israelis. Following review is, therefore, for information London as well as Department.
We continue attach greatest importance reconciling any divergence views US–UK on question trace observance. November 4 resolution, which passed by vote 9–1–1 as amended by US, reflected virtual identity US–UK views. Psychological impact this resolution has served very useful purpose maintaining authority SC. Work of committee established by resolution and of Mediator in his consultations with parties give every reasonable hope compliance withdrawal beyond demarcation lines both sides which will effectively separate respective armed forces while at same time saving face both sides. Committee should finish work Saturday. Thereafter Bunche informs me few days will be needed initiate plan.
Meanwhile, we feel November 4 resolution represents furthest Council should attempt go in direction truce “enforcement”. To crowd beyond this point would ignore practical realities. These are, on one side, every evidence that “truce” both practically and psychologically has served its purpose and it is essential, therefore, to push forward to new constructive phase. Bunche and Riley, who are in best position to know, feel this very strongly. General Riley in particular feels that “truce” as such cannot last longer than two weeks. On other hand, all evidence we have indicates parties finally tired of fighting, want to compass differences and get on with business of final settlement.
For these reasons we feel British, having achieved November 4 objective, are now making mistake wanting push further along same road which in our opinion strongly shared other members SC, such as Canada, France, could only lead disaster because psychological atmosphere of tension, rigidity positions, state near-war would not only be continued but further stimulated.
This might readily upset steady progress settlement Negev question and lead to defiance Mediator and SC. This in turn would immediately raise question whether SC should apply sanctions which we are convinced SC would not do.
This is so because (1) USSR might veto but would probably abstain; (2) under present circumstances we cannot envisage as practical reality US voting in favor any SC resolution calling imposition sanctions against Israel; (3) we are virtually certain France would not support. Others would probably abstain and we doubt whether UK at best could get more than three or four votes total (UK, Syria, possibly China, possibly Belgium). Failure of SC to impose sanctions in unhappy event it is confronted with necessity examining this question would (a) cancel psychological effect already gained and present restraining effect November 4 resolution; (b) generally damage prestige and authority of SC probably beyond any possibility of [Page 1576] repair; (c) destroy possibility GA contributing solution Palestine question; and (d) greatly increase risk that expansionist pressures within Israel would lead to new adventures.
In event SC failed apply sanctions British position, in light considerations advanced above, presumably would be arm Arabs in conformity treaty commitments. Result would be three-cornered arms race between UK, US, USSR to supply respective sides in long-continuing struggle which would set back common US–UK objectives in Middle East for years. The US, UK, Israel, the Arab states and UN would all lose; the USSR would be only one to gain and they would gain very substantially.
In the event, which we consider unlikely, US and France vote in favor of, and a sanctions resolution passes the Council, the ultimate result will be same but reached by slightly different route. We do not feel USSR would vote in favor sanctions and they would feel no obligation whatsoever, legal, moral or otherwise, to withhold arms from Israel. Effect of this would be to throw Israel into Soviet camp rather than holding them in Western orbit.
In view of foregoing we have been trying capitalize strong sentiment Council (e.g. France, Canada) favor new approach along lines Bunche armistice idea. We drafted last night short punchy resolution (text new [next] following telegram1), establishing armistice but at same time reaffirming truce while parties with aid acting Mediator work out details armistice. This armistice phase will not, as we see it, impede straightening out Negev situation as contemplated November 4 but will actually facilitate Jewish cooperation with acting Mediator in Negev and will clear decks prompt consideration Committee One of permanent settlement. We are convinced rapid progress with this program is surest guarantee against new Israeli military operations. Consequently we earnestly hope British will recede from their present rigid position which we feel blind alley with disaster lurking at end, and that they will find it possible support our brief resolution.
Canadians pressing for soonest meeting SC and working on UK to meet our views with which they agree. Canadians think McNeil was persuaded in our joint evening conference on November 9 (see Delga 6612—London 1214) but was slapped down by London.
In addition to UK and Canada we gave copy our short resolution on personal basis to Eban this morning making clear this paper had no delegation our [or] US Government standing. Eban has since consulted Shertok and first reaction indicates our resolution basically acceptable to Israel subject, however, to drafting changes we believe can be worked out.
[Page 1577]Sent Department Delga 717, repeated London as 1250 for the Ambassador.