USUN Files
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State1
| Participants: | The Secretary |
| Mr. Shertok, Israeli Foreign Minister | |
| Mr. Eban, Israeli Representative at United Nations | |
| Mr. Wilkins, United States Delegation |
Mr. Shertok called on me this afternoon at his request to discuss the Palestine question.
Mr. Shertok told me he wanted to discuss two aspects of the question at the present time:
1) The Security Council Resolution of November 4 and its relation to a proposed Security Council resolution providing for the establishment of an armistice in Palestine and for the commencement of negotiations leading to final settlement of the Palestine question
Mr. Shertok said that his government attached the greatest importance to immediate negotiations and that it felt that if the Security Council called upon Israel and the Arab States to commence negotiations directly or through a United Nations representative, armistice demarcation lines could be established at an early date. Mr. Shertok did not think that the principle of broad demilitarized or neutral zones should be followed, although it might be necessary to have narrow “no man’s land” strips. In particular, Mr. Shertok objected to the November 4 Security Council resolution as it related to the Negev in that it would prevent administrative and military control of Israeli Negev by Tel Aviv. Mr. Shertok said that his government felt that the November 4 Resolution should be superseded by the proposed Security Council resolution providing for the establishment of an armistice in Palestine and for the commencement of negotiations leading to a final settlement of the Palestine question.
2) Admission of Israel to the United Nations
Mr. Shertok said that their lack of membership in the United Nations at the present time was of considerable disadvantage to them. He said that, for example, it prevented them from dealing on a basis of equality with the six Arab States both in the United Nations and in Palestine. He said that it prevented them from having a vote on [Page 1578] important matters affecting Israel. He said that if they were not admitted at this session of the General Assembly, Israel would not be able to become a United Nations member for another year. He said that so far the Provisional Government of Israel had been recognized by eighteen countries, that these included the United States and Russia and the Soviet satellite state but did not include any of the Western European states. Mr. Shertok was of the opinion that the admission of Israel into the United Nations would not make it necessary for other members of the United Nations to recognize it immedately unless they wished to do so, but that the fact of Israel’s admission would have the international effect of establishing Israel’s status and thus prove a stabilizing factor in the Near East.
Mr. Shertok said that he wished to speak very frankly and confidentially to me, as he had instructed Mr. Epstein in Washington to communicate with Mr. Lovett, with regard to Israel’s general foreign relations with the United States and the U.S.S.R. Mr. Shertok said it had been his Government’s endeavor to steer a middle course, that, if it became necessary, there was no doubt where Israel’s tone [sic] sympathies lay but that Israel was having increasing difficulty in proving to its people, in view of the position which we had taken on various aspects of the Palestine question, that the United States desired friendly or as friendly relations with Israel as did the U.S.S.R. Mr. Shertok pointed out, for example, that the U.S.S.R. had a full Minister whereas the United States had only a Special Representative at Tel Aviv. Mr. Shertok said there was no doubt that the U.S.S.R. was friendly towards Israel, as revealed by the Soviet position in the United Nations and elsewhere; consequently, many Israelis now say: “Why should we not go along with the Russians who are friendly towards us?”
Mr. Shertok seemed to feel that American support for their position regarding negotiations and an armistice as well as for Israel’s immediate admission to the United Nations would counterbalance the sympathy of the Israeli people for Soviet Russia.
Mr. Shertok said he understood I was perturbed regarding recent reports that Israel was obtaining men and munitions from the Soviet Union. Mr. Shertok said he wished to assure me categorically that no men or munitions had been received from the Soviet Union, but that men had come from all parts of the world to help Israel and that munitions had been purchased and received from Czechoslovakia, France and Switzerland.
I told Mr. Shertok it was our main purpose to bring about agreement between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine and that we were not necessarily concerned as to what the agreement was as long as it did [Page 1579] not involve conquest by war. I re-emphasized this point several times during my conversation. I said that if Israel openly flouted or defied the United Nations or the Security Council, it seemed clear it would be unable to gain admission to the United Nations, and that such other matters as loans and de jure recognition would, of course, be affected.
I said that we had been endeavoring for a long time to make it possible for the Arabs and Jews to agree. I said that thus far we had been successful in bringing the Arabs and, I might add, the British along with us, in the steps which the United Nations had taken. I said that I was convinced the Arabs greatly feared that Israel might not be content with its present position in Palestine, and that it might endeavor to branch out and would actually take steps in this direction. I said that reports of Israeli arms purchases in Czechoslovakia and their receipt increased Arab fears in this respect. I expressed the opinion that we were closer to an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews at the present time than we ever had been and said to Mr. Shertok, in brief, “Don’t overplay your hand.”
I also added that I had not seen any of the Israeli representatives in Paris since my last conversation with Mr. Shertok in October, and that I had not done so because I had learned from experience that what was said in confidence was immediately thereafter known in New York. I said that I understood the long historial background in Israel’s struggle, but that my attitude was that we should now deal with each other in the normal fashion as Foreign Secretaries each representing his own Government.
Mr. Shertok thanked me for the frank expression of my views. Mr. Shertok said that he wished to be equally frank and to state he was convinced the British were seeking through the November 4 Resolution to accomplish in the Negev what they had been unable to do in any other way. He said that they wished to prevent its control by Israel and that the November 4 Resolution was not a truce resolution but a political resolution for this purpose. Mr. Shertok added that his Government had two choices: 1) to cooperate in the implementation of the November 4 Resolution through the present plan of the Acting Mediator, or, 2) to oppose it by refusing to withdraw Israeli armed forces from recently occupied areas in the Negev. Mr. Shertok said that he did not know what position his Government would take, but he personally was inclined to the latter.
Mr. Shertok added that Israel had definite evidence that the British were now supplying the Arabs with men and arms. I told him I had heard reports to this effect, had investigated them and was convinced that the British were not supplying the Arabs with men and arms.
I emphasized again the importance of an agreement between the [Page 1580] Arabs and Jews and strongly stressed that we now had a real opportunity of reaching it.2