501.BB Palestine/11–1248: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State
niact
4851. Personal for Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas. No distribution. Herewith are my first blush comments on Telmar 148:1
1. I had understood in Washington that our basic position in regard to the settlement of the Palestinian issue rested on the Democratic Party platform of 1948; that Israeli could not have its cake and eat it too; that if it insisted upon Galilee, it could not have all of the Negev; that if it got a part of the Negev, adjustments would have to be made in the north; that the US was not disposed to impose a settlement on either side.
I had understood, perhaps erroneously, that this position did not preclude our supporting the resolution in the GA which provided for international machinery empowered to make adjustments in line with the above in regard to frontiers.
I also understood that in regard to the truce, it was our view that we should follow the general line of the Bunche proposal with the question of sanctions somewhat clouded.
2. I, of course, have not revealed or discussed Telmar 148 with the British, and have disclosed its contents to no one, but it strikes me at first blush that while it fits the above general framework, the emphasis which it places on certain features and the restraint which it imposes on GADel in connection with other aspects are such that it may [Page 1574] seriously disrupt US–UK solidarity which is so important both in the SC and in the GA. I do not mean by this to suggest that we buy the whole British position. This, in any event, would be impossible, for the facts are that the British, because of their extensive shift of policy have in effect bought a large part of the US position.
3. Elaborating on paragraph 2 above, the following observations occur to me:
- (a)
- The southern frontier of Israel, indicated in paragraph 4, when seen on the map goes far beyond the idea of “adjustments” in the Negev in return for compensation for the Arabs in the north. I do not believe that the UK will buy this one for many reasons.
- (b)
- Telmar 148 appears to be a new “plan” for a Palestine settlement since it appears to adandon the principle of US–UK seeking acquiescence by the contending parties to Bernadotte proposals as a basis for settlement by refusing to foster cause of one or the other party. For example, does “fully acceptable to the State of Israel” mean that this criterion must be observed at outset of hoped-for negotiations under Bernadotte aegis, or does it mean that this criterion can be treated elastically to be reflected in the terms of the final negotiated settlement.
- (c)
- While UK would be willing to see “adjustments” in the Negev in the circumstances I have outlined, I am certain that if the Jews should maintain their claim to the hourglass frontiers of November 29 (electing to give up Galilee) the UK on grounds of what it believes to be US–UK strategic interests, would resist all the Negev going to Israel.
- (d)
- Idea inherent in final paragraph of section 3 of Telmar 148, that if Jews and Arabs fail to negotiate a settlement of boundary problem, is US belief that Israel should reliquish Galilee and Jaffa and Egyptians relinquish Israeli part of Negev. Here, it seems to me, is the crux of the problem. Are we prepared, if necessary, to take measures against PGI to expel it from Galilee and Jaffa? If we are not prepared to do so; i.e., apply sanctions under Chapter 7, it seems to me the US position is somewhat unrealistic, since the Jews already hold Galilee and most important part of the Negev by conquest.
4. I am leaving Sunday, 14th, for Paris to discuss situation with the Secretary.
Sent Department (for Lovett eyes only) as 4851; repeated Paris (personal for Secretary eyes only) as 869, no distribution.