501.BB Palestine/8–2448: Telegram
The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to President Truman 1
us urgent
Already a crisis—perhaps you, Mr. President, foresaw it when you asked me to report on grave issues directly to you—is in the making. It threatens, if not wisely handled both in Washington and Israel, to place the government of this small state before the tragic alternative of accepting dangerous humiliation from the US and the UN or of [Page 1338] defying both US and UN. Either Israel’s humiliation or Israel’s defiance could bring to the President personally and to our Government—not to speak of the UN—only new and embarrassing problems.
This crisis is threatening because of two basic facts:
1. The seeming wide difference of opinion between our Government and that of Israel on the next important step which should be taken. Washington appears to concentrate on the maintenance of truce, the demilitarization of Jerusalem, and the alleviation of the Arab refugee problem. The Israeli Government, instead of concentration on either of these partial measures, wants peace negotiations now. The truce they regard as merely a thinly-disguised continuation of the war. They insist that the truce, which does not permit them to demobilize any of the very large section of Jewish population under arms, is imposing an unbearable burden.
The Arab proposals for the demilitarization of Jerusalem, which the Department of State reports it and the British regard as fair basis of discussion, the Israeli Government says are unacceptable because: (a) They would work to the advantage of the Arabs and (b) they could not in fact be made effective. To try to enforce such demilitarization could only continue, say the PGI, the present futile and debilitating state of ineffective truce.
Arab refugee problem was, says PGI, created by war and can be finally solved only at peace conference.
According to [Ben-]Gurion and Shertok, there is only one peaceful and practicable way out of the present impasse. This is prompt peace negotiations directly between Jews and Arabs either on their own or under UN or other auspices. Once negotiations were begun or even clearly foreshadowed through acceptance of the principle by both sides, such “secondary” questions as the continuance of the truce, the demilitarization of Jerusalem and the Arab refugees, would all become manageable. Israel wants and would welcome US and UN pressure to force such peace negotiations now.
Striving to see the whole problem objectively, I have reached the conclusion that the Jewish emphasis on peace negotiations now is sounder than the present US and UN emphasis on truce and demilitarization and refugees.
2. The second fact which is inviting crisis is the existence of two dangerous illusions. The one is held in some quarters here that the US would under no circumstances be a party to UN sanctions against Israel; last Friday I frankly warned Ben Gurion and Shertok against this illusion. The second illusion and in my opinion just as dangerous as the first is the feeling in some Washington quarters that Israel would under no circumstances resist a US-supported UN decision carrying a threat of sanctions.
I am convinced that neither [Ben-]Gurion nor Shertok in their talks with me exaggerated when they said in substance: “On no matter adversely affecting our independence or our security will we yield to the threat of UN sanctions, even if these are backed by your Government, which we know to be our friend. What We have won on the battlefield we will not sacrifice at the council table.”
Suicidal though it may seem, these people would resist, and not merely passively. I cannot too strongly emphasize my conviction that, rather than submit to what would be regarded as infringement independence [Page 1339] or weakening of security, they would fight both the US and the UN”.
My urgent plea—which in different language I have presented to Department of State—is that our government guard zealously against permitting its good intentions and love of peace betray it into supporting a UN policy which would mean armed conflict with Israel.
This message sent through Haifa. Department reply directly Tel Aviv.
- Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 70, “for the personal attention President and Secretary.”↩