Clifford Papers
The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the President’s Special Counsel (Clifford)
Dear Clark: This letter is to supplement the long telegram I sent day before1 yesterday2 to the President and General Marshall outlining the nature of and the causes for the threatening crisis in Israel-U.S. and U.N. relations—a crisis which despite or rather because of Washington good intentions might lead our government into open hostilities with Israel.
To you I want to explain more fully why from the point of view of the PGI the seeming continued concentration by the U.S. and U.N. on the indefinite prolongation of the truce is (a) tantamount to taking sides with the Arabs against the Jews and (b) may finally force the PGI to resume the war despite the possibility of U.S. and U.N. sanctions.
I. So long as the Arabs refuse peace negotiations either directly with the Jews or through the U.N. or other auspices, it should be perfectly clear that Israel cannot demobilize. Until through such negotiations the Arab states recognize the existence of an independent Israel, the Jewish authorities will know that the Arabs are continuing to prepare to destroy the Jewish state.
Hence, an indefinite truce is from Israel’s point of view equivalent to a death sentence to be executed at the convenience of the Arabs.
II. Economically a prolonged truce is unbearable for Israel because by precluding demilitarization it keeps perhaps as many as 70 or 80 thousand men and women under arms. To argue that Israel does not need such a disproportionately large section of its population in The Army falls on deaf ears here because the PGI authorities are determined to rely on their own strength to defend their independence and security; and naturally, they will insist on being the judge of what such strength ought to be.
[Page 1340]The danger is that the time may come when PGI will consider resumption of the war as a lesser burden than the continuation of the armed truce.
My own conclusion is that since the President and the Department want peace, they should concentrate on getting peace negotiations started. To reply that this is difficult or that the Arabs won’t accept is to confess that the Arabs can indefinitely call the tune.
On this issue, I do not think that the U.S. should be overly influenced by the views of either the Mediator or the British. The former, so far as I can judge, is almost completely discredited not only among the Jews but among the Arabs. His inability to enforce his “decisions” and his loquacious pronouncements have left him neither substantial moral authority nor dignity.
As to the British, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that: (a) their record here in recent years has shown that they can be completely unrealistic in their estimate of existing forces; (b) they are not, and in the nature of the case cannot be, impartial as between Jews and Arabs. Unless and until this is always kept in mind by Washington, there will be unnecessary misunderstanding about the elements in the problem here.
My telegram to the President and General Marshall of August 22 [24] and this letter to you are motivated by concern lest the U.S. get itself needlessly involved and lest the President be needlessly and gravely embarrassed.
Cordially yours,