Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

867N.01/2–2248

Mr. Moshe Shertok to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

Washington, February 22, 1948.

My Dear Mr. Lovett: In connection with our conversation yesterday, I think it important to offer a few additional explanations on two points raised by you at the end of our talk and clear up their possible implications.

1. You asked me whether there have been peace moves on our part vis-à-vis the Arab Higher Committee since November 29, 1947. I replied in the negative. I explained that there had been innumerable attempts made by us in the past to explore possibilities of a peaceful settlement, including an approach to the Secretary General of the Arab League immediately after the publication of the UNSCOP Report, which had revealed an unbridgeable gulf; but that after the General Assembly had adopted its Resolution on Palestine, we felt convinced that any further such overture from us towards those pledged to oppose it by force would be not merely futile, but definitely harmful, in that it would signify that we, ourselves, did not regard the Assembly’s Resolution as final, but as a basis for further compromise.

As I indicated, to the Jews of Palestine, and to the Zionist movement throughout the world, the Partition scheme adopted by the Assembly represents the limit of the concessions which they were prepared to make. After the cutting away of Transjordan from the area of the Jewish National Home in 1922, the present scheme has reduced the remainder of that area by nearly one-half. Moreover, in the land which the Jewish people through the ages has regarded as its historical heritage and as the country of its future, a second independent Arab state is now to be set up. The Jews have accepted these painful and far-reaching sacrifices on condition that in the reduced area, their political independence would be recognized, and that they would be able in that territory to work out their salvation as a free nation. It is to them the last and final compromise beyond which they will not go.

Actually, we have made efforts even after November 29th, 1947, to explore prospects of Jewish-Arab understanding and collaboration on the basis of full implementation of the United Nations plan. We have made and will continue to make these approaches to those Arab personalities and circles whom there is any hope of inducing to accept the internationally decreed settlement. Self-evidently, the Arab Higher Committee does not come into that category. It is not merely that the hands of its President are drenched in the blood of millions of Jew’s. We are convinced that nothing will ever satisfy that Committee short of the complete acceptance of its program, namely, the conversion of the whole of Palestine into an independent Arab state, with the Jews as a crystalized minority at its mercy; and that any impression of readiness to offer concessions to the Committee is bound to strengthen its belief that it can achieve this object.

Incidentally, a letter addressed by one of our representatives to the Secretary General of the Arab League after the session of the General Assembly, has remained unanswered.

It is for these reasons that we view with the greatest alarm the rumors now afloat that a move is about to be made calling for the “freezing” of the Palestinian situation so that a new effort of conciliation might be undertaken. Such a move would mean, in the first instance, that the United Nations Resolution does not necessarily stand. It would, moreover, come as a reward for the campaign of violence now being conducted against that Resolution and encourage the forces of defiance to redouble their efforts once the peace move had failed, as it must fail. It would completely shatter Jewish confidence in the United Nations authority and fortify extreme councils among Jews. It would discredit the United Nations in the eyes of the Arabs and deal a serious blow to its prestige generally. In short, far from serving the interests of peace, it would only prolong and intensify the present strife.

It was the spokesman of the United States delegation who pointed out to the Assembly at its last session, just before the vote was taken, that the compromise based on Partition was the only way out after all past efforts at conciliation had failed; that it was therefore useless to re-open the question of conciliation and that the time for action had now arrived.

2. Another question which you put to me was whether we had tried by direct contact with the British Government to clear up those aspects of their policy which were so distressing to us. I replied that we had, but to no avail. I should explain that soon after the decision at Lake Success my friends in London approached the Colonial Secretary and expressed their readiness to discuss with him questions of policy relating to the interim period, with a view to a possible agreement. His reply was that the British Government would negotiate on these points with the UN Commission and preferred our desiderata also to be communicated to the Commission and not to them direct. A similar approach on my part to Sir Alexander Cadogan in New York elicited a similar reply.

In the course of time, we repeatedly discussed with the representatives of the British Government in London questions arising from the course of events in Palestine. We called their attention to current reports about the designs they had in mind, aiming at or liable to lead to the frustration of the solution adopted by the United Nations. They have categorically denied the allegations and rejected the charges, but facts have continued to tell a different story—a story which. I presented to you in the first part of our interview.

So long as the British Government are in control of Palestine, we shall, quite naturally, continue to address ourselves to them in an attempt to remove, or at least mitigate the evils arising from their present policy, however futile the attempt may be. Be we cannot hope to change that policy, which appears to be inveterate.

I should like to add, again in connection with rumors that are current, that we would view with the greatest anxiety any attempt to prevail upon the British Government to prolong their Mandate over Palestine beyond the date of May fifteenth, which they, themselves, have fixed for its termination. We would, in fact, most strenuously oppose any such prolongation. The progressive disintegration of the British governmental machine in Palestine, its failure to maintain law and order, the distrust and suspicion which its every action and inaction evokes, make the continuation of the present regime daily more intolerable. The new ghastly outrage in Jerusalem, which has given rise to the worst possible fears as to its authorship, renders the position unprecedentedly critical. In these circumstances, any deliberate attempt to give a further lease of life to British rule in Palestine is tantamount to courting disaster. If any change is indicated it is to shorten, rather than lengthen, this critical period. We can only hope that either the report to which I have referred is completely untrue, or, if it is true, the attempt will not be countenanced by the United States Government.

In our submission, concern for a just solution of the problem and for eventual peace in Palestine, should lead to the concentration of all efforts on the speediest possible establishment of a Provisional Council of Government for the Jewish State, the immediate preparation of a properly armed Jewish State-militia, and if at all possible, the setting up of an internationl force adequate in composition and size.

We fully accept the position that the United States can act in this matter only as a member and within the framework of the United Nations. But it seems to us axiomatic that action by the United Nations depends on the initiative and readiness to assume responsibilities of its leading members.

I must apologize for the length of this letter, particularly since you were kind enough to give me so much of your time. But I hope you will agree that the seriousness of the subject warrants making every effort to clarify it fully.

With renewed thanks for your courtesy and attention, I remain¹

Yours sincerely,

Moshe Shertok

1. Acknowledged by Mr. Henderson on February 27.