Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/2–2348

Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the White House¹

undated

top secret

Message to the President

There follows draft statement which Ambassador Austin proposes to make before Security Council Tuesday morning about 10:30 a. m. This statement accurately reflects the policy which you have approved in principle in working paper submitted earlier.² Austin’s speech does not represent recession in any way from position taken by us in General Assembly. In fact, it is stronger with regard to threats to the peace which have developed since Assembly discussion. Those who may construe this as recession hold the incorrect view that Charter authorizes Security Council to impose recommendations by force.

If you wish to comment publicly on Ambassador Austin’s statement, it would be helpful if your comments could be along the following line:

“I entirely approve the position taken by Ambassador Austin in the Security Council regarding Palestine; it is the position of the United States Government and follows the attitude we took in the General Assembly.”

[Here follows the proposed statement, which, except for inconsequential changes in wording, was the same as that delivered by Ambassador Austin before the Security Council on February 24. Extracts from his statement of that date are printed on page 651.]

1. This top secret message is undated. In an attached memorandum, also un dated, Secretary Marshall stated: “This is final on Palestine—The President has approved Austin’s statement. Original is in New York.” The latest available draft prior to the final message is dated February 23.

   In a memorandum to Mr. Lovett on February 19, Mr. McClintock noted that he had prepared, at Mr. Rusk’s request, the first draft of Ambassador Austin’s proposed statement, also dated the 19th, and that it had “been gone over by representatives of NEA and Le.” The memorandum stated that “The watershed of the speech is reached on Page 8. If the sentence in brackets in the second paragraph on that page is omitted the speech in effect knocks the plan for the partition of Palestine in the head. If that sentence is retained, however, the speech comes out in favor of UN enforcement measures to partition Palestine.” The paragraph containing the bracketed sentence, as originally drafted, stated: “What this means is this: The Council under the Charter powers I have just mentioned can take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Council by these same powers can take action to prevent a threat to international peace and security from inside Palestine. This action is directed solely to the maintenance of peace. It has no concern with implementing per se the Assembly’s resolution on Palestine. The Council’s action, in other words, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition. [It is undeniable, however, that the establishment of internal order in Palestine by the Security Council in pursuance of its duty to maintain international peace might establish conditions under which the Palestine Commission could succeed in carrying put its mandate according to the terms of the resolution of November 29, 1947.]”

   In a memorandum of February 24 to Mr. McDermott, Mr. McClintock observed that Secretary Marshall had participated in the final drafting of the speech. He also expressed his belief that “it is of the utmost importance that an off-the-record background briefing of American correspondents be given promptly, either by Mr. Lovett or Mr. Bohlen. Mr. Lovett would seem to be the logical candidate since he has been handling the Palestine question at the top level. There is wide public misconception as to the enforcement powers of the United Nations and the kernel of our constitutional position requires considerable educative effort if it is to be got across to the people in plain English.”

   The memorandum of February 24, as well as various drafts of Ambassador Austin’s statement, are filed with the record copy of the paper sent to the President.

   The Elsey Papers contain an abbreviated version of the Secretary’s top secret message, as transmitted to President Truman in telegram White 7 at 12:50 p. m. EST, February 23.

2. See p. 637.