501.BB Palestine/6–1848: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
us urgent
2702. For Secretary and Lovett. Bevin said this morning that future of Haifa is a specific problem of great concern to HMG, to the Mediator, [Page 1123] to the Jews and to the Arabs, and to European recovery. Matter is urgent because plans British military call for last British troops leave Haifa by June 30. This fact is not as yet known to Arabs,1 but Mediator is alarmed at possible resulte British withdrawal before end truce and he is going to discuss matter with GOC Haifa.
2. Jews have asked that refinery should be opened (Embassy’s 2700, June 182) and have stated that in absence sufficient Arab laborers Jewish manpower would be provided.
3. On June 14 Iraqi Defense Minister advised British Ambassador Baghdad that ultimate fate Haifa is most important Palestine problem. He expressed view that if Haifa cannot be in Arab state it must be free port; otherwise pipeline would have to be relaid through Syria and Lebanon because although Iraqi economy is dependent on oil royalties, Iraq “could not tolerate outlet for its oil being in Jewish state”. British Ambassador commented to Foreign Office that “it becomes more than ever clear that Haifa is sorest of all Arab points and the evacuation Haifa during cease-fire will be severe shock to Arabs and considered as disturbing in favor Jews present balance.
4. Bevin said he is faced by necessity of deciding on course which HMG should follow. If British troops remain at Haifa after June 30, fresh troops would have to be sent in and HMG is most anxious to avoid this. On other hand, he thought British Government, because of (a) British and Western European interests in refinery, (b) Jewish desire to reopen refinery, and (c) Iraqi approach (paragraph 3 above), would be fully justified in laying these facts before Mediator either with or without British comment. If HMG commented, it would express to Mediator the view that before British troops withdraw Mediator might consider possibility of getting Arabs and Jews to agree on establishment, if only for a period and if only with reservations on both sides, of an international port at Haifa under Mediator’s or UN auspices. This port might consist either of whole town or be confined to port area including refinery now occupied by British troops. Such an arrangement would have the advantage of possibly attracting back to Haifa the Arab laborers essential to refinery operations. These laborers are presently unwilling to return to work in Jewish state. If Mediator acted along these lines, it would be important that international regime in Haifa should exclude USSR: Foreign Office has in mind a very small international control element; perhaps only one administrator with small police force and staff.
[Page 1124]5. At this point Bevin digressed to say that early action by Mediator to achieve international regime Jerusalem seems highly desirable to Foreign Office although perhaps it would not be as appropriate for HMG to comment with regard to Jerusalem as with regard to Haifa. He thought international regime, both Haifa and Jerusalem, particularly if area Jerusalem is reduced, might go far to stimulate confidence among Arabs.
6. Bevin said there was no compulsion upon him to do so, but in line with his thoughts embodied in paragraph 4, Embassy’s 2701, June 18, he is unwilling to raise the pressing problem of Haifa with Mediator without having first consulted US Government. The present was not too early to begin the working arrangement he hoped for with regard to advice. Bevin said he would like to know:
- a.
- Does US Government perceive any impropriety in HMG’s advising Mediator of the approaches to it by Jews and Arabs with regard to reopening Haifa?
- b.
- Does US Government believe that it would be appropriate for HMG to lay before Mediator in addition to a its views with regard to the desirability of international regime for port or town of Haifa along lines paragraph 4 above?
- c.
- If HMG takes either action with US concurrence, would US Government be willing to so advise Mediator or at least to let HMG do so?
7. I told Bevin that I understood the urgency of these questions and appreciated the motive which caused him to consult the US before acting. I said that I would ask the Department to reply to his questions within 48 hours. I said that in my view Haifa oil is essential to ERP and if some international regime or control by mediator would result in refinery resuming operations near future, this would not only be contribution to Jewish economy and to Arab economy: it would also be a vital contribution to the economy of Europe.