Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/6–1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

secret
us urgent

London, June 18, 1948—8 p. m.

2701. For Secretary and Lovett. Bevin sent Michael Wright to see me June 16 and today I continued the discussion directly with Bevin who said that he is most anxious to consolidate and extend beyond truce period the common ground found with USG re Palestine: He wished fervently that we would work together until both sides agreed on final settlement. The following is summary of views and hopes expressed by Bevin (and in Bevin’s name by Wright) on these two occasions:

1. British Government has not in the least altered its views re disastrous consequences which would flow from imposition sanctions under Chapter 7 (Embassy’s 2267, paragraph 3).¹

2. Any solution upon which Jews and Arabs can agree would be welcome to HMG.

3. Regretfully Bevin is inclined to think that Arabs and Jews may not reach agreement under Bernadotte’s auspices without much delay and then probably not without USG and HMG getting involved to some degree as sources of advice. Already Bevin had been asked by Lebanese Prime Minister for British counsel (for Prime Minister’s use in Cairo talks) with regard to how far Arab states can push their case without losing sympathy British Government. (See Paragraph 5 below). It is not unlikely, Bevin thinks, that British Government will receive other similar requests to this one and question arises as to what reply if any British Government should make.

4. Bevin said British Government could prefer not to get into position of giving advice different from US views. If this happened a new divergence re Palestine would arise between USG and HMG. He thinks it advisable, consequently, for USG, and HMG to agree in so far as possible that when either government is asked for counsel (and he foresees possibility that occasion might arise in which USG and HMG might find it necessary even to volunteer counsel) neither HMG or USG will give advice without either agreeing its substance between themselves or at least informing the other sufficiently in advance as to its character.

5. Bevin said that he has decided not to comply with request of Lebanese Prime Minister for advice. His question was too vague and the mediator should be given a clear field with both sides.

6. Future opportunities might occur, however, when such advice might be crucial to a settlement and he would feel greatly reassured if Department would agree with his thinking in Paragraph 4 above.

7. Bevin said he hoped also that USG and HMG are agreed that it is their common aim, even if first truce does not succeed, that truce itself should be extended and thus avoid recourse to compulsion by SC under Chapter 7.

8. Bevin said that he felt that Foreign Office knows too little of how the mind of Bernadotte is working and suggested that since mediator is hard man to catch, it would be advisable for USG and HMG to pool their information in this regard. Time might come when both governments might be able to help mediator’s task considerably if they knew the trend mediator’s negotiations.

9. I told Bevin that I thought his idea of cross-clearing advice before it is given in response to requests is a good one, which I would put to Department for consideration with my favorable recommendation. I said that I had little doubt that if this cease-fire failed to result in solution USG would in any case wish to see truce extended. I said that I thought an American-British pooling of information re mediator would be of mutual advantage and that in so far as messages reaching this Embassy are concerned I thought that we are already doing this. I suggested that we might both endeavor to stimulate flow of reports of this character.

10. I feel that the conversations described above constitute an extension of the meeting with Attlee, Bevin, Chiefs of Staff and others, May 25 reported Embassy’s reference telegram and as such are to be welcomed as a further British effort to keep US and UK in step re Palestine. I hope the Department will specifically endorse the tentative replies I made to Bevin (Paragraph 9).

11. See my immediately following telegram re Haifa.

Douglas

1. Dated May 25, p. 1047. Ambassador Douglas, on June 19, sent a telegram for the special attention of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary Lovett, which stated: “Lest there be any misunderstanding, I must emphasize that nothing in paragraph 1 of Embassy’s 2701 is contrary to official UK position with regard to Chapter VII taken in SC (Embassy’s 2312, May 27, paragraph 5). Bevin is in full agreement that if present efforts break down it may become necessary to invoke Chapter VII. It is Bevin’s earnest hope that by US and UK moving together it will be possible to work out a final settlement without recourse to sanctions.” (Telegram 2713 from London, 501.BB Palestine/6–1948)