891.20 Missions/4–1248: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley) to the Secretary of State
377. Minister of Interior informed General Schwarzkopf 11th that latter enjoyed full confidence of Iranian Government and that he, Ahmedi, was in favor of retention of Schwarzkopf’s command authority as provided in present agreement covering gendarmerie mission. Minister continued, however, that Iran was in very difficult position owing Soviet pressure and was anxious not to provoke USSR at this time. Government had accordingly decided it would be best for time being for head of gendarmerie mission not to have command authority, and for mission to be advisory only. This, he said, would be a purely temporary expedient and it would be intention of Iranian [Page 138] Government to restore Schwarzkopf’s full authority as soon as circumstances should permit.
As General Schwarzkopf is reporting to Army Department, his reply was that decision was entirely in hands of Iranian Government but that he must point out he would probably be replaced if character of mission were altered to make it purely advisory, even temporarily. Ahmedi showed great concern over possibility of Schwarzkopf’s departure and declared strong representations would be made through Iranian Embassy in Washington to have him stay here during temporary advisory phase of mission. Ahmedi gave assurances that during this period Iranian commander would cooperate fully with Schwarzkopf. He also said matter would be discussed with me by Foreign Minister and himself, but Schwarzkopf is inclined to doubt now whether Iranian Government will make a written reply to Ambassador Allen’s note of February 7.1
General Schwarzkopf is strongly of view that this move on part of Iranian Government, constitutes appeasement of USSR taken in conjunction with desire eliminate Article 24 of Grow Mission contract. He feels presentation of matter as a purely temporary expedient is a device to do away with command authority, which once removed will never in his opinion be restored. He is skeptical of assurances re full cooperation of Iranian commander once Article 20 is eliminated. Schwarzkopf also feels that it would be contrary to the American interest for us to accede at this time to such a proposal, especially in view of present prospects for our affording concrete assistance to Iran in regard to supplying arms.
I should appreciate receiving urgently an indication of views of State and Army Departments with regard to this latest development.
I think present Iranian Government has become very decided on reducing authority of Schwarzkopf mission. In view of present political situation I am inclined believe this might be advisable. The criterion of efficiency of the mission will depend on the extent to which the gendarmerie would act on recommendations of an advisory mission.
I suggest, however, no action be taken until Foreign Minister sends for me to discuss matter.2
- Not printed, but see first footnote 1, p. 107.↩
- Tehran, on April 15, reported information that the gendarmerie would be merged into the army, primarily for reasons of economy, and that the Shah had approved the merger (telegram 390, 891.20/4–1548). Then, on April 24, Ambassador Wiley advised that plans to merge the gendarmerie and army had been temporarily suspended because of the unfortunate publicity. He stated also that the “Foreign Minister did not deny to me [on the] 21st that government had decided merge army with gendarmerie and also eliminate Schwarzkopf’s command authority.” The Ambassador concluded that “we should insist on Iranian Government’s replying to Ambassador Allen’s note of February 7 before considering anything else.” (telegram 434 from Tehran, 891.20/4–2448)↩