Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

890.0145/12–648

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard S. Sanger of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

secret

[Washington,] December 6, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. T. E. Bromley—First Secretary, British Embassy
	GTI—Mr. Clyde Dunn
	NE—Mr. Richard H. Sanger
	NE—Mr. Harlan Clark

Background:

On November 24th the following informal memorandum was handed by Mr. Jernegan¹ to Mr. Bromley:—

“We suggest that the wording of paragraph 1 (a) of the draft proclamation might be changed to read as follows:—

[Here follows paragraph as quoted in paragraph 2 of telegram 1114, November 29, to Tehran, page 61.]

“The purpose of this change would be to make it clear to Iran that Iran would have a voice in the delineation of the line rather than being presented with a fait accompli. We think that this change does not make any material change in the meaning of the paragraph and that it might serve to make the proposed action more palatable to the Iranian Government.”

Discussion:

Mr. Bromley said that a reply had been received from London regarding Mr. Jernegan’s memorandum of November 24th. In this reply the British Foreign Office doubted the wisdom of the changes proposed in the wording of the proclamation on the following grounds:—

(1) Such a change in wording might point the way to a conference of the rulers or governments of the Gulf states on the subject of the proposed draft proclamation, a development which it was felt would be undesirable.

(2) The changes indicated that there might be several ways of drawing up a median line and of determining various other technical aspects of the proposed proclamation which offered an opportunity for dispute between the states involved.

(3) On the political side, London felt the changes offered a wide field for disagreement among the countries involved and therefore might provoke the very disputes which we are trying to avoid.

(4) The suggestion that the “line is subsequently to be more precisely defined” meant that the oil companies involved would remain in a state of uncertainty as to how far out into the Gulf their concessions extended.

Mr. Bromley said that in transmitting Mr. Jernegan’s memorandum to London he had explained that the Department favored these changes but would not insist upon them if London strongly disagreed, and he felt that this reply from the British Foreign Office constituted Such disagreement. Mr. Bromley was told that we wish to consider the reaction of London before giving him any final reply on the subject of the proposed changes.

In further discussion Mr. Bromley said that the Foreign Office had been happy to learn that we had advised Aramco to go ahead and hold talks with SAG on this subject provided certain restrictions were met. He said that the Foreign Office was anxious that we should work out a, schedule on dates so that there would be no question but that SAG was the first Government approached about this matter. He concluded by saying that the high level clearances for which we are waiting, in regard to timing and procedures, had not yet been forthcoming from London.²

1. John D. Jernegan, Chief of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs.
2. The Department transmitted a summary of this memorandum to Tehran in telegram 1152, December 10; and repeated it to London. The telegram stated that “Dept not pushing matter changes or taking any action offshore oil pending (a) arrival Wiley in Wash, (b) visit Allen, Tehran and (c) high-level Brit approval draft proclamation and approach procedure mentioned Deptel 4537 to London rpt Tehran as 1139, Dec. 4.” (890.0145/12–948)