745F.90H/12–1148
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Richard S. Leach of the Division of South Asian Affairs
During a conversation at the Department today, concerning Afghan security requirements, Mr. Aziz1 reiterated the view that cooperation between Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan was essential if these countries were to be secure. However, Afghan agreement with Pakistan over the future of 6,000,000 Pathans* east of the Durand line, was a sine qua non for any real cooperation. He felt that some “middle ground” arrangement could be worked out with Pakistan which would be acceptable and viable. However, there should in any case be another and equitable plebiscite enabling the Pathans to opt for independence if they so desired. It was the Afghan hope that the U.S. would use its influence with the UK and Pakistan to bring this about.
He went on to say that Afghanistan feared the “denationalization” of these 6,000,000 Pathans—with their absorption into Pakistan they might in time become “semi-Punjabis”. This would be disastrous to Afghanistan because its survival as a national entity depends upon keeping the spiritual orientation of the Pathans toward Kabul, and being able to draw on them for military support. At the same time, [Page 474] Mr. Aziz says there are about 1500 “Afghans” in key positions in the Pakistan government.
Failure in bilateral negotiations to achieve the desired status for the Pathans (i.e. independence or something close to it) would make it necessary for the Afghan government to strengthen its ties and influence with these Pathan elements in the Government of Pakistan, possibly to accept some kind of federation with Pakistan in which the Pathans would have appropriate standing.
In response to queries Mr. Aziz said the economic advancement of the Pathans was more important to Afghanistan than it was to Pakistan and indicated that his Government was willing and able to undertake this burden. He further said the Pathans possessed leaders of sufficient stature and ability to organize a new state. Perhaps it would be feasible for Afghanistan and Pakistan jointly to support and cooperate with such a state, which would then be a source of strength to both of them, and would be an essential element in any regional defense plan.
The writer mentioned the difficulty Pakistan faces in assuming the responsibilities of statehood, and suggested that the injection at this time of controversial issues such as the Pathan question would complicate the problem and would not be conducive to the stability which this government hopes may be attained and preserved in the area. However he indicated that the U.S. was aware of the complex and deep-seated nature of the tribal problem and was endeavoring to keep an open mind on the subject.
Comment: This is the first time the writer has noted an assertion by any of the Afghans of their economic ability to fend for their tribal cousins in Pakistan.
Leaving aside the question of any new referendum it would seem that real cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan not only cannot be achieved, but recurring trouble for both countries can scarcely be avoided until some move is made vis-à-vis the Pathans which will satisfy, partially at least, the Afghan desire to maintain prestige amongst them, without doing violence to Pakistan’s conception of its sovereign rights and legal position. At the same time there would appear to be a strong community of interest between the two countries in (a) the need for stability in the border area, and (b) regional defense possibilities. A step in the direction of cooperation might be consideration by both countries of some joint responsibility for the economic advancement of the tribal people.