501.BC Kashmir/11–148
Memorandum by the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (Huddle)1
Subject: Developments on the Kashmir Problem.
[The first two paragraphs of this memorandum concern a luncheon conversation of October 30 between Huddle and Zafrullah Khan regarding water rights in three rivers that originate in Jammu-Kashmir and flow through Pakistan before entering the northeastern area of India.]
On Saturday evening, October 30th, I dined with Colonel Abdur Rahim Khan of the Pakistan Delegation, and Minister Mohammed Ali the Pakistan Chief of the Cabinet who accompanied the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to London and Paris.
Mohammed Ali informed me that the London conversations which Prime Minister Attlee arranged with Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan were without constructive result insofar as the
[Page 441]Kashmir problem is concerned. He said that when Prime Minister Attlee first raised the question, Mr. Nehru was somewhat receptive to the idea of a plebiscite which would be arranged as the Pakistani advocate. Later however he seemed to change his position, and in the end had flatly refused to agree with Pakistan demands in the plebiscite proposals. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan continuously expressed himself as favorable to the plebiscite idea although he would not agree with a “district plebiscite” or series of district plebiscites but insisted that an overall or general plebiscite be held for the whole country. The Pakistani objected to the district plebiscite because they feel that displacement of population has occurred to such an extent that a series of district plebiscites might have spotty results which would be entirely unsatisfactory in the ultimate disposal of Jammu-Kashmir. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan expressed himself during the conversation as being agreeable to any arrangement under neutral control which would guarantee a fair result.
At one point in the conversations Mr. Attlee had asked about the possibility of a military decision if matters went from bad to worse. In response to this question Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had said that the Pakistani had no idea that they would be able to expel the Indians from Jammu-Kashmir, but he said on the other hand that India would never be able to drive the Pakistani out of Jammu-Kashmir.
The conversations ended therefore without anything in the nature of an understanding for settlement.
Sir Stafford Cripps however had suggested a day or two ago that since both Prime Ministers Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan were together in Paris they should by all means make an effort to meet here for a further conversation. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had said in reply to this suggestion that he would be agreeable, and it was therefore arranged that he would call on Mr. Nehru on Saturday evening, October 30th at 10 p. m. (I understand that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan attended an early evening reception given by Pandit Nehru and the Indian Delegation and that the 10 o’clock appointment was filled thereafter.)
Mr. Mohammed Ali told me on Saturday evening that he would arrange to let me know the results of the conversation of Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan as soon as possible, and since he thought he would have the information in hand by Monday morning we arranged for an appointment at 10:30 a. m. on Monday, November 1st prior to his departure on Tuesday for Cairo and Karachi.
In my conversation with Mr. Mohammed Ali I found that his views have not changed since my departure from Karachi, and they remain as previously reported to the American Delegation and the Department.
[Page 442]On Monday, November 1st, in our conversation at 10:30 o’clock, Mr. Mohammed Ali reported to me that the talk between Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru had no better results than their previous conversations in London. Mr. Mohammed Ali said that Mr. Nehru had proposed one of two methods of procedure to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.
The first was that Pakistan accept without any conditions the Resolution, taken by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on August 13, 1948.
The second, an alternative, would be that Pakistan accept a partition of Jammu-Kashmir on the lines now existing, meaning the territory occupied and controlled by the Azad Kashmiri and the Pakistani on the one hand and the territory occupied and controlled by the Indians and the local Sheikh Abdullah Government on the other.
Regarding the first Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had replied to Mr. Nehru that Pakistan had accepted the Commission’s Resolution, although it had made a condition that India must accept the plebiscite terms of the Resolution of the Security Council of April 21, 1948. Unless India would accept those terms as applicable in working out the future of Kashmir, Pakistan of course could not implement the Parts I and II of the Resolution. Mr. Nehru would not go along with this proposal of the Pakistan Prime Minister.
Insofar as the second proposition of Mr. Nehru was concerned, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan declined to give any consideration whatsoever to the suggestion of partition, to say nothing of partition on lines which exist at present.
(It seems clear that a stalemate exists between the two Governments on the Kashmir question and that neither is willing to make concessions which are obviously necessary if a peaceful settlement is to be achieved).
Having thus briefly reviewed the conversation of the two Prime Ministers, Mr. Mohammed Ali told me that the idea of partition seems to be gaining some support in recent days. He says that the Indians are apparently responsible for initiating a new consideration of partition. In addition to members of the Indian Delegation whom he thinks have been broaching the matter he met an old friend from India, a former university professor of his, who suggested to him that partition might well be undertaken.
When Mr. Mohammed Ali introduced the question it gave me a good opportunity to discuss again with him the partition possibility. Little or nothing had been said of partition during the later weeks of the Commission’s presence in Pakistan but in our earlier days there the question was raised from time to time. At that time Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan told me in a manner not to be misunderstood that [Page 443] Pakistan would not favor any splitting up of Jammu-Kashmir which would deprive Pakistan of all or even any part of the Vale of Kashmir. Even regarding the eastern corner of the State of Jammu which is now probably 100% Indian, Liaquat Ali Khan said that he would take his chances on a general plebiscite to cover the whole area and would not think of giving up a claim to any of Jammu. Mr. Mohammed Ali maintained the same position in this present conversation which his chief had expressed last July. I mentioned several possible divisions which might seem on their face to be equitable. I suggested that southeastern Jammu wasn’t necessary to Pakistan economy, that it was now denuded of Muslims, and that it appertained naturally to India. I feel that the Pakistani would not be too averse to the loss of this particular territory, but they do want the whole of the Chenab Valley. My personal feeling is that the Chenab should not be a boundary but in a division should go to Pakistan. I also broached the possibility that the Vale of Kashmir itself might be susceptible to division so that the southern part might appertain to India and the northern part to Pakistan. The southern part would include the district of Anantnag and the town of Srinagar, while the northern part would include Baramulla and the town of Baramulla. As stated above Pakistan might be willing that India should have the extreme southeast of Jammu without too much dispute, but Mr. Mohammed Ali flatly refused to consider any division of the Vale of Kashmir.
These possible divisions presume, to be sure, that all of the perimeter now in Pakistan hands should remain under Pakistan jurisdiction.
I finally asked Mr. Mohammed Ali whether his Government would be disposed to consider any partition proposition with favor and he said he thought it would be useless to present one.
With reference to the question of partition I am convinced that a similar attitude will be found among the Indians. The similarity lies in the fact that the Indians are equally insistent upon obtaining the Vale of Kashmir and they would not accept any partition of Jammu-Kashmir which did not award them the famous Valley. The situation in this respect is no different from what it has been in the past.
I took this opportunity to sound out Mr. Mohammed Ali on what Pakistan might find agreeable in the recommendations and conclusions of the Commission. He is explicit in answering that Pakistan now favors a Resolution by the Security Council setting forth the conditions under which a general plebiscite shall be held in Jammu-Kashmir. He said if this is prescribed by the Security Council along with the August 13, 1948 Resolution of the Commission, Pakistan will be glad to comply in all respects such as the withdrawal of its Army, etc. Beyond this, Mr. Mohammed Ali has no constructive suggestions for solution of the problem.
[Page 444]I desire to note for future reference that I asked Mr. Mohammed Ali how long he felt would be required to arrange for a plebiscite. In reply he said that he thought if the conditions were laid down soon that it still could be held within the coming year. This I mentioned specifically because it conflicts with statements made by both Sheikh Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas to members of the Commission, including myself. These minor leaders insisted that anywhere between three to five years would be required to restore conditions to such an extent that a satisfactory plebiscite could be held.
I also asked Mohammed Ali to explain clearly to me what Mr. Liaquat Ali Kahn, Sir Zafrullah Khan and he himself meant by “a neutral government” to ensure a fair and equitable plebiscite. He said “neutralized” might be a better term. They had in mind something like a coalition government participated in on equal terms by the present Azad Kashmir movement and the Sheikh Abdullah regime which for these purposes would fuse. (Members of the Commission had learned through informal conversations with Sheikh Abdullah and Ghulam Abbas that they might not be adverse to forming a coalition which might possibly be effective in this relation).
- Transmitted to the Department by the Commission in its despatch No. 10, November 1, 1948; not printed.↩