501.BC Kashmir/10–948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

secret   priority

Delga 257. Following aide-mémoire handed Austin by Cadogan late yesterday:

  • “1. We understand that the UNCIP have now arrived at Geneva to write an interim report. Since this report will then come before the SC we are anxious to obtain some advance indication of:—(a) the probable date when it will be available; (b) the main points which the commission contemplate including in it. Owing to our lack of contact with the commission we have no direct source of information.
  • 2. In view of the present deadlock it seems important that the report should contain some constructive indications of the lines of which the commission themselves would propose to make further progress. Otherwise we fear that the whole question will be thrown back upon the SC with a repetition of the debates which preceded the resolution of 21 April.
  • 3. As regards the timetable we are particularly anxious to know whether the report will be available before or during the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London when there may conceivably be an opportunity for some talk with the Indian and Pakistan representatives on Kashmir. Such discussions, if practicable, might be useful, without of course, in any way affecting the functions of the SC or its commission. Pandit Nehru will be here from about 6th to 25th October. We hope that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan will also be here and if he cannot come owing to the responsibilities falling on him consequent of Mr. Jinnah’s death, Sir M. Zafrullah Khan will take his place.
  • 4. We understand that the commission may be thinking in terms of partition. We have hitherto believed that it would be a mistake for the SC to abandon the relatively firm ground of the proposal to have a plebiscite which has been accepted in principle by both sides and which is enshrined in the SC’s resolution of 21 April, unless there is really solid reason to think that India and Pakistan are ready to agree on some alternative arrangement and one which promises to provide permanent solution. We still think that to abandon the agreed principle of a fair plebiscite would be a most dangerous proceeding, unless both sides are really agreed. On the other hand, we are conscious that a plebiscite covering the whole state would involve considerable administrative difficulties and is open to the objection that, if the fate of the whole state of Kashmir and Jammu is decided by plebiscite as a single unit, either south-eastern districts with a Hindu majority might go to Pakistan or Poonch and Gilgit etc, might go to India. Our information suggests that India might now be ready to consider partition, although Pakistan appears to be increasingly confident that a genuinely fair plebiscite covering the whole state would go in their favour.
  • 5. In these circumstances, we would see some advantage in the commission mentioning partition in their report as a possible solution. But [Page 425] since straightforward partition does not seem politically practicable this suggestion could therefore best take the form of proposal that:
    1.
    Certain areas in south-east of the state should be conceded outright to India and certain other areas should be conceded outright to Pakistan;
    2.
    Plebiscite conducted on lines suggested in SC’s resolution of 21 April should be held in remainder of state.

    It seems essential to keep this resolution in the foreground in this way, since it has the authority of the SC and lays down minimum conditions for the conduct of a fair plebiscite. It also seems of great importance that the commission should not attempt to define at this stage the areas which under any partition should go to either India or Pakistan, because this would make it difficult for either side subsequently to accept less.
  • 6. It is important that, if partition is to be discussed, the initiative should come from the commission. Any chance of progress would be seriously prejudiced if the Indians and Pakistanis believed that the UK Government had taken steps to promote a solution of these lines.”

Air-pouched to Geneva and London.

Marshall