Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

501.BC Kashmir/10–448: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

secret

London, October 4, 1948—8 p. m.

4376. Sir Paul Patrick volunteered following re Kashmir October 1st.

1. While acute apprehension exists in Pakistan regarding GOI military intentions in Kashmir, CRO has “best reasons” to think GOI fears Pakistan military aggression in Kashmir. However, Patrick said as he saw situation in Paris, and on basis other information he could not believe there is much risk GOP–GOI war at the moment. For example, Indian and Pakistan general headquarters are still in daily telephonic communication. Patrick believes both sides sincerely would like to have out-of-court settlement and that both sides recognize that sooner or later each will have to make concessions. Immediate question to be decided, Patrick said, is whether publication Kashmir Commission report would help or hinder out-of-court settlement. Patrick said view CRO is that if two sides could get together on a settlement it might be better for Kashmir Commission report never to be made public even though it is as even-handed as Department suggests (paragraph 5, Department’s 3814 September 29 to London sent Geneva for Kashmir Commission as 1391). If report is published Patrick believes it should be as short as possible.

2. Patrick said His Majesty’s Government has in mind that following lines of action would be desirable during next two weeks:

(a) Step one, which is now in progress, involves informal conversations between Mudaliar¹ and Zafrulla in Paris with a view to an out-of-court settlement. Two men are old friends and are stopping at the same hotel.

(b) Step two would be advising Kashmir Commission not to rush preparation of its report. In any case CRO understands report could not be ready before October 11.

(c) Step three, because it is important to know whether Mudaliar and Zafrulla are in fact making progress, would involve President SC quietly requesting Secretary General to ask Colban to go to Paris and there discreetly sound out GOI and GOP representatives as to how close they are to a settlement.

(d) Step four would be Colban’s report of his investigation to President SC via Secretary General: If genuine progress towards settlement has been made President SC would direct Kashmir Commission not to publish its report, if progress is slight or non-existent President SC would give directions for publication report with or without prior discussion of its contents with GOP and GOI representatives.

(e) Step five would involve such help toward out-of-court settlement as Prime Minister Attlee might be able to give by urging such settlement upon Nehru and Liaquat (or his representative) at time of Commonwealth conference.

3. Patrick said Cadogan has been instructed to speak to Senator Austin along above lines.

Sent Department 4376; repeated Paris (for Gadel) 702, Geneva (for Kashmir Commission) 84, Delhi 74, Karachi 76.

Holmes

1. A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, Representative of India on the U.N. Economic and Social Council.