Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

501.BC Kashmir/9–2948: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (Huddle), at Geneva¹

secret

Washington, September 29, 1948—7 p. m.

1391. Kascom 35 for Huddle.

1. Dept approves suggestion urtel 868 Sep 21 that informal discussions Paris GOP and GOI Dels be undertaken in effort obtain their acquiescence Commission’s resolution Aug 13 with such modifications as may be necessary. We believe that it would be desirable for any efforts made by US GADel along these lines be accompanied by similar approaches by UN reps Paris other members Com. We feel that even though Com plans initiate preparation its report to SC Sep 30, informal efforts Paris should be continued as outlined until such time it is clearly evident Corns report must be negative thereby necessitating formal SC debate.

2. For your guidance and that GADel we believe that most practicable course pursue during these informal talks would be endeavor persuade GOI and GOP reps accept brief outline plebiscite arrangements under UN supervision as supplement Aug 13 resolution. Dept inclined believe GOP attitude conditioned by deep-seated fear Indian aggression which leads GOP insistence on safeguards after withdrawal Pakistan troops along lines Part B SC res April 21. After preliminary examination SC Document S/995² Sep 15, Dept questions whether GOI response Corns proposals points 2 and 3 GOI letter Aug 20 fully compatible with sections IB, II B 1 and 2, and III Corns Aug 13 res. Although in view Korbel’s letter Aug 25³ Com probably unable reverse its position this matter, we feel GOP attitude re plebiscite should not necessarily be considered as rejection Corns proposals and that every effort should be made with GOP and GOI reps to indicate that Com has not yet closed door on this point.

3. Nature Corns report will no doubt be influenced to some degree by outcome in formal talks Paris. If such talks fail produce definitive results, please endeavor persuade Com include in its report specific recommendations for SC action, in order provide new terms reference for Com or any other UN authority that may replace it. SC resolution 21 April contains general proposals cease-fire and truce and more detailed proposals for plebiscite in Part B. Corns efforts to date have resulted in elaboration and clarification plans for cease-fire and truce. It would appear desirable for Com, building on these bases, to submit specific recommendations to SC covering cease-fire, truce and plebiscite, modifying both SC resolution and Corns proposals as necessary in light positions taken by GOI and GOP during negotiations. Diminution military action Kashmir due to winter conditions may offer best opportunity place such plan in operation and plebiscite might be scheduled May 1949 prior to weather permitting resumption military activity.

4. As to SC action on Corns recommendations, choice appears lie between (1) taking further action under Chapter VI (2) adopting recommendations as provisional measures under Art 40 (3) issuing cease-fire order under Art 40 and recommending truce and plebiscite arrangements under Chapter VI. Pls indicate your views and discuss GADel. We have in mind that whatever course decided upon it might be desirable Com submit its views on this as well as recommendations on substance.

5. Dept wishes stress importance tone and approach Corns report. Wherever justifiably permissible, criticism should be directed equally against both sides. For example, note might be taken of GOI military campaign in Kashmir last spring as factor in present situation. In light continued strained GOI–GOP relations and recent reports from several sources that Pak officials sincerely fear military invasion Pak from India, Dept somewhat concerned New Delhi radio report that Com has published letter to GOP placing onus on GOP for breakdown negotiations. If report correct, Dept feels GOI may interpret Corns attitude as moral victory and as possible justification military action against Pak. In view this and in view desirability general support for Corns recommendations in SC and importance acceptance or acquiescence by both parties, we feel it would be tactical mistake for Corns report seek place on either side major blame for lack agreement.

Keep Dept closely advised development thinking in Com.⁴

Lovett

1. The Commission had arrived from New Delhi on September 25.
2. SC Document S/995 is the Commission’s resolution of August 13 and related correspondence, printed in SC, 3rd yr., Suppl. for Nov. 1948, pp. 32 ff.
3. As Commission Chairman, Korbel signed two letters addressed to Nehru on August 25. These are printed in SC, 3rd yr., Suppl. for Nov. 1948, pp. 36–37.
4. This telegram 1391 was repeated to Paris as telegram 91 for information of the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly, and to Karachi, New Delhi, and London as telegrams 370, 593, and 3814, respectively.