845.00/9–2448
The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State
No. 1117
Subject: Reasons for Hyderabad Army Offering Only Token Resistance.
Sir: I have the honor to refer to New Delhi’s telegram no. 865 of September 20, 1948 regarding the Governor-General’s remarks to me on the question of Hyderabad’s appeal to the United Nations. There is enclosed a press despatch from the Delhi Statesman of September 24, 1948 which in the Embassy’s opinion offers an excellent analysis of the military fiasco staged by the Hyderabad Army when GOI troops entered the State. The Department is also referred in this connection to New Delhi’s telegram no. 872 of September 241 in which the Nizam stated in a broadcast on September 23 that he was helpless in the hands of the Razakars and the Laik Ali Ministry.
The political commentator who prepared the enclosed press despatch inquires why the Nizam’s Government, in apparent disregard of the superior power of the Indian Army, saw fit to offer resistance, India had in the field an armored division comprised of a massed force of armored, motorized infantry, paratroops and the necessary auxiliary services, in addition to infantry and artillery units. Against this well-trained and equipped force the Nizam’s Army and Razakar irregular’s, although more than five times in number, had practically no armor, less experience and leadership, limited ammunition and arms, and no air force. The fantastic stories circulating around India regarding Hyderabad bombers in the State, in Pakistan, and in Goa were never credited by the Embassy.
According to the enclosed press despatch, there were two basic reasons for the Nizam’s Government offering no resistance. First, although he never hoped for a decisive military success, the Nizam’s Government gambled until the last minute against the chances of India taking precipitate armed action. The Razakars and the Laik Ali [Page 404] Ministry counted on the possibility of outside help, both military and political, and on the effect of world opinion as expressed through the United Nations.
The second reason for Hyderabad offering no resistance to India’s overwhelming strength is that the Nizam expected, by means of a military clash with a superior opponent, to get rid of the Frankenstein he had created in the form of the Razakars. As it turned out, the Nizam was right and the Laik Ali Ministry wrong. The State is now able to liquidate military Fascism with the help of the Indian Army but the Nizam will probably continue as ruler of the State with his powers circumscribed in the same manner as the other Indian princes. The Embassy considers the foregoing explanation of Hyderabad’s token resistance as entirely correct. The method adopted by the Nizam was the easiest and in fact the only way of getting rid of the Razakars without a terrific toll of lives and serious civil disturbances. The Embassy also believes, although this belief will probably never be substantiated by any tangible evidence, that high ranking officers of the Indian Army who were friends of General El-Edroos, Commander-in-Chief of the Hyderabad Army, made a deal with him (El-Edroos) whereby the Hyderabad Army would not fight. General Bucher himself told me some weeks ago that he had written to El-Edroos advising him not to be so foolish as to resist the Indian Army. High ranking Indian officers who were also personal friends of El-Edroos were also in touch with him. Saadat Ali Khan, son of Nawab Zain Yar Jung, former Hyderabad Agent-General at New Delhi, told me in August that there was bad blood between the Hyderabad Army and Police on the one hand and the Razakars on the other. He also said, however, that it was a question of just how far the Army and Police would go in putting down the Razakars because all three organizations were almost exclusively Muslim.
There is no doubt that the Nizam’s Government lost control of the civil administration in certain, areas adjoining Madras Province and that the Communists were having a “field day” in those areas. The Embassy feels that the GOI action in entering Hyderabad was the only possible remedy for an impossible situation and that it was the only way India could deal effectively with such a trickster as the Nizam. The Embassy has come to the conclusion that the question of a plebiscite in Hyderabad is immaterial since the result would be a foregone conclusion. The Embassy also believes that the GOI will exercise tolerance and discretion in dealing with the Nizam and the Muslim ruling clique in Hyderabad despite the fact that there is a great deal of pressure on the GOI to break up the State, to depose the Nizam, etc.
[Page 405]Finally, the Embassy believes that American prestige and interests in India would be seriously damaged by the United States taking up the cudgels over the question of a plebiscite in Hyderabad. If the plebiscite would serve any useful purpose then such action might be justified on our part but as the situation exists today, the Embassy believes it would be a useless gesture which would only tend to impair relations between India and the United States. In other words, the Embassy believes that from now on the less said by our Government the better so far as the Hyderabad question is concerned.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩