501.BC Kashmir/9–2148: Telegram
The United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (Huddle) to the Secretary of State
868. Comkas 46. Commission considers its departure from sub-continent necessary and expects arrive Geneva about 26th, resuming sessions 30th. Interim will afford me opportunity lay situation before American delegation Paris if desired (Kascom 27 and 291).
Nehru declined categorically to modify his attitude and stands on demand for withdrawal Pakistan forces as preliminary to any plebiscite negotiations. With its army in Kashmir and revolutionary Azad Kashmir forces having had some success, Pakistan now undoubtedly stronger position than last spring, and will not willingly give up its evident gains. Agree too early estimate effect Jinnah’s death on Pakistan policy, but previous experience similar conditions might lead to expectation intensification nationalistic aspirations, at least for time. On other hand, India’s present success Hyderabad will strengthen India, disappoint Pakistan in Kashmir case.
Actually situation in an impasse. It may be that some simple formula supplementing Part III Commission resolution August 13 will prove acceptable both parties, though I am doubtful, and form this will take [Page 401] can be discussed when I arrive Paris. My present feeling is it should not be proposed in interim report but may form subject of separate documents for consideration GOI and GOP.
Advantage may be taken of visit to Paris of both Pakistan and Indian representatives, it is hoped, by our and British delegations, as well as others represented on Commission, informally to impress upon them urgency of coming to agreement, without subject coming up for SC debate.
Zafrullah Khan is, I am convinced, of belief he can divide SC and win support there, though he is worried by Pakistan military invasion Kashmir. He has been most difficult of all officials dealt with in subcontinent, and has succeeded completely alienating majority Commission by his tactics. He has sorely tried my own patience by obvious forensic trickery. His regret because “Commission breaking off discussions” (Karachi telegram September 8, unnumbered2) is to be interpreted as hypocritical misrepresentation actual conditions to cover his own rejection of Commission’s proposals, and his disappointment at being unable delay Commission and utilize it to India’s disadvantage in Hyderabad case. He also has consistently endeavored put on Commission burden which can only be borne by Pakistan and India, and from beginning resented terms of Commission’s proposals which clearly placed responsibility.
Both India and Pakistan demand for selves all of Kashmir. Both fear result of plebiscite in Valley. Neither is in mood to compromise rat moment. In background is religious question.
However, informal discussions in Paris might tend first to press for acceptance Commission’s resolution August 13 as it stands; Zafrullah’s objections are not well founded. If that effort fails, then, second, to press Indians to accept brief outline of plebiscite arrangements under UN supervision, supplementing Commission’s resolution. It is this alternative to which Nehru gave unqualified negative in response to Commission’s request after rebuff by Pakistan.
Failing solution along one or other of these lines, future is obscure. To throw case into SC and to agree upon course of action with threat sanctions raise troublesome prospect.
Sent Department 868; Department pass Paris US GADel.