501.BC/9–1748: Telegram
The Chargé in India (Donovan) to the Secretary of State
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849. Deptels 551 September 14 and 559 September 15.1
1. When I advised Bajpai this morning of observations of Department contained Deptel 551 he said any remarks he might make should not be construed as in any way prejudicing GOI position that Hyderabad question is purely internal problem. He said he appreciated friendly spirit in which Department had approached GOI. Before commenting on question UN supervising plebiscite Hyderabad, he wished inquire exactly what role US envisaged for UN. While Bajpai did not commit himself definitely, it is my impression that UN role, according to Indian view, would have to be limited to observation.
Telegram from Rama Rau re his report on conversation with Satterthwaite2 in which Department’s observations imparted arrived Delhi yesterday afternoon. V. P. Menon then called me his office and expressed his resentment at trend US policy was taking as indicated Rama Rau’s telegram. He apparently did not fully understand contents of telegram as he said GOI would never on principle permit UN interference, but GOI might on own initiative invite UN observer plebiscite when held. When it was pointed out Department envisaged voluntary action by GOI somewhat along these lines, Menon retreated and said while GOI might ask UN, US and Great Britain, furnish observers it would not extend invitation now “on matter of principle” but might or might not do so when preparations plebiscite nearer completion.
Menon reiterated GOI view Hyderabad issue purely internal issue since Hyderabad has no international locus standi. He also said Hyderabad was in identical position as other Indian states and asked if, in case GOI had difficulty with Baroda, UN would feel it should intervene. He also said if principle UN intervention in GOI-Princely state relations accepted, it was possible that whole structure of accession states to India would collapse. He emphasized that Jodhpur, other Rajputana states and Jaipur were waiting for any indication weakness GOI policy before challenging GOI authority and, at least in one case Jodhpur, acceding Pakistan.
Embassy suggests Department give careful consideration following aspects situation before supporting Hyderabad case or insisting [Page 395] UN intervention in GOI-Hyderabad dispute: (1) While V. P. Menon possibly exaggerated danger, Embassy believes Princes would not hesitate take advantage any evidence weakness central government to reobtain former position of power or even attempt establish independence; (2) moreover Embassy feels India will strongly oppose attempt bring Hyderabad dispute within purview UN and would so greatly resent efforts US and Great Britain achieve this objective that friendly relations between India and democracies would be seriously, if not irreparably, damaged. Thus instead of neutral India which despite its neutrality has many bonds friendship and affection uniting it with west, India might become more closely associated with USSR in international field; (3) lack of resistance by Hyderabad troops and speed Indian advance leads Embassy believe UN may find itself dealing with a fait accompli with respect Hyderabad. While Embassy appreciates UN position with respect Hyderabad dispute, there is strong possibility UN intervention will increase difficulties solution Hyderabad problem because of encouragement it will give Nizam not to arrive agreement with India; (4) moreover, Embassy suggests Department bear in mind that disintegrative forces in India are already strong and any encouragement given to Hyderabad, leaders of which interested mostly in maintenance their own power, would to certain degree jeopardize stability India which, with all its weakness, is probably strongest bastion against further advance communism on Asian continent.
Sent Department 849; repeated Karachi 157. Department pass London, Paris for US GADel.