501.BC Kashmir/9–1048
The Chargé in Pakistan (Lewis) to the Secretary of State
No. 409
Subject: Kashmir Dispute: India–Pakistan Commission
Sir: I have the honor to refer to my telegrams No. 446 of September 8 and No. 450 of September 9, 19481 with regard to the release for publication by the United Nations India-Pakistan Commission of the correspondence exchanged between the Commission and the Governments of India and Pakistan since the presentation of the Commission’s resolution of August 13, and the comments of Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, at his press conference on September 8 on the statement of Pandit Nehru before the Indian Parliament on September 7.
Ambassador Huddle has furnished the Department copies of the documents released to the press by the Commission. There are enclosed copies of the “Sind Observer” of September 9 which contain an account of Sir Zafrullah’s press conference. It is assumed that the Embassy at New Delhi is furnishing the Department with the text of Prime Minister Nehru’s statement before the Indian Parliament. All of these documents should be read in close connection if a fair understanding is to be obtained of the problems which perplexed the Commission before it finally decided that further effort toward a solution of the Kashmir question would probably be largely useless, or, as indicated in the communiqué which it issued as an accompaniment to the released documents, that “immediate effectuation of its proposal of August 13 is not to be envisaged.”
It was perhaps a foregone conclusion that however impartial, sincere and understanding the members of the Commission might be their [Page 380] mission was foredoomed to failure because any concessions which the Commission might make to meet the point of view of the Government of India would be unacceptable to the Government of Pakistan and vice versa. The Commission also felt itself obliged to work under the very serious handicap of the presence of regular Pakistan army forces in Kashmir.
The Government of India has held from the very beginning that its quick acceptance of the Maharaja of Kashmir’s hasty offer of accession to India was occasioned and necessitated by the invasion of Kashmir by hostile forces from Pakistan, and India’s case before the United Nations Security Council was based exclusively on the cry that aggression against Indian territory was being committed by Pakistan although at that time Pakistan had no regular troops in Kashmir and had none in Kashmir until May of this year. India has at no time admitted that there was an uprising of people in Kashmir against the Maharaja and his dictatorial regime, which is more accurately what sent the Maharaja on his hurried way to seek accession to India, and through that medium Indian assistance in crushing the rebellion. Whatever the true facts may be, however, the Commission accepted the fact of accession as legal, and on that basis the Commission logically followed with the conclusion that Pakistan, was, as represented by the Government of India, guilty of aggression in this sense against India because of the presence of regular Pakistan forces in Kashmir. While I have no knowledge that the Commission actually accused the Government of Pakistan of aggression in this sense, I know that the members of the Commission held that view and that the Government of Pakistan felt that there was this implication in the Commission’s resolution of August 13, which requires the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, the presence of which “in the territory of the state of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council,” prior to any movement for the withdrawal of Indian forces.
The Government of Pakistan has not been willing to concede that it is in any sense guilty of aggression against Indian territory. As Sir Zafrullah points out in his interview with the press, the Government of Pakistan is not even willing to acknowledge that Kashmir has legally acceded to India. The Government here holds that it is strange reasoning on the part of Pandit Nehru that carries him to the conclusion that whereas the accession of Kashmir to India is legal the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan is illegal and that while he cries out against Pakistan’s aggression against Indian territory (Kashmir) he sees nothing wrong in India’s aggression against Junagadh. Although he searches his soul to put his actions on a high moral plane he sees [Page 381] nothing wrong in Hari Singh’s2 carrying his predominately Muslim state into the Indian Union without any reference to the will of his people (because he was in a hurry) but sees much wrong in the Nawab of Junagadh’s carrying his predominately Hindu state into a union with Pakistan. The Maharaja had the authority to accede but the Nawab had no such authority.
The presence of raiders from Pakistan, and later of Pakistan troops, in Kashmir has sorely troubled Pandit Nehru. He makes a great moral issue of Pakistan’s perfidy and duplicity in this connection but he makes no allusion to the invasion of Junagadh by Indian troops and the complete suppression by India of the former government of that state. Perhaps he, like his colleague Patel, regards Junagadh as no longer an issue, or, at best, it is an irrelevant issue. The feeling in Pakistan is quite the contrary, and the thinking of the Government of Pakistan with particular reference to the Commission’s resolution of August 13 is definitely conditioned by its own conception of Indian perfidy and duplicity in Kashmir, in the matter of Junagadh, and in no small measure in the matter of Hyderabad, and its consequent utter lack of faith in the word and good intentions of Nehru and Patel and, going further, its probable lack of faith not in the good intentions of the Commission but in the ability of the Commission to suppress or control Indian perfidy.
It was for the latter reason particularly that Sir Zafrullah, to the chagrin and perhaps even to the amusement of the members of the Commission, so insistently held on behalf of Pakistan that any “clarifications and elucidations” which may have been given to India by the Commission must be plainly stated for the information of Pakistan and vice versa. The Commission has felt that this has been nothing more or less than quibbling and stalling on the part of Sir Zafrullah, and there may, in fact, be much to support this conclusion, but on the other hand it also seems probable that Sir Zafrullah knows his opponents.
Pandit Nehru says that the Government of India, notwithstanding that there were many matters in the resolution which went against the grain, nevertheless accepted the resolution without reservation. He says that India accepted the cease fire proposal without qualification because of Indian interest in peace and international order and as a gesture of good will towards the United Nations, whereas Pakistan after much delay and the writing of many letters refused to accept the proposal. One has but to read Pandit Nehru’s two letters of August 203 in reply to the Commission’s resolution of August 13 to observe how unconditionally Nehru accepted on behalf of the Government of India [Page 382] the resolution. Among other reservations Pandit Nehru states twice in his first letter that should it be decided to seek a solution of the future of the state of Jammu and Kashmir by means of a plebiscite Pakistan shall have no part in the organization and conduct of the plebiscite or in any other matter of internal administration in the State. Is it honestly to be expected that Pakistan could accept such a condition? Apart from other considerations, this reservation is hardly in line with the Security Council’s resolution of April 21, 1948 and with the spirit of the discussions which clearly indicated the acceptance by the Security Council of a legitimate interest by Pakistan in the holding of the plebiscite.
Actually the position of Pakistan with regard to the Commission’s resolution of August 13 is that the resolution is not rejected but that it cannot be accepted without Pakistan being given further “clarifications and elucidations” on the subject of verbal or other assurances given to the Government of India by the Commission. As already stated, the members of the Commission regarded this request as quibbling and stalling, and as their patience had already been worn thin they decided to discontinue further discussions of the problem unless resumption of negotiations may subsequently be found desirable as a result of any change of attitude which may occur on the part of either of the two governments. Inasmuch, however, as it appears to be the determination of the Commission to alter in no particular whatever the terms of its resolution of August 13 or to offer any further clarifications it is freely conceded that in all probability the work of the Commission is finished. The Commission is not necessarily to blame for its failure, and there is no indication that the Government of Pakistan holds any grudge against the Commission, although it does feel that the resolution was plainly unfavorable to Pakistan and involved concessions on the part of Pakistan which could not, for practical reasons as well as for reasons of principle, be conceded.
From a practical point of view the Government of Pakistan was faced, or believed that it was faced, with the necessity of sending its troops into Kashmir to take up a defensive line to meet an offensive which the Government of India was mounting and which if carried through successfully would have had disastrous consequences to Pakistan through the submerging of the northern part of the country with refugees from Kashmir and exposing the rear and flank of Pakistan to an invasion by Indian forces. Pandit Nehru dismisses this explanation out of hand as being false and fictitious and nothing other than a cover for wanton aggression against India. Whatever Nehru’s real thinking on the subject may be, and his thoughts might well be different from his words, Pakistan looked at the problem in terms of the estimated danger to its own security and took such measures as it [Page 383] felt necessary for the protection of that security in what was regarded as a purely defensive sense. There is no doubt that had Pakistan informed the Security Council, as Nehru suggests, of its movement of regular troops into Kashmir, Pakistan’s moral position vis-à-vis the Commission would have been stronger although legally and technically the probabilities are that the Commission would have regarded Pakistan’s position as still being weak and indefensible in that particular. Incidentally it would also have deprived Nehru of one of his crying points at this time, to the advantage of Pakistan, a point perhaps not beyond his appreciation.
One is inclined to wonder what might have happened to Pakistan had the regular troops not been moved into Kashmir. The consequences of its failure to protect itself might then have been better understood by the members of the Commission, for there is no denying that it was the presence of Pakistan troops in Kashmir that broke the back of the Indian offensive which, incidentally, was mounted long after India, like Pakistan, had agreed to the Security Council’s request that neither party do anything to aggravate the situation in Kashmir. In any event, Pakistan feels that it has no apologies to offer for what it did in the above connection, and though Nehru may proclaim to the world, as he does, the guilt of Pakistan there is little or no likelihood that Pakistan will put itself in the position of voluntarily accepting from the Commission what it regards as a proclamation of guilt.
There is another consideration also to be taken into account in explaining why the Government of Pakistan would probably be unwilling, as required under the terms of the present resolution, to withdraw its troops from Kashmir even if the Government of India could be relied upon not to resume its offensive. The withdrawal of Pakistan troops from Kashmir without something very practical and substantial in return, something which the tribal peoples of the North West Frontier and the people of Azad Kashmir could understand in their simple minds as a satisfactory return for this concession, there is little doubt but that these peoples would rise up in holy wrath against the Government of Pakistan for surrendering, as they would regard it, to the Government of India on so vital a matter. There is a serious question in my mind whether the Government of Pakistan feels that it is strong enough to resist any such movement. The tribesmen, being restive about the situation of their brethren in Kashmir, were only partially satisfied when Pakistan finally sent its regular troops into that territory. The three or four hundred thousand already armed fighting men of the North West Frontier area, entirely apart from the inhabitants of Azad Kashmir territory, would be a serious problem for the Government of Pakistan should they decide, as they might [Page 384] very well decide, to rise against Pakistan if this country should now give the appearance of abandoning the Muslims of Kashmir.
Reference is made to Despatch No. 1005 dated August 28, 19484 from the Embassy at New Delhi enclosing an “unofficial note” issued by the Bureau of Information of the Jammu and Kashmir government reporting that dissension exists within the Azad Kashmir movement. This Embassy has no information which would support that report. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim, who describe themselves respectively as Supreme Head of the Azad Kashmir Liberty Movement and President of the Azad Kashmir Government, appear to be working in close cooperation and in complete harmony, and while there may be, as is natural in human affairs, differences of opinion between these persons and others, no intimation has reached Karachi that there are any serious rifts in the Azad movement, nor does there appear to be any reason to believe, as has lately been rumoured, that there are any differences between the Azad Kashmir leaders and the Government of Pakistan. It is my opinion, however, as previously intimated, that the Government of Pakistan did not dare to make any concessions to the India-Pakistan Commission which would have aroused intense disgruntlement amongst the Azad Kashmir or tribal ledders. In the latter connection it should be pointed out that Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas and Sardar Ibrahim have expressed strong disagreement with Nehru’s statement before the Indian Parliament and have issued a joint statement, published in today’s press, in which they assert that the Commission’s proposals in their present form are totally unacceptable to Azad Kashmir. A copy of this joint statement as published in “Dawn” of September 10, is enclosed as being pertinent, even though the Commission has so far shown what superficially appears to be little interest in the Azad Kashmir Government and its point of view.
Meanwhile, the fighting in Kashmir continues as far as monsoon conditions and the terrain permit. Although aerial attacks by Indian bombers have lately been more frequent the Azad Kashmir forces appear to be holding their own and to be operating in Some areas at an advantage.
Respectfully yours,