501.BC Kashmir/8–3148: Telegram
The United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (Huddle) to the Secretary of State
434. Comkas 29. Commission returned Karachi Saturday to resume conversations with Pakistan officials endeavor persuade Pakistan Government to accept its proposals for cease-fire and truce agreement. First indications are that Pakistanis remain firm that it must be either unconditional cease-fire or if conditional then entire program for plebiscite must be worked out and agreed upon.
Commission’s standpoint is that latter is not feasible and that unconditional cease-fire would be flatly rejected by India. Thus neither is workable.
India demands withdrawal Pakistan troops from Kashmir territory probably justifiably. Pakistan is equally insistent Indian troops get out of Kashmir perhaps less justifiably. Commission feels its proposals meet Indian demands and at same time satisfy what may be reasonable demand by Pakistan that majority Indian forces be required to withdraw so that they will no longer constitute what Pakistan claims is menace to its existence as state.
Pakistan officials however now claim Commission’s proposals do not enable them to assure tribesmen of ultimate fair plebiscite and protection their co-religionists, so they cannot control tribesmen. Commission insists that this is explicitly called for in proposals.
I get impression in going over these and other points that Pakistanis do not want to be convinced; that they wanted some action on Commission’s part which would in some way recognize or tacitly approve Pakistan Army invasion of Kashmir and leave these forces there, with result that no plebiscite or any other peaceable measures could ever be worked out; and that they are grievously disappointed at failure. On other hand while India has signified acceptance, it is undeniable that Nehru looks on proposals with great disfavor.
Moreover I feel that Zafrullah Khan finds his government now bearing onus of rejection which he had formerly passed back to Security Council with criticism of its plan but he was not standing alone since India for other reasons had also rejected SC proposals. Refusal to agree to cease fighting and arrange truce so that negotiations for peaceful solution can proceed is not easy to justify. He is therefore resorting to all available devices in effort to evade issue. That he may decide ignore Commission and take issue to SC is possibility. He is not aware of India’s decision so far as I know.
India’s approach is very like that of Pakistan. India originally expected SC decision its favor otherwise would never have presented case and has continued same position. But India’s present troubles have [Page 372] occasioned increasing desire some influential elements Delhi to end “this Kashmir business”. Both Maharajah and Sheikh Abdullah losing favor and former almost completely ignored.
Situation is something like tri-cornered war nerves. Some members of Commission showing strain to certain extent and their judgment and decisions tending to be less wisely considered.
This leads me to suggest that Department and USUN might think of desirability of appointment of moderator to succeed Commission if perchance both governments accept its proposals and also in event of failure. My experience leads me to believe that one man, of international stature, if acceptable to both governments, would be in better position to work out this problem than is an unwieldly commission. He would need small corps expert advisers.
In case Commission does not succeed matter would become urgent, and some action might have to be taken by SC to avert disastrous results. General Eisenhower1 presumably would be unavailable but disinterested figure of similar international repute might be able to save situation.
- General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of Columbia University.↩