845.00/8–648
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. W. L. S. Williams of the Division of South Asian Affairs
| Participants: | Mr. E. G. Mathews |
| Mr. C. W. Adair1 | |
| Mr. J. S. Sparks | |
| Mr. W. L. S. Williams |
The above officers foregathered in Mr. Mathews’ office to discuss the Hyderabad situation in the light of the letter received yesterday afternoon from the Nizam of Hyderabad to the President in which the Nizam appeals to the United States Government to lend its good offices to secure a peaceful settlement between India and Hyderabad.2 A re-examination was made of various documents relating to the matter, particularly the Indian Independence Act, the Stand-Still Agreement between India and Hyderabad and, from Hansard, a number of pertinent speeches made during the debate in Parliament over the Indian Independence Bill. The purpose of this preliminary reexamination was to attempt to clarify the legal aspects of the matter, particularly the Nizam’s contention that with the British withdrawal from India, the Princely States were given freedom to associate with one or other of the Dominions or to remain independent. It was unanimously agreed that on the basis of the Independence Act and the discussions of the question of the future of the Princely States which took place in Parliament that the Nizam did, in fact, have a rather strong argument. Mr. Attlee is quoted on 10 July 1947 as follows:
“With the ending of the treaties and agreements, the States regain their independence. But they are part of geographical India, and their rulers and peoples are imbued with a patriotism no less great than that of their fellow Indians in British India. It would, I think, be unfortunate if, owing to the formal severance of their paramountcy relations with the Crown, they were to become islands cut off from the rest of India. The termination of their existing relationship with the Crown need have no such consequence. In fact, already a large number of the States have declared their willingness to enter into relationships with the new Dominions, and some have been represented in the Constituent Assembly of India. It is the hope of His Majesty’s Government that all States will, in due course, find their appropriate place within one or other of the new Dominions within the British Commonwealth, but until the constitutions of the Dominions have been framed in such a way as to include the States as willing partners, there must necessarily be a less organic form of relationship between them, and [Page 361] there must be a period before a comprehensive system can be worked out.
“If I were asked what would be the attitude of His Majesty’s Government to any State which has decided to cut adrift from its neighbours and assert its independence, I would say to the ruler of that State, ‘Take your time and think again. I hope that no irrevocable decision to stay out will be taken prematurely’.”3
Mr. Harold Macmillan, member of the opposition was also quoted as follows:
“We warmly approve the decision of His Majesty’s Government to resist the pressure to transfer paramountcy to the successor governments. They have been very wise in that. I was glad to hear, or think I heard, the Prime Minister say that the States were to be absolutely free in their choice as to whether or not they should join one or other of the new Constitutent Assemblies; whether they should subsequently join one or other of the Dominions as they emerge from the Constituent Assemblies, or whether, finally, they will declare themselves free and independent sovereign authorities. I trust that this is true not only in words but in fact, because there have been disturbing rumours reaching us of a good deal of moral and even physical pressure which has been exercised, perhaps by misunderstanding of some of the official statements made in India or elsewhere”.4
It was suggested that it was these statements and others like them, made by British officials at the time of the passage of the Independence Act, which now cause British officials to say, as they have to our Embassy in London, that if the case of Hyderabad were brought to the UN, the British would be very embarrassed. Following a telephone conversation with Mr. Allen of UNA, Mr. Mathews suggested that the letter of the Nizam to the President as well as the Nizam’s letter to the King5 were quite possibly steps, taken after careful planning by the Hyderabad Government to insure that the case might be given a hearing in the UN. Hyderabad would be able to argue quite plausibly, in the event its appeals for good offices are not granted, that it has exhausted every means except the UN to settle the question. Various approaches to the letter were considered and the ramifications of each approach were explored. It was generally felt quite possible, indeed probable, that the Indian Government had seen the Nizam’s letter. It was considered likely that it had been carried by Beaumont who was searched by Indian Customs officials in Delhi on July 22, at which time a letter of the Nizam to the King was opened by Indian officials.
[Page 362]It was agreed that the British Government should be informed of the receipt of the Nizam’s letter. It was also agreed that the Embassy at London should be asked to be informed by the British Government of the nature of the Nizam’s letter to the King, of the official reaction to it, and of British thinking regarding Hyderabad generally.
It was also agreed that probably, but dependent on London’s report, it would be desirable to inform the Indians of the receipt of the letter, particularly since it was felt quite likely that they already knew of its existence and were probably deeply concerned about it. It was conceded by all that the Indian Government would take an extremely dim view of U.S. good offices in the Hyderabad dispute. It was suggested that by conveying to the Indians the fact that the letter had been received and was being given careful study, apparent Indian plans to settle the question by a resort to force might be retarded. Suggestion was made that the U.S. could not, for obvious reasons accede to the request for good offices, unless a parallel request was also made by the Government of India. This development was considered extremely unlikely, and therefore a suggested sequence of events might be (this, again, depends on the nature of the British Government’s view) (1) for the U.S. to inform the Indian Government of the receipt of the Nizam’s letter and the fact of our considering it, and to ascertain the Indian reaction, (2) at the same time taking the opportunity thus afforded to urge the Indian Government to attempt again to reach a settlement through peaceful negotiations. An acknowledgment of the letter from the Nizam might be made verbally by our Embassies at London and New Delhi to the Hyderabad representative at both posts, and the opportunity would be taken to point out our feeling that our good offices would be unavailing unless both parties to the dispute desired them.
The possibility of a Commonwealth meeting or roundtable conference to solve the problem was also discussed. The fact of heavy British responsibility for the Hyderabad situation was noted.
It was suggested that if a written reply were to be made to the Nizam’s letter, it should be sent through the GOI in view of the Stand-Still Agreement in which Hyderabad agreed that GOI would handle Hyderabad’s foreign affairs.
- Vice Consul at Bombay, December 1941 to July 1946.↩
- This letter, not found in Department of State files, was dated July 4, 1948 and received via the Nizam’s Agent General in London (845.00/8–648).↩
- Comments during the second reading of the Indian Independence Bill, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. 439, col. 2451.↩
- Ibid., col. 2471.↩
- Reference to the Nizam’s letter to the King, together with information on a similar letter to the Prime Minister and Attlee’s reply, was conveyed to the Department in telegrams 3628 and 3636 of August 11, neither printed (845.00/8–1148).↩