745.45F/2–748: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Grady) to the Secretary of State
117. I have had two talks with Bajpai in past two days and he in turn has talked to Nehru. GOI (Government of India) is very anxious for settlement Kashmir matter and very anxious to do what our government feels they should do in the circumstances. In my first talk with Bajpai I told him very frankly there was a feeling in Washington and at Lake Success that GOI was most anxious to hold to Kashmir and that the plebiscite offer was eyewash to justify their making the accession to India stick because they know how difficult a proper plebiscite will be and how strong the presumptions are in favor of a verdict for the government controlling the country at the time of the plebiscite. Bajpai communicated this to Nehru and Nehru replied that personally he was most anxious to keep Kashmir in the Indian union but on the other hand he was equally desirous that the will of the people determine the matter, and that he wished to have an honest plebiscite to ascertain people’s desires.
In my second talk with Bajpai we discussed the analogy between Kashmir situation and that of Greece. Two situations are not completely comparable, but there are elements in both which make it possible to approach Kashmir question with the Greek experience in mind. In Greece we dealt with interim governments or what were called service governments. It seems to me that the present emergency or interim government of Abdullah is in same category of service governments in Greece. His government represents Kashmir National Conference, the largest and most important political organization in Kashmir and GOI naturally queries what the alternative would be in [Page 296] terms of an interim government or how it would be set up if Abdullah and his government are to be displaced. It seems to me it would be hardly practicable for a UN commission to set up a service government in Kashmir. Service governments in Greece were set up by the Regent who derived his power from the King. Abdullah acquires his power from the Maharaja who is the only one able to exercise such power as well as to exercise the power of determining accession under present circumstances. If plebiscite can be conducted in a manner to give assurances of fairness to Pakistan, question of the service government becomes of lesser importance.
GOI is confident that if Pakistan will use its influence on the tribes, GOI can police the country and insure safety of life and property there so that those who have fled Kashmir can return and participate in establishment of parliamentary government. I believe interim government should promptly take necessary steps for a parliamentary election, once the matter of law and order in Kashmir is established. Setting up of machinery for a parliamentary election would take some months but should not be too difficult a task since Kashmir has not in the past ever had a popular election and there would not be the problems that we faced in Greece where comprehensive election machinery was already fairly definitely set up. Machinery for the election in Kashmir could be simplified and still be effective.
UN commission should scrupulously observe and study the methods and machinery for the parliamentary election and report to the council whether they believe the election was fair and represented the will of the people. Their observation of the methods, etc., would be a definite check on any disposition of the interim government to do other than carry out a fair ballot. If report of the commission to the council is satisfactory, a plebiscite could then be held with the commission again observing. They would again report to council whether they believed plebiscite was fair and representative of the will of the people. It seems to me that if some such plan as this were carried out, natural suspicions of having one of the parties at interest conduct the election would be allayed as the UN commission would be final determinant of legitimacy of the balloting.
Strength of our position in Greece was that the service government in power at the time was most anxious for favorable verdict from the allied observing mission. I think this can be the case in Kashmir. Bajpai has since discussed with Nehru these points which I outlined to him purely in a personal and tentative way and Nehru has approved. Indian delegate at Lake Success will doubtless be instructed attempt solution Kashmir problem along these lines. Department is in no way committed to these suggestions if it sees any reason for with-holding [Page 297] support. They will come if they come at all as the suggestions of the Indian Government.
Bajpai after discussion with Nehru stated these suggestions are along lines GOI has proposed to Security Council but Nehru wishes emphasize following conditions for initiation proposals: (a) Cessation of hostilities and departure of raiders from Jammu and Kashmir and (b) return of those people who have either left Jammu and Kashmir or have been displaced.
For Department’s information Bajpai advised me that there are now 76,000 tribesmen fighting in Kashmir.
Department please repeat London if deemed advisable.