745.45F/1–148: Telegram

The Chargé in Pakistan (Lewis) to the Secretary of State

secret   immediate

1. Have talked with Jinnah,2 Liaquat Ali Khan,3 Sir Zafrullah Khan,4 Secretary General Mohammad Ali and Ikramullah5 and nowhere have detected any trace of anxiety or nervousness such as seems exist in Delhi on Kashmir question, although profound annoyance is felt that GOI is using Kashmir affair as excuse for not making good its commitments on cash balances, failure to pay which under terms recent agreement6 places GOP in difficult fiscal position, as presumably desired by GOI (Deptel 218, December 26,7 London’s 53, December 298).

GOP answered GOI note night before last.9 In nearly two hours review of Pakistan’s relations with India, Mohammad Ali and Ikramullah told me yesterday GOI note contained no ultimatum or time limit for reply but did contain some hints of trouble for Pakistan if GOP did not cease alleged aiding and abetting Azad Kashmir Government and raiders. In that connection, these officials said while Pakistan’s sympathies were with Azad Government GOP was not aiding Azad movement and could not if it would stop uprising against [Page 266] Kashmir Government and the struggle against GOI troops in Kashmir without revolution in Pakistan.

Mohammad Ali, who participated in talks with GOI said GOP position in all these talks was that while welcoming in principle plebiscite in Kashmir, GOP must have assurances neutral administration preceding and during plebiscite. Given such administration GOP would exercise every possible influence with Azad Government and raiders to cease activities and abide by plebiscite result. If neutral administration cannot be agreed upon between GOI and GOP, as seemingly it cannot since every proposal that direction by GOP has been rejected by GOI, Pakistan will gladly agree UN Security Council set up appropriate administration with safeguards for honest vote and conduct plebiscite. If GOI unwilling accept latter procedure, GOP will counter any action by GOI in placing before SC question alleged guilt Pakistan in supporting belligerent activities against Kashmir by asking SC conduct investigation all relations between the two Dominions including Junagadh matter.10 This is substance GOP reply notes.

GOP thoroughly convinced Kashmir’s accession to India and sending of GOI troops to Kashmir is only part of GOI’s deliberately planned policy dating from acceptance of partition, to strangle and destroy Pakistan in successive stages and will support that conviction before SC if GOI carries its case to SC in form indicated in its last note to GOP.

Department, repeat to London if desired. Delhi informed.

Lewis
  1. Mohamed Ali Jinnah, Governor General of Pakistan.
  2. Prime Minister, Minister of States and Defense, Pakistan.
  3. Minister for Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Pakistan.
  4. Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan.
  5. Reference here is presumably to an agreement between India and Pakistan relating to division of the assets of the Reserve Bank of India. A detailed summary of 1947 Indo-Pakistan financial agreements may be found in the Hindustan Year-Book and Who’s Who, 1948, pp. 304–307.
  6. For text, see identical telegram 814 to New Delhi, December 26, 1947, Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iii, p. 184.
  7. Printed as telegram 6647 to the Department, December 29, 1947, ibid., p. 185.
  8. The notes referred to here are the letter of December 22, 1947, from Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to Liaquat Ali Khan, and the latter’s reply dated December 30. For text of this exchange, see Government of India, White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, pp. 74–75.
  9. Junagadh, one of the states whose accession was in dispute, received the intermittent attention of the Security Council during the spring of 1948. Security Council action was limited by the general feeling that the accession of Junagadh to India was not of sufficient importance to justify distracting the Council from the more pressing issues involving Kashmir. For summary of Indian and Pakistani statements before the Security Council concerning matters of dispute not covered in Foreign Relations, see United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947–48, pp. 400–402. Hereafter cited as Yearbook, 1947–48.