741.90B/4–748

Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)1

secret

Subject: US Support for UK-Saudi Arabian Negotiations for Treaty of Alliance; US Attitude toward Arab Disposition to Favor Alliance between Arab League, UK and US.

In line with our general policy to promote the security of the Middle East and to cooperate with the British to that end, we have been putting in a good word when and where it would do the most good to help the British work out revised treaties of alliance with the Arab countries. Their efforts have succeeded with Transjordan2 but have bogged down with Egypt, Iraq3 and Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi Arabian situation is such that the British can make a new approach designed to elicit counter-suggestions from King Ibn Saud as to the basis on which negotiations might be continued. The first half of the attached draft telegram to Jidda is designed to help the [Page 230] British in the new approach their Minister has been instructed to make.

King Ibn Saud, Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi leaders, and Azzam Pasha (Secretary-General of the Arab League) have indicated to our representatives that they feel the nationalistic leaders in the Arab world have got themselves into a box. The latter will not sign treaties of alliance with the British on terms which will permit the British to carry out their end of the obligation. Therefore, the broader-gauged Arab leaders consider that the Arab countries might enter into a treaty or some kind of arrangement with Great Britain as a group, thus accomplishing together what domestic politics do not allow them to accomplish singly. The possibility of making a group arrangement with the United States as well as with Great Britain is also being considered by the Arabs. There is no doubt that they fear that an alliance between the Arab countries and Great Britain might well, in view of present British weakness, be more of a liability than an asset unless the United States was associated with it in some way.

For their part, the British consider that an Arab League-Great Britain arrangement (with the United States added if we are agreeable) might possibly solve the present impasse. However, they, do not want a vague alliance which will commit Great Britain to the defense of the Arab Near East unless facilities are granted enabling them to carry out their commitment. The British will shortly point this out to Ibn Saud and to the Lebanese. The working-level view in the Foreign Office is, that the best plan would be an Arab League resolution forming an umbrella under which the British could go ahead with their bilateral treaties. (This transparent device would probably not appeal to the Arabs.)

It is, of course, clear that the United States should not give any encouragement to any idea that we would participate in an alliance arrangement with the Arab Near East. On the other hand, we are interested in the security of the area and should keep informed on the development of Arab ideas coming in so that we can throw cold water on any unrealistic plans before they become formalized, and encourage any trend that coincides with our interests and capabilities. The last part of the telegram is directed to this end.

It is recommended that you sign the attached telegram.4

G[ordon] P. M[erriam]
  1. Marginal notation by Mr. Henderson: “I agree”.
  2. The British Treaty of Alliance with Transjordan was signed at Amman on March 15, 1948; for text, see British Cmd. 7404: Treaty Series No. 26 (1948).
  3. Documentation on the unsuccessful efforts of the United Kingdom to enter into revised treaties of alliance with Egypt and Iraq are included in the sections on these countries in this volume.
  4. See telegram 125, April 14, to Jidda, p. 231.