741.90F/1–2048: Telegram
The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State
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24. Following my account my audience with Prince Feisal this afternoon (Department please note: pressing importance I have US [Page 212] Government’s comments for transmittal Feisal before twenty-seventh.):
Feisal stated he had come to Jidda from Mecca especially to see me but he desired greatest discretion purpose his visit. I was acquainted with great concern SAG re Hashimites1 about which His Majesty had spoken to me on numerous occasions. With view to clarifying SAG’s relations with its friends the British this question, SAG had approached some time ago British Government and latter had suggested Prince Feisal come London to review whole field British-SAG relations.
In meantime British had concluded treaty with Iraq2 and Mr. Bevin3 had suggested that a similar treaty be concluded with SAG. His Majesty in view great concern with Hashimites was at first favorably disposed proposal but after further and closer consideration SAG found two objections:
- 1.
- Britain’s relations with Iraq (Beginning with occupation that country followed by mandate over it and treaty which had not in reality left Iraq independent) were altogether different from Britain’s relations with Saudi Arabia, a wholly sovereign and independent state; and
- 2.
- Latest treaty included heavy obligations on part Iraq which SAG not disposed assume.
Prince Feisal said he had in mind that Britain should conclude treaties with other Arab states by which they would all be treated alike, and in particular Hashimite states should not be favored. Proposed British-SAG treaty went beyond this idea. He added British Ambassador had been recently Riyadh and was returning there on twenty-seventh when Feisal himself expected to be there. It was very likely British proposals would be discussed in detail at that time. In view fact that US was closest foreign government to Saudi Arabia Prince Feisal had come to Jidda to acquaint me with foregoing and asked if I had any comments.
I said I had two: (1) I felt my government would be most gratified with confidence reposed in it by SAG; (2) I felt my government would be favorably disposed toward conclusion of any treaty arrangements by SAG which promoted peace and security in Middle East without touching SAG’s independence and liberty of action. I said any other comments would have to come from my government.
Feisal said in view of Riyadh meeting on twenty-seventh it was most important His Majesty have by that time any comments which US [Page 213] Government might have to make on the problem as he had outlined it to me. I promised I would communicate urgently with my government and would endeavor to have reply before he left for Riyadh.
Department will find foregoing development at variance with my estimate situation in Legtels 16, January 13 and 23, January 20.4 I suggest his latest development instance fluctuations to which SAG’s policy has been subject during recent weeks as result international developments including Palestine. First shock was to throw SAG into arms Great Britain but there is now a reaction brought about after reflection upon Iraq’s dependent status and unwillingness SAG conclude any arrangement suggesting prejudice to its sovereignty. I suspect also Prince Saud’s influence has been active to retrieve a balance in our favor.
Sent Department 24, please repeat London 8.
- The ruling dynasties in Iraq and Transjordan; for documentation on efforts by Transjordan to attain a Greater Syria, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.↩
- For documentation on this subject, see editorial note, p. 204.↩
- Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Latter not printed; it requested the Department to note that “as result positions taken by US and British Governments over Palestine partition at UNGA, British Government has virtually overnight replaced us in confidence of King.” (741.90F/1–2048)↩