891.20/11–1848: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran
1093. Depts of State and Defense believe you should take over principal role in discussions on subj Sexton’s M–354, Nov. 3, and that further communications should be through State and Emb channels. If desired in replying to Razmara, MA may join with you in these discussions.
Depts of State and Defense agree your reply should be on following lines subject your concurrence:
[Page 197]In event of war with Soviet Union involving Iran and US, Iran may be assumed of all assistance compatible with US resources in a global conflict. It must be clear from recent history that US devotes its full and unrelenting power, in cooperation with its loyal allies, to achieve total victory over those who bring war to the world. On our part, we have complete confidence as to favorable outcome of any future conflict in which US may be involved.
US is, naturally, interested in Iranian defense capabilities. In event of war of Soviet aggression, USSR, would enjoy initial advantages accruing to aggressor.
It is logical therefore that Iranians formulate their plans on basis of resistance as effective and prolonged as possible, including, if necessary, extensive and extended guerrilla-type warfare.
If pressed by Razmara or if you think it necessary, you may say we cannot be more specific in our advice or assurances1 because we cannot foresee what world-wide demands upon us may be if war breaks out. U.S. would be arsenal and pivotal point in coalition against aggressor and, in the interests of all, would necessarily bring its resources to bear at whatever points would provide best opportunity speedy victory. Choice of those points would depend to some extent on degree of continuing resistance being offered by Iran forces and those of other states similarly situated.
All above predicated on assumption that U.S. as well as Iran is at war with USSR. It does not answer question, which we understand Razmara is not raising, namely, whether U.S. would go to war immediately if Iran were attacked by USSR.
All communications to Iranians this subj should be oral. Nothing should be committed to writing. Any discussion this subj should be prefaced and concluded by statements to the effect that we are not convinced war is inevitable and we have not abandoned hope in our continuing efforts to preserve peace.2
- The Department, on October 28, had instructed Ambassador Wiley to reply to queries from the Shah and General Razmara concerning United States strategic plans in terms of a “satisfactory formula which would prevent undue Iranian discouragement while not revealing US plans or implying US commitment.” (telegram 1020 to Tehran, 891.00/10–2848)↩
- The Department, on November 16, had sent a draft of this telegram to Secretary Marshall at Paris for his views (Telmar 160, 891.00/11–1648). The Secretary had replied two days later, stating: “I think the proposed telegram to Wiley is forthright as to our interest in Iran, an excellent guide to Iran activities in the event of war, yet holds out no specific promise of commitment which we might be unable to fulfill.” The reply suggested minor drafting changes and made some comment (Martel 153, 891.00/11–1848).↩