Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

501.BB/10–2348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran

secret   us urgent

Washington, October 29, 1948—7 p. m.

1021. Following is summary two conversations with. Brit Emb here on subject Embtel 1223 Oct 23 from Tehran¹ and Delga 491 Oct 26 from Paris:²

(1) Le Rougetel reports conversation with PriMin Oct 23 in which latter said (a) Soviet-Iran notes of last spring have already been communicated to SC and (b) Iran Govt some time ago prepared note appealing for consideration by SC of Art 6 of 1921 Treaty and requesting its revision in light of changed circumstances, namely, absence of counter-revolutionary forces in Iran which could threaten USSR and existence UN SC to deal with threats to security. This note held in abeyance, but, according Hajir, Amb Wiley had just advised him that time had arrived for it to be transmitted to SC. PriMin asked Le Rougetel advice, to which latter replied he would have to request instructions.

(2) London FonOff considers communication of type mentioned by Hajir would be unfortunate because it would provoke Soviet Union as much as if Iran Govt should denounce 1921 Treaty and Iranians, in order to appease USSR, might be expected take some action harmful to US and UK, especially with respect to pending questions of AIOC concession and proposed arrangements for division subsea oil resources Persian Gulf. FonOff feels bound to oppose suggested action by Iran Govt and would greatly regret divergence between views communicated by US and UK to Iran Govt.

(3) Dept has explained to Brit Emb that we have never suggested to Iranians that they request SC action re Art 6 of Treaty and were unaware they contemplated such request. We had in mind simply communication for info of SC summarizing developments Irano-Soviet relations past several months and stating Iranian view that if USSR considers itself threatened from Iran only proper course would be appeal to SC as body charged with maintenance international peace and security. If such communication made, US might make parallel statement refuting Soviet charges re US activities in Iran and supporting Iranian assertion that USSR should have recourse to SC rather than unilateral action. We added Dept had never heard of any Iranian transmission of Irano-Soviet notes of last spring as stated by Hajir, and did not believe it possible this could have been done without coming to our attention.

(4) We thought Hajir must have misunderstood Amb Wiley suggestion, since latter had merely relayed (to Shah, not Hajir) our thought that Paris Del should consider whether time appropriate for action.

(5) Dept further informed Brit Emb we understood USDel Paris doubted desirability any action this moment. It was therefore improbable Dept would take additional steps for present. Iran Del Paris had shown no disposition take initiative. Dept suggested it would be useful for Brit Del Paris consult Bohlen to determine present status whole subject.

(6) We asked Brit Emb inquire whether FonOff would think undesirable communication to SC, at appropriate moment, of type suggested by US Govt (as contrasted with type mentioned by Hajir to Le Rougetel). Pointed out that while objections raised by FonOff might apply, though to lesser degree, to our type approach, failure to say anything might have even greater drawbacks.³

Lovett

1. Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 188.
2. Not printed; this was a repeat of telegram 22 from Mr. Bohlen to Ambassador Wiley (501.BC/10–2648). It covered much the same ground as telegram Delga 492, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 188.
3. This telegram was repeated to London, Gadel Paris (as no. 361) arid Moscow.