Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 1

891.00/9–1948: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iran

top secret

Washington, October 1, 1948—8 p. m.

948. You should in ur discretion make following points to Shah and appropriate Iranian officials as general comment on Shah’s and PriMin’s recent complaints as set forth Embtels 1025, Sept 1; 1041, Sept 3; 1083, Sept 14; 1111, Sept 19¹ re alleged inadequacy of US military and economic aid to Iran.

1. Shah must realize every free country in world is under Soviet pressure or attack in form of military, political, economic or social pressure or combinations of these methods in varying degrees and forms to suit local circumstances as understood by Kremlin and in pursuance overall Soviet objectives.

2. Since no country is perfect in all respects no country is completely impervious to these tactics. All feel more or less vulnerable in their respective weak spots.

3. US, all things considered, being strongest country in world, all other countries look to US to bolster up their weaknesses.

4. This too large order for US to fill even assuming, which is not case, that other countries are using their own resources and capabilities to greatest advantage.

5. US must, accordingly, be its own judge of where, how and to what extent it can extend assistance. Decision, in all cases where important policy determinations are dependent on substantial appropriations rests with Congress which, of course, must act within limits set at any given moment by American public opinion.

6. We hope Shah will agree that, on any broad view, US has not been either inconsiderate of or irresponsive to problems of other countries resulting from Soviet policies and practices. Moreover, we hope he will agree that US choice of locales and methods for application of assistance, judged by results achieved and emerging, have in main been correct.

7. As was bound happen, critics have arisen in various countries to complain with respect to one or another aspect of US cooperation and assistance, with resulting pressure on govts concerned and upon US. Obviously we cannot take “keeping up with Joneses” type of appeal into serious account. On other hand we are always glad to give most affirmative consideration we can to realistic and urgent needs.

8. US cooperation and assistance on even smallest scale must be premised on concrete efforts of country concerned to stand on own feet. In our considered opinion, most effective means whereby Iranian Govt can resist Soviet expansionist aims are within competence of Iranian Govt itself, namely: (a) persistent refusal of Soviet demands which would impair Iran’s independence, (b) constant vigilance in preventing and suppressing Soviet-sponsored attempts to infiltrate country or undermine Govt, and (c) conscientious efforts to improve provincial administration immediately (Tabriz A–35, Aug 14²) and raise standards of living gradually, thereby increasing people’s allegiance to Iranian Govt and decreasing proportionately their susceptibility to Soviet subversion.

9. There is one point in particular which you should drive home: That if worse comes to worst in international sphere, we are not worried over eventual outcome. Shah may wish to keep this conviction in mind in considering general Iranian policy.³

Lovett

1. Nos. 1083 and 1111 not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Department officers discussed United States policy toward Iran with Ambassador Ala and Mar. Ebtehaj on October 4. The latter stated that the “Shah, Hajir, Ala, and other responsible Iranians shared his conviction that Iran should abandon ‘neutral’ policy toward Great Powers and commit Itself openly to cause of Western democracies. He feels Iran at present suffers all liabilities of contemplated alignment (i.e., Soviet opprobrium) without commensurate benefits (i.e., assurance US aid).” The Department officers gave the Iranians the substance of telegram 948, which Mr. Ebtehaj called “one of the most unsatisfactory things I have ever heard from the American Govt”. He was mollified after further discussion and “in conclusion stated his understanding with which Dept reps agreed that if Iran requests assistance, US will give it to the extent possible within limited resources and existing commitments.” (telegram 960, October 6, 5 p. m., to Tehran, 711.91/10–648)