761.91/7–1548: Telegram
The Consul General at Istanbul (Macy) to the Secretary of State
206. For Loy Henderson from Wiley.1 For years in a loyal but fruitless endeavor American efforts were devoted to gaining the confidence of the Soviet Union. Certainly we are now at long last relieved from the necessity of making any sacrifice or effort in order to preserve a confidence that was never forthcoming.
I refer now to the official charges brought by the Soviet Government against the activities of our military missions in Iran and to Soviet references to Soviet Iranian treaty of 1921. These charges are false, malicious and dangerous. They have been given widest publicity and contribute to uncertainty of world opinion. To bring up in connection with American activities in Iran the possibility of the Soviet Union’s invoking treaty of 1921 is ominous blackmail.
[It is] True [that] Soviet charges have been denied categorically by Iranian Government but all recall the Soviet allegations and none remember the Iranian refutations. Why? Because we have remained silent. Yet we are party of first part in all of this. Iran is merely the locality, according to Soviet complaints, which we are converting into a place d’armes for aggressive attack against USSR. Therefore, I feel that for us to continue to maintain silence is innocently to collaborate [Page 161] with Soviet propaganda and imprudently to further Soviet designs.
My instructions from Department then boiled down have been in substance that Iran Government, should maintain a firm attitude towards Soviet Union, should do nothing to wound Soviet susceptibilities, should refrain from raising question of 1921 treaty. In my approaches to Ionian Government I have followed Department’s instructions to the letter.
But why must we remain silent when false witness is borne against us? Soviet intentions are clearly only to build up a fictitious juridical case for marching into Iran if and when circumstances permit. The USSR I fear is not thinking in terms of Azerbaijan alone. Soviet sights are raised to Abadan2 and Persian Gulf. Are we not running a grave risk that our silence may be dangerously misinterpreted? May we not be encouraging the prevalent legend that Iran lies within [without?] area of our strategic concern?
I venture to suggest that for our policy to be truly prudent it should not he timid. Crisis in Berlin, turmoil in Palestine and confusion in Italy merely add to need of vigilance and a positive policy everywhere, Iran included. We should avoid the vulnerability of cautious indecision.
I am not pleading for provocative action nor for wounding Soviet prestige in order to gain an imaginary point in some senseless game, but we can not afford to permit grave and baseless charges against us to pass unchallenged. And why should we? Further we should not discourage the Iranian Government from seeking in a dignified manner a juridical interpretation of the 1921 treaty which the Soviet Union is now hanging over the Iranian head like the sword of Damocles.
Sent Department 206, repeated Tehran.
Department pass to Moscow. [Wiley.]