761.91/7–448: Telegram
The Ambassador in Iran (Wiley), to the Secretary of State
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770. Saw Prime Minister for nearly hour last evening. Most important topic discussed was his interview with Sadtchikov, Soviet Ambassador, which interview took place Friday and lasted two hours. Prime Minister stated that it was clear Sadtchikov talked only on basis of specific instructions from Moscow.
Prime Minister, who, I understand, speaks excellent Russian, told Sadtchikov of his earnest desire to improve relations with Soviet [Page 153] Union. Then Prime Minister referred to Iranian Gold held by Russia, to Iranian customs claims against USSR, and other economic matters at issue. Sadtchikov complained over “contingents” of Russian imports into Iran held by Iranian customs. Prime Minister replied that it would be easy to find prompt formula for release of their “contingents” provided that Soviet Union would not insist on selling to Iran at ten times pre-war price level while at same time refusing to pay more than twice pre-war price level for Iranian exports to USSR. All USSR had to do was to be reasonable.
Sadtchikov answered that all this was irrelevant. There was not one question, including that of the gold, between Iran and Soviet Union which could not be immediately and satisfactorily settled provided that Iran changed its “inadmissable” policy of political and military “unity” with US. Sadtchikov then sounded off with old theme song, namely, that US, with Iranian complicity, was constructing subterranean deposits of aviation fuel and building secret airfields.
Prime Minister replied that this was untrue. Where, he answered, were the secret airfields? There was, he insisted, no subterranean fuel storage. Prime Minister asked why should Iran or anyone else be interested in such activities. Iran Government would under no conceivable circumstances ever dedicate itself to Communist revolution. Therefore should war break out, Iran would be on side of allies (meaning of course, US and UK). Abadan, Prime Minister added, was in British hands. Who needed, therefore, secret subterranean fuel deposits?
Sadtchikov continued his charges against US activities in Iran, reminding Prime Minister of Soviet offer to furnish, without charge, planes, arms, munitions, et cetera, as well as number of Soviet military instructors, likewise on gratis basis. Sadtchikov expressed resentment that instead of accepting Soviet generosity, Iran should have turned to US. Prime Minister replied that after all Iran was an independent and sovereign nation, and felt itself free to turn wherever it wished.
Sadtchikov then complained against publicity which had been given to frontier incidents. Stories about frontier incidents, Sadtchikov declared, were largely invented, publicity given to subject had been unnecessary and hostile to USSR. Prime Minister replied by asking whether Soviet incursions and frontier incidents should be considered a normal and continuing state of affairs between two countries with a common frontier. Sadtchikov, whose instructions perhaps did not cover this query, sidestepped, replying that any publicity which agitated Majlis and aroused public opinion should be avoided. He was apparently very firm on this point.
Soviet Ambassador—I think this is rather significant—raised question of Soviet oil concession in north, which was defeated in Majlis. [Page 154] He gave Prime Minister to understand that rejection of concession by Iran was something that USSR could not stomach. He was not speaking, Sadtchikov said, because of material considerations involved. It was more serious than that. Soviet prestige throughout entire world had been seriously damaged by Iran Government—the situation had to be remedied.
Prime Minister concluded our conversation by asking my advice. He had obviously taken conversation with Sadtchikov very serious[ly] indeed. He said that his Government had to choose between two courses of action: (1) That Iranian policy was fixed, clear and definite and would be followed. Soviet Union could, for its part, adopt whatever policy it desired, or (2) Iran Government could leave door half open—I interrupted him to ask “To permit the Russian foot to be interjected?” Prime Minister replied “No”. He said that what he meant by leaving door half open was merely to talk in order to stall for time. I told him that I would like to think it over.
My feeling is that I should tell Prime Minister that conversations just to gain time would not deceive Russians for a moment. They could produce misunderstanding, even confusion. This might facilitate Russian designs. Iranians should not pursue such a policy but ought to protest again against the notes which Soviet Union has addressed to Iran Government; utterly false Soviet charges should be withdrawn; incursions into Iran should be stopped at once, and “clandestine” radio activities likewise should be discontinued.
I would therefore, greatly appreciate Department’s guidance before Tuesday, when I shall have my next interview with Prime Minister, I shall also see Shah on Tuesday.
British Chargé called upon me last evening. Following my interview with Prime Minister, Creswell was received by Hajir for half hour’s talk. Prime Minister went over pretty much same ground with Creswell as he did with me. Creswell, I believe, is sending only a brief telegram to Foreign Office and regards Sadtchikov’s representations with serene composure.
Sent Department, repeated London 60. Department pass Moscow 38.