Editorial Note

On November 24, 1947, President Truman approved a paper stating that the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Middle East was “vital to the security of the United States” and that it should be the policy of the United States Government “to make evident in a firm but non-provocative manner the extent of the determination of the United States to assist in preserving in the interest of world peace the security of the area.” For the text of this paper, and for related information, see Foreign Relations, 1947, volume V, pages 575 and 623. The policy was subsequently included as paragraph 2 of document NSC 5/2, February 12, 1948, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Greece”, ibid., 1948, volume IV, page 47.

On August 2 Secretary of Defense Forrestal concurred in the following views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

For the purpose of this memorandum the “Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Area” is viewed as being two separate areas. The first, referred to as the “Eastern Mediterranean area”, includes the landed areas of Egypt, the Levant States and Turkey. The other, referred to as the “Middle East Area”, is comprised of the land areas of Iraq, Iran and Arabian peninsula.

Short-range emergency plans approved for planning purposes within the military establishment and other studies in process of development consider holding the Cairo-Suez-Khartoum area in the Eastern Mediterranean as a minimum. This area would be used initially as a base for air offensive action and, in later phases, as a base for further operations to regain Middle East oil resources. The possibilities of success in these operations cannot be accurately forecast at this time. In addition to retaining this minimum base area, such plans provide for retention of as much of the Middle East oil resources as allied capability will permit.

Other plans are under consideration which involve the employment of bases other than the Cairo-Suez area. Implementation of the latter plans would not permit augmenting forces already deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean area or the Middle East area at the outbreak of war sufficiently to assure retention of either after the initial stages. The forces deployed in these two areas would operate there as long as feasible in support of the over-all plan. These plans provide for the regaining of a portion of the Middle East oil resources prior to the [Page 3] end of the second year of war. The possibilities of success in these operations depend to some extent upon the development of the political situation in this area.

Realistic appraisal of the military capabilities of the USSR, the geographical locations of the Middle East oil resources with respect to the USSR, and consideration of the probable early objectives of Soviet military operations in the event of war in the near future lead to the conclusion that United States and Allied forces presently available probably could not retain the major portion of the oil-producing areas from the outset. However, Allied forces can deny the enemy use of oil-producing facilities in the area. (S/PNSC Files, Lot 61D167, File “Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East”)

In a memorandum of August 5, 1948, subsequently circulated as document NSC 19/3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff further appraised the position and security interest of the United States in the Mediterranean and Middle East area. For the text of NSC 19/3, see volume III, page 933, and for related expressions of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see post page 244, and volume IV, page 191.