868.00/7–1448: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Greece
1124. We are attempting to anticipate position USSR vis-à-vis Grk case in GA. If Soviet strategy elects to intensify “peace offensive” we feel component this strategy may be renewed effort to effect political solution in Greece or at least to discourage GA action by pointing to recent Markos compromise offers and also alleged willingness Albania and Bulgaria to resume diplomatic relations with Greece. If Markos military position continues to deteriorate it seems almost inevitable International Communism will intensify drive for political solution, thereby preserving elements Markos’ organization as potential for future Communist activity in Greece and avoiding loss Communist prestige which would follow annihilation or rout of Markos’ forces.
We agree with Athens (Athens 1400 July 231) successful Grammos operation would probably result in appearance Zachariades as paramount figure. However, it would seem strongest attempt at political solution would be made before Markos is eliminated as force in being. Such effort may well coincide with GA meeting. In view Markos’ demonstrated ability to reinforce his position in Grammos and fact that developments in economic and security situation have failed to decrease number of refugees, it would seem unwise to assume cleverly directed campaign for political solution would not have appeal to significant number of people within Greece as well as in other countries.
Although difficult to estimate we feel Communist propaganda, uninformed reporting and certain Grk policies (particularly regarding [Page 119] executions and strikes) have succeded in stigmatizing Grk Govt in some sectors of world opinion as being in only slightly better moral position than Communist aggressors. Consequently, it is possible that some UN member-nations might find compromise political solution attractive even at this late date. In US growing and not insignificant proportion of opinion sincerely questions whether US can continue support Grk Govt without compromise American ideals.
In order defeat possible Soviet efforts to deflect GA consideration from essential factors in Grk case, Grk Govt, as well as ourselves, must be prepared to answer attacks against internal policies Grk Govt. Though examination into internal policies ostensibly outside terms UN” Charter, successful attempt by Soviet bloc to portray Grk Govt in unpalatable light would materially diminish enthusiasm for strong GA policy designed to support Govt against current aggression.
We approve unconditional surrender policy announced by Sophoulis and Tsaldaris in reply to Markos overtures, but we are concerned to know what policies are currently being applied to surrendered and captured guerrillas. We believe moderate and well-publicized “de-Markosization” and rehabilitation policy might increase guerrilla surrenders and mitigate bitterness on part friends and relatives of guerrillas which will otherwise provide reservoir of resentment against Grk Govt to be tapped at convenience of Communist and other subversive forces.
We suggest Grk policy regarding court-martial sentences be reexamined with view to reducing executions to minimum and as first step toward eventual halt in cycle of killing in Greece. Although executions for 1945 offenses have apparently been greatly curtailed we doubt public has ever distinguished between those offenses and executions for treason still currently being reported in press. We recognize Grk Govt may feel any formal, announced change in policy might be misconstrued as weakness, but we believe Govt should earnestly consider at least informal changes in policy which would tend to reduce capital punishments except in cases of principal guerrilla leaders and most heinous crimes. Even though Grk Govt is unable develop fundamental changes in current policies concerning executions (which we consider essential component any plan eventually to restore tranquility within Greece), simple political expediency requires all executions be held to absolute minimum pending termination GA meeting.
We appreciate delicate problem, ably analyzed Emb despatch 741,2 involved in disposing persons sentenced for crimes committed during and after December revolution 1944. With regard to these crimes we would recommend only most heinous be punished by execution, that [Page 120] any executions be postponed for several months, that more lenient policy be adopted by clemency boards with view to commuting vast proportion of sentences and that no publicity be given to policy changes. Our views apparently conform closely to those of British Foreign Office listed as alternative number 3 in ref despatch.
Despite legal correctness Ladas’ policy, it is important to remember that it was this policy which provoked storm of protest and was so successfully exploited by Communist propaganda agencies. We feel strongly new wave of unfavorable publicity could produce serious damage to reputation Grk Govt at this time.
We would appreciate summary latest execution figures for all types offenses, statement current Grk policies concerning court martial executions and treatment captured guerrillas, and Embassy’s views regarding advisability approach to Grk Govt along foregoing lines.