711.68/1–948
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. David LeBreton, Jr., of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs
| Participants: | His Excellency Huseyin Ragip Baydur, Ambassador of Turkey |
| A–A—Mr. Armour1 | |
| GTI—Mr. LeBreton |
The Turkish Ambassador spent more than three quarters of an hour with Mr. Armour this afternoon, during which he took up various aspects of United States policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, with special reference to Greece and Turkey.
The Ambassador opened the conversation with the remark that he had received a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Ankara instructing him to ascertain the State Department’s current views toward the Greek situation since the establishment of the so-called “Government” of General Markos Vafiadis.
Mr. Armour replied that the Government of the United States was greatly concerned about this situation and realized that if the Markos junta were recognized by any of several foreign powers the consequences would be serious in the extreme. He pointed out that our policy had been clearly stated in Mr. Lovett’s memorandum of December 30, which was released to the press and transmitted to our missions abroad for the guidance of American diplomatic representatives in replying to similar inquiries.2 (This memorandum stated that “the establishment of a ‘Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece’ was a transparent device, the true purpose of which was clear to everyone and which was only a phase of the familiar effort of certain elements to overthrow the legitimate recognized Greek Government and to threaten the territorial integrity and political independence of Greece.” The Statement went on to say that if other countries recognized [Page 19] the group there would be serious implications and such a move would be clearly contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter.)
Mr. Armour then referred to General Livesay’s3 announcement from Athens which was reported in the morning press, to the effect that 21 American Army officers would arrive shortly in Greece to advise the Greek Army in its operations against the guerrillas, and that a partial reorganization of the Greek Army would shortly be undertaken to provide for an infantry replacement pool, more machine guns and mounted artillery for increased fire power, and national Defense Corps units to free the regular garrisons now guarding towns for combat duty.
These two developments, continued Mr. Armour, taken in conjunction with the improved military situation around Konitza which had, temporarily at least, deprived the Markos junta of a fixed headquarters, justified at this point a certain degree of optimism.
The Turkish Ambassador next alluded in a very general way to the fundamental policy of the United States in dealing with the menace of Soviet aggression. In rather discursive preliminary remarks, he drew a parallel between the presently existing situation of the U.S. vis-à-vis the USSR and Great Britain’s policy toward Nazi Germany just prior to the war. The danger, he said, is that the USSR may misjudge America’s intentions, just as Hitler misjudged Britain’s determination to go to war over Poland. If the United States were to make known in unequivocal terms its position in the Greek-Turkish matter, this would have a most heartening effect on the dissident anti-communist elements (which the Ambassador estimated to be in the vast majority) in the satellite countries of the Balkans. The burden of the Ambassador’s rather rambling and digressive remarks was a plea that the United States demonstrate conclusively to the Soviets that we mean business.
Mr. Armour replied that this whole question was at present under very close study in this Department, in the Department of Defense, and other competent agencies of the Government. He expected that a clear-cut decision would be reached in the near future, at which time he promised to communicate with the Ambassador.
The Ambassador wondered if the recent announcement in the press that a thousand Marines were being sent to reinforce American naval units in the Mediterranean could be interpreted as meaning that we had decided to make a show of force in that area. Mr. Armour and Mr. LeBreton explained that so far as they knew, such a move was [Page 20] merely designed to bring up to normal strength the standard Marine complements of the naval vessels in these waters. “If, however, this step is interpreted in certain quarters as a show of force, so much the better,” added Mr. Armour.
The Ambassador next launched into a general review of the program of United States assistance to Turkey. While he appreciated the fact that Public Law 75 was a tangible expression of America’s common interests with Turkey, he could not forebear to express concern over the successive delays in implementing the program. The Turkish Government, he said, was doing everything possible to cooperate in the handling of the aid shipments. The General Staff had some time ago dispatched Army personnel to clear certain sections of the port of Istanbul, but to date not a single shipment had arrived. The Ambassador said that while the Turkish people have full confidence in the support of the United States, such delays were disappointing and naturally had an adverse effect on the morale of the Turkish government and people, who were constantly subjected to pressure of various sorts from the USSR. Mr. Armour and Mr. LeBreton endeavored to explain the causes of the delay and expressed the hope that before very long the aid cargoes would begin to arrive in quantity.4
The Ambassador wondered whether the decision to use Turkish ships so far as possible to transport these cargoes was related in any way to the delay. He said that he, personally, had opposed this idea on the ground that he felt Turkish crews were not sufficiently experienced in handling the type of equipment to be furnished under the program. He had been overruled, however, and the ships had been made ready and were awaiting word to proceed with the transfer. Mr. Armour surmised that this decision was probably based to a certain extent on considerations of American public opinion. Just as in the case of the European Recovery Program, it is important to the American public to know that the recipients of aid from this country are doing their utmost to help themselves. Mr. LeBreton added that another consideration was the savings that could be effected by the elimination of [Page 21] high shipping charges on American carriers, savings which could be applied to increasing the actual amount of equipment furnished under the program.
In preparing to leave, the Ambassador again remarked that America’s interests and Turkey’s interests are one. His Government wishes to cooperate with us in every way, but in so doing will expect to be treated as an equal and taken into full confidence regarding our plans and policies. He digressed briefly to mention the situation in early 1943 when, at the Adana Conference,5 the British brought pressure to bear on Turkey to come into the war. The Turkish Government agreed to do so provided it received sufficient military equipment to wage war against Germany, and provided further that the Turkish General Staff were kept progressively and fully informed of Allied operational plans. As finally drawn up, the list of equipment to be furnished Turkey was handed to the General Staff by Mr. Churchill without prior Anglo-Turkish consultation. The Staff found it acceptable, but there were no further conversations or discussions in the matter. The Ambassador said that in consideration of our mutual interests, such a situation should not be permitted to arise today. His Government would expect to be kept fully informed of United States policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Mr. Armour said that as soon as a decision was reached in the matter now under study, he would be pleased to inform the Ambassador fully and promptly.
- Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs.↩
- See telegram 2076, December 30, 1947, to Athens, Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. v, p. 477.↩
- Maj. Gen. William G. Livesay, Commanding General of the United States Army Group in Greece, which was part of the American Mission for Aid to Greece.↩
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In a letter of February 12, Secretary Marshall informed Secretary of Defense Forrestal that “The delay in the shipments of aid cargoes to Turkey is a source of great concern to the Department of State.… I am cognizant of the considerations which protracted the period of planning Turkish aid requirements.… Nevertheless, in view of the importance of the Turkish Aid Program to the effectiveness of our national policy, it is requested that the National Military Establishment take the most urgent action to bring the rate of shipments up to the maximum capacity of the Turkish ports and depots to receive them.” (867.00/2–948)
Secretary Forrestal, in reply on March 24, stated that he concurred “entirely in your estimate of the importance of this problem and there is now every indication that the causes of delay have been overcome.… Actual shipments as compared with previous estimates have been retarded approximately 60 days. Substantial shipments to Turkey began in February; however, maximum capacities of the Turkish ports will not be reached until early May.” (867.00/3–2448)
↩ - For documentation on the conference between British Prime Minister Churchill and Turkish President Inonu at Adana on January 30 and 31, 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 1058 ff.↩